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1Abstract
This study examines the impact of governing parties in changing patterns of income 
inequality in three liberal democracies with 'Westminster' systems - Australia (1981-1990), 
the United Kingdom (1979-1986) and Canada (1971-1981). Extensive analysis of the 
Luxembourg Income Study datasets for these countries and periods suggests that structural 
factors, such as changes in the market sphere or alterations in the demographic profiles, can 
account for only a part o f the overall inequality trends in these periods. By using income 
decomposition analyses, this study indicates that government redistributive policies played 
an important role in changing inequality trends.
Governments in all three countries are single-party operations, and policy responds 
strongly to partisan processes and considerations. The main question involved in assessing 
policy changes is therefore why party actors may be willing to increase or decrease income 
inequality. Applying conventional 'unitary' models o f party behaviour (such as the median 
voter convergence hypothesis) to try and explain decision-making on income inequality also 
cannot explain these examples. It seems that redistributive policies can only be understood 
by taking account of the bargaining processes which take place within the organization of the 
party in power. Explanations of how parties intervene on income inequality should explicitly 
incorporate the organizational dimension as a key to their behaviour.
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CH APTER ONE-INTRODUCTION
It is remarkable that income inequality in Western democracies has been so little discussed 
(Atkinson, 1994; Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993: 1). Perhaps the marginality of distributive 
concerns in scholarly work, at least until recently, rested on the relative stability of the size 
distribution o f income in the postwar period. In addition, over the 1950s and 1960s the lower 
tail o f the income distribution decreased slightly, suggesting a slow but steady diffusion o f 
economic well-being. Some scholars regarded the perceived trend towards less income 
inequality as the by - product of economic liberalism and liberal democracy (Kuznets, 1955; 
Downs, 1957: 198). It was assumed that spillover effects from economic development and 
universal suffrage ensured the oblivion of poverty.
From the mid-1970s, however, it was evident that the assumption of growing equality 
was largely misguided. Research findings showed that the shape o f the income distribution 
exhibited greater dispersion, reflecting a wider gap between rich and poor (Gardiner, 1993; 
Goodman and Webb, 1994; OECD Employment Outlook, 1993). This reversal o f inequality 
trends raised few doubts initially about the fundamental premises. A common first response 
rested on the anticyclical nature of income inequality, whereby economic downturns 
inevitably implied wider income differentials (Blank, 1989). The expectation was that as the 
economy recovered the 'rising tide would lift all boats'.
Yet in the early 1980s despite economic prosperity income inequality in some 
countries continued to accelerate, casting serious doubts on conventional wisdom. By the 
late 1980s there was widespread agreement about the distributional changes that had taken 
place, but the causes of those changes were much less well understood (Atkinson, 1994; 
Rowntree Foundation, 1995). A vast array o f factors could lie behind the changing shape of
the income distribution, including variations in demographic composition, family structure, 
factor rewards, macroeconomic performance and tax and transfer policies.
The absence o f a general model of income inequality explains why research in this 
area has tended to be exploratory and descriptive (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993: 9). This 
tendency is encouraged by progress in sampling techniques and data collection, which 
pushes researchers to concentrate more on establishing the 'facts' than on exploring the 
sources o f the income distribution (Saunders, 1993a: 353). Sometimes scholars have focused 
on a smaller number of hypotheses to see whether potential explanations were consistent with 
the facts.
The study follows this tradition by examining specific changes in labour markets, 
demographic variables and transfer polices that could have affected inequality trends in 
Australia (1981-1991), the United Kingdom (1979-1987) and Canada (1971-1981), giving 
particular attention to the role played by governing parties. One reason for the periodization 
is the persistence o f the same governing party for a relatively long period, which presumably 
endowed party leaders with sufficient time to formulate and implement transfer programmes. 
The examination o f transfer policies over a period o f eight-ten years also allows for some 
leeway in the time-lags between various policy stages.
This work bridges the political science literature on the redistributive impact of 
parties and the economic literature on income distribution. It thus follows the view that 
political analyses are inherently multitheoretical endeavours (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 
336). More specifically, analytical techniques and methods necessary for coping with the 
analysis o f income inequality in a systematic way, are incorporated into the theoretical 
concerns o f political science. The study is therefore intended as a contribution to the 
emerging literature on the 'new political economy' (Gamble, 1995).
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1.1 The redistributive impact of governing parties
The central concern of this study is the relationship between governing parties and income 
redistribution by means of cash benefits. Explanations of the redistributive impact o f parties 
have rested upon partisan theory or vote-maximizing assumptions. Some of the core 
propositions o f these two schools o f thought are radically antithetic, portraying a 
schizophrenic image of party behaviour. On the one hand, the ideology o f the party in power 
is the best predictor for the allocation of redistributive costs and benefits. On the other hand, 
electoral imperatives dictate variations in transfer policies which in turn affect socially 
undifferentiated voters.
Despite their differences, these views share fundamental assumptions, including a 
conception o f political parties as ’unitary1 actors and the idea o f preference-homogeneity 
among party leaders. In both approaches, moreover, the redistributive impact o f parties is 
demand-driven, implying a passive response of elected representatives to the wishes of their 
constituencies. Most scholars also believe that redistributive policies aim at improving the 
relative position o f one social class, itself regarded as internally fairly homogeneous. 
Accordingly, the population is subdivided into distinct classes, defined as lower, middle and 
upper income groups.
Advances in the theory of political parties, however, suggest that so simple a model 
may be unsuited to analysing the redistributive impact of parties in a significantly fragmented 
and heterogeneous society. Traditional theories based either on the ideology of the 
incumbent, or on vote-maximizing behaviour, cannot in themselves encompass the 
complexity o f the link between governing parties and the distribution o f  costs and benefits. 
This complexity can only be fully understood in relation to those processes through which 
party policies em erge.
Theoretical work on political parties has long argued that parties are not monolithic
entities and are instead more fruitfully conceived of as organizations or arenas in which 
coalitions o f party elites form and dissolve. Actors striving for relative dominance interact 
with each other in the struggle for power within the party organization (Laver and Schofield, 
1990; Luebbert, 1986; Panebianco, 1988). The making and breaking o f internal coalitions, 
each with its own agenda, are considered the driving force of party life. Special forms of 
bargaining and negotiations continuously evolve during the formulation o f redistributive 
policies. Hence in devising redistributive programmes party leaders may be primarily 
concerned with gaining and retaining power in their own party, rather than in maximising 
votes or in pursuing ambiguous and vague ideologies.
These considerations provide excellent reasons to alter the traditional manner in 
which we have studied the phenomenon o f the redistributive impact o f governing parties. It 
seems reasonable to assume that shifting patterns of internal coalitions may generate a 
dynamic process whereby new dominant factions attempt to translate the gains at the party 
level also into redistributive gains for their actual or potential supporters. The main question 
involved in assessing policy changes is therefore how internal conflict and cooperation affect 
the redistributive process. To answer this question it is necessary to relax some basic 
assumptions endorsed by conventional views, especially the 'unitary actor' and preference- 
homogeneity.
An important element uncovered by focusing on the organizational life of political 
parties is that party factions may be connected to disjointed groups, rather than to social 
classes regarded as units. In their struggle for relative dominance within the party, elites may 
strengthen their internal position by tightening or changing their links with specific sub­
groups o f the population. This view addresses often neglected questions regarding the role 
of party politics in the formation and protection o f social identities. It defines transfer policies 
as the outcome o f distinct factional configurations within the governing party. It points out
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that shifting boundaries between intraparty coalitions may affect the formation of privileged 
and less privileged state-dependent groups.
The argument developed throughout this study places limitations upon the role of 
electoral and partisan politics in the making of redistributive policies, by stressing that party 
leaders are first and foremost leaders o f large organizations where strategies o f conflict 
management are ubiquitous. Because the interplay between intraparty bargaining dynamics 
and transfer policies is a largely under-researched area, my purpose is to provide a step 
forward towards filling a gap in the literature. The main contribution o f this study lies in 
incorporating into the analysis of transfer policies advances in the theory of political parties, 
especially developments in the theory o f party goals, party competition and party 
organization. Through three case studies, the study highlights the links between bargaining 
games in the intraparty arena, transfer policies and social security recipients.
1.2 The comparative method
The comparative approach is meant to show that the redistributive impact of strategic games 
within governing parties is not accidental. The empirical chapters examine inequality trends 
under three governing parties of different ideological persuasion, the Australian Labour Party 
(ALP), the British Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party o f Canada. As noted earlier, 
some scholars contend that the position o f the incumbent on the ideological space is a good 
indicator o f the government's redistributive choices. Hence exploring the strategies adopted 
by parties traditionally located on the left, the right or the centre o f the ideological continuum 
may shed light on the role played by ideology in the allocation o f burdens and benefits.
Focusing on the political systems o f Australia, Britain and Canada facilitates the 
process o f comparison because these countries share institutional, religious and some cultural 
and historical traditions. These similarities should minimize the risk o f miscomparing
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because they avoid the problem o f ’conceptual travelling', that is, the application of concepts 
to new cases (Sartori, 1984). For instance, concepts suitable for analysing multiparty systems 
may not be adequate for understanding the politics of two-party systems, and vice-versa. For 
this reason some authors contend that countries with common traits might be grouped in 
'families o f nations' (Castles, 1993: 3-32; Collier and Mahon, 1993).
The key institutional features of Australia, Britain and Canada are subsumed in the 
Westminster model o f democracy. In Lijphart's typology o f democracies, the essence of this 
model is the concentration o f executive power in the hands of the incumbent which 'wields 
vast amounts o f power to rule' (Lijphart, 1984: 6). In addition, although Westminster 
democracies are parliamentary systems of government in which the cabinet is dependent on 
the confidence of the parliament, in reality there is fusion o f power in the cabinet The cabinet 
dominates parliament because it is composed o f the leading members o f the majority party 
in the House o f Commons. Unconstrained by the need to stipulate alliances and to cooperate 
with coalition partners, governing parties can deploy state power for partisan advantage. 
They are also expected to be the most accountable (Klingemann et al, 1994: 256). 
Westminster systems thus offer the best institutional environment for exploring the impact 
o f governing parties on transfer policies.
In Westminster democracies the dynamics of electoral competition rests on the 
principle of'first past the post'. Single plurality systems erect powerful barriers to entry for 
new parties and usually trigger bi-polar competition, marked by either two alternating large 
parties or two alternating blocs. Plurality elections may also yield landslides or large defeats 
for an incumbent running relatively close to the opposition party.
The third reason for comparing Australia, Britain and Canada is that their welfare 
states are somewhat similar. Following Esping-Andersen’s typology o f welfare regimes, we 
can describe Australia and Canada as archetypical examples o f ’liberal’ welfare-regimes, in
which means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans 
predominate (1990: 26). The evolution of the British welfare state is perhaps best depicted 
by the 'social-democratic' model o f welfare-regimes, where universalism rather than 
selectivity is the dominant principle. Yet in the past twenty years the strong emphasis on the 
means-testing of target groups and attacks on the 'culture of dependency' have probably 
transformed the British welfare state along the lines of the 'liberal' regimes o f Canada and 
Australia. Liberal regimes are centrally concerned with disincentives effects and tend to 
encourage private insurance.
All the above considerations mean that the choice o f the three case-studies is based 
on the 'most similar system design'. The advantage of this strategy is that it allows a large 
number o f systemic variables to be ignored, under the assumption that they are equal 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Dogan and Pelassy, 1990: 133-134). It also offers a solution 
to what Lijphart felicitously defined as the 'many variables small N1 dilemma (1971: 368). 
This problem obtains because comparisons of a limited number of cases prevent 
mathematical applications of probability theory, thus affecting the plausibility of 
generalizations. Scholars engaged in regional or in area studies opt for the 'most similar 
systems design' in order to neutralize a large number o f variables.
The dilemma raised by 'many variables small N' may be less problematic if we reduce 
the number o f variables by operating with a parsimonious theory/model (see Collier, 1991). 
Rational choice theory and game-theoretic models may offer sharp analytical tools in a field 
where much work is burdened by 'too many variables, too few countries' (Mackie and Marsh, 
1995: 180-181). Valuable insights have been offered by comparative research seeking to 
integrate the complexity o f different historical and institutional cases with game-theoretic 
accounts o f strategic behaviour (Schaipf, 1991:13-15). Arguably, by using rational choice 
in comparative politics we may avoid one o f the major 'methodological defects o f rational
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choice theorizing that..generate and reinforce a debilitating syndrome in which theories are 
elaborated and modified in order to save their universalistic claim' (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 
6). This study seeks to elude universalistic claims by adopting the 'most similar system 
design' and by combining the institutional analysis of political parties with rational choice 
explanations o f factional interactions.
13 The data
Until recently comparisons of income distributions within countries and between countries 
have been hampered by the lack of comparable income data (Smeeding et al, 1989). As 
Heidenheimer et al (1990:10) have noted:
Elementary though it seems one key problem in comparative policy studies is the 
difficulty of finding truly comparable measurements of the same things in different 
countries. For example, every major nation produces statistics on the distribution of 
income. However, income is measured differently in different countries; definitions 
of household versus individual income are often not the same; methods for estimating 
the underreporting of income in government statistical surveys vary greatly, and so 
on.
This drawback in comparative distributional analyses has been partially offset by the release 
o f the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) microdata sets. The salient feature o f the LIS data 
is that a large number of income and demographic variables have been drawn from national, 
usually government sponsored, surveys and have been made comparable across the datasets.1 
More confidence can be attributed to the fact that distributional outcomes are not merely the 
result o f changing concepts and definitions imposed on the data.
Advances in data quality coupled with progress in analytical techniques have made
:It should be stressed that complete consistency cannot be assured because in each case the figures 
were drawn from national studies of income inequality which were not designed for the purpose 
of international comparison (Saunders, 1994: 202). Comparability in the LIS datasets is achieved 
ex-post.
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it easier to identify and monitor trends in inequality. They have contributed to the 
development of more accurate accounts of how the structure of inequality has been changing 
and the role o f different factors in the process of change. Although there are still formidable 
difficulties in assessing the overall effect of redistributive policies, the LIS datasets allow 
comparisons of the take-home pay of population sub-groups, including the aged, low income 
families, single-parents and the unemployed. In this way we might achieve what Rose 
describes as an 'underair view, which aims at throwing some light on the standards o f living 
of'ordinary people' (1989: 1).
The income information in the surveys is, of course, subject to the problems of non­
response and under-reporting, and the reader is cautioned to bear this in mind when 
interpreting the results (see appendix B). The data are subject to a range o f conceptual 
limitations. No information is available on net imputed rent, or capital gains, even though 
these are clearly important sources o f income. Finally, life-time income might have been a 
more appropriate indicator of economic well-being than annual income, but such an indicator 
is beyond the available data and the scope o f this work. Because the LIS datasets only 
provided information on given points in time, a more complete picture required assembling 
data from official publications, including the governments' expenditure plans, reports of the 
Department o f Social Security, Labour Statistics, OECD historical statistics and other OECD 
publications on employment and inequality.
The evidence presented in this work cannot prove that party policies affect poverty 
and inequality. Innumerable intervening variables may alter the direction o f redistributive 
policies during the stage of policy implementation, distorting the intentions o f policy makers. 
In addition, at the current stage o f our knowledge policy evaluation in the field o f income 
inequality is highly controversial. However, the statistics on poverty and inequality presented 
throughout this study indicate that while common forces may be at work in shaping the
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distribution of income, there are distinct national experiences. It is this variety in inequality 
trends which requires a detailed investigation of the driving forces behind national policies 
(Atkinson, 1994).
1.4 The structure of the study
The contention that the shape o f the distribution o f income is changing in some Western 
democracies needs to be empirically supported. In Chapter Two I analyse inequality trends 
in ten OECD countries drawing upon twenty-seven LIS datasets spanning a period of twenty 
years. The chapter provides the international background for a better understanding of the 
three case studies. Having established that there are distinct national experiences, the chapter 
points to the role o f transfer policies as a key stage in the process o f income redistribution. 
Its main aim, however, is to address some methodological difficulties facing the student of 
income inequality and to highlight the problems they present for interpreting the evidence.
Chapter Three critically evaluates different theoretical perspectives on the 
redistributive impact of governing parties. After assessing strengths and limits of established 
approaches, it suggests that inconsistent evidence supporting those views calls for a 
theoretical reappraisal of the party-policy link. The chapter argues that advances in the theory 
of political parties may provide important insights into the analysis of redistributive policies. 
It focuses on the theory of party goals, which indicates that parties pursue a plurality of aims, 
rather than just one aim; it draws on mobilization theory, which stresses the role o f party 
leaders in forging electoral coalitions; and most importantly, it centres on the theory 
regarding party organizations, especially its emphasis on strategic games in the internal arena 
as a crucial dimension for understanding party policies. The chapter concludes that these 
advances might be fruitfully employed to unravel some puzzles in the redistributive choices 
of governing parties.
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The chapters on Australia, Britain and Canada are divided into three parts. Each of 
these chapters begins with a section setting out the socio-political and historical background 
for an informed examination o f the income inequality trend. It then undertakes a detailed 
analysis of the inequality trend by first presenting results for five inequality indices. It then 
deepens the understanding of the structure of inequality by exploring demographic and 
market effects using sophisticated decomposition techniques. The total population is divided 
into six age-groups and their relative weights and mean incomes are compared and analyzed. 
The distributional effects of within and between-group inequality are carefully assessed in 
order to expose the 'optical illusions' discussed in Chapter Two.
Because variations in the size o f particular age-groups may have significant 
implications for aggregate inequality data, I undertake a simulation exercise and consider 
how measured inequality would have fared if no changes had occurred in the population 
shares. By using decomposition techniques, we can ask what would have happened to 
inequality in, say, 1990 if the age structure remained as it was in 1975? Hence we take as 
given the age (head o f household) in 1975 and impose these figures on the income data for 
1990. This simulation suggested that variations in the size of age-groups, especially the 
growing number o f elderly, a factor which some authors find significant,2 had neglible 
distributional effects.
Decomposition techniques are also employed to analyse the influence of changes in 
family size and composition. I subdivide the population into six household types: one adult, 
two adults, three adults, one adult with children, two adults with children and three adults 
with children. I then disentangle the impact of different concentrations of household types 
on overall inequality. The expectation is that smaller household sizes should increase
2For a comprehensive review of the literature focusing on the relationship between income 
inequality and demographic structure see Pestieau (1989).
inequality because they prevent income pooling. The results reflected something different.
The final step in the examination of the structure of income inequality is to assess the 
role of market income (i.e. original, pre-transfer income). I subdivide the working population 
into four income classes, one low income category, a very broad middle category, an upper- 
middle and a very high income category. This categorization is to provide cut-off values of 
unequal size, so that alterations in the share o f market income at the top and at the bottom o f 
the distribution can be more easily detected. Having assessed the role played by market 
income on the inequality trend, I then evaluate the separate effects o f market and transfer 
income on aggregate inequality, thus paving the way for an examination of the driving forces 
behind changes in transfer policies.
The second part of the chapters dedicated to the case studies explores the 
plausibility o f some conventional views on the redistributive impact o f parties. It describes 
the pattern o f change in macroeconomic variables and transfer policies, and then argues that 
manipulations o f entitlement and eligibility rules are not merely responses to economic 
cycles. Rather, governing parties actively engage in modifications o f those rules. Vote- 
maximizing explanations are then examined, most notably the median voter hypothesis and 
the political business cycle. Detailed descriptions of population decile shares of disposable 
income appear inconsistent with the median voter hypothesis. Similarly, the timing of 
expansionary and contractionary transfer policies is only partially congruent with the political 
business cycle. Above all, this section brings to the fore the theoretical lacuna on the party- 
poiicy link by highlighting the limits o f conventional, demand-driven interpretations.
The third part of each chapter examines transfer policies as the outcome o f strategic 
interaction within the party organization. Following Dowding's suggestion, I analyze power 
relations between party actors by adopting a two-stage strategy (1991: 53-54). First, I trace 
the development o f the choice situation: How did factions find themselves in this situation?
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Were there modifications in the incentive structure that could have affected the bargaining 
position of party factions? The second stage focuses on bargaining processes between faction 
leaders over the content of transfer policies.
More specifically, the first stage assesses whether key changes have occurred. These 
include changes in the selection procedures for party delegates and party leaders and 
variations in the distribution of decision-making authority between party factions. Hence 
focusing on the historical development of the choice situation is a preliminary step for 
understanding the strategic environment and the availability o f resources. The second stage 
highlights a distinct scenario in each case. It pinpoints the impact o f specific strategic 
interactions on transfer policies.
Chapter Four, the Australian case, advances a game-theoretic argument explaining 
how factional manoeuvring within the Australian Labor Party mitigated the anti-progressive 
stance o f the dominant faction. The pivotal position of the Centre-Left meant it could alter 
the outcome desired by the dominant Right-wing faction. A bargaining model throws light 
on the strategic interactions that obtain between the Centre-Left and the Right. This analysis 
suggested that the redistributive output was also a rational decision. The chapter also 
develops a compelling game-theoretic model to account for the unions' acquiescence in the 
ALP's retrenchment of redistributive policies. The key element seemed to be the asymmetry 
in bargaining power between the unions and the ALP. Taking all o f the above factors into 
account, the interplay within the party organization presents an interesting phenomenon: 
although the party was dominated by a Right-wing faction, its policies reflected a less radical 
attitude. Evidence suggests that while inequality grew under Labor, the internal struggle for 
power limited the potential increase in income inequality.
In Chapter Five the internal dynamics o f the British Conservative Party is viewed in 
terms of what Schelling defines 'implicit1 and 'explicit' games. (1980: 21). The chapter then
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focuses on the redistributive impact of sequential elections, introduced by modifications of 
the leadership selection and reselection rules. It argues that during the first Thatcher term the 
potential threat to the leader altered the direction of transfer policies advocated by the 'dries'. 
This threat perception in the context of a dynamic process o f bargaining accounted for the 
concessions o f the 'dries' both in public expenditure growth and in the level and scope of 
unemployment benefits. The result was a curious asymmetry in the allocation of 
redistributive costs and benefits which penalized the unemployed and privileged the elderly. 
Yet the onslaught against 'the culture o f dependency1 launched during the second Thatcher 
term appeared as both cause and consequence of the institutional weakness o f the 'wets'. 
Their eventual demise from the centre of the political scene was accelerated by some 
organizational features of the Conservative party, especially the traditional cohesion and unity 
o f the parliamentary party.
Chapter Six focuses on transfer policies in Canada under Trudeau between 1971 and 
1981. This chapter is particularly innovative for the attention it places on Opposition effects 
on intra-party bargaining, and consequently on transfer policies. The results differ from the 
case studies of Australia and Britain in that the role of electoral competition is much stronger. 
The distinctiveness o f the Canadian experience lies in the fact that both the expansion and 
the contraction of social security benefits are viewed as the outcome o f intra- and inter-party 
competition. Under the Liberal minority government of 1972-1974 expansionary programmes 
are interpreted as a dominant strategy in inter-party competition. Vote mobilization accounts 
for electoral effects on income redistribution. Internal conflicts surfaced in the late 1970s 
when the u-tum from generous to stiffer cash benefits seemingly aimed at pre-empting the 
leadership threat.
Chapter Seven reviews the material presented in an explicitly comparative 
perspective. It argues that demographic and market effects on income inequality can account
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for only a part of the overall inequality trend in the three countries. By manipulating 
eligibility and entitlement rules governing parties played an important role in changing 
inequality. Differences in the policy actions and reactions of governing parties suggested that 
a plurality o f incentives for income redistribution were at work.
Reasons behind the distribution of cash transfers encompassed both electoral and 
factional politics. Their respective importance was the product o f three key factors: the 
formation o f specific linkages between party factions and social clienteles, the margin of 
manoeuvre that the distribution o f power in the party organization conferred to the leaders, 
internal repercussions of Opposition effects. Hence viewing governing parties as political 
systems in miniature opened new avenues to analysing the political constellations that 
sustained and shaped the distribution o f cash benefits in the three countries.
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CHAPTER TWO -DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND 
METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
Empirical facts are treacherous objects. The subject of income 
distribution is littered with 'facts' that have ceased to hold or which 
proved on closer examination to be mere statistical artifacts rather 
than genuine economic regularities (A.B. Atkinson, 1995: 1).
Many o f the arguments advanced in the analysis of income distribution in Australia, the 
United Kingdom and Canada depend upon evidence drawn from the Luxembourg Income 
Study datasets. It seems therefore important to address some o f the methodological 
difficulties involved in those studies and to highlight the problems they present for 
interpreting the evidence. This chapter provides an overview o f postwar trends in the size 
distribution o f income in Western democracies, placing the three countries in an international 
context.
Drawing on the first and second 'wave* of LIS datasets, section one shows that the 
pattern o f inequality trends is not universal but comprises a variety o f experiences. The 
second section argues that the impact of redistributive policies is better understood if social 
classes and risk categories are conceived as disjointed groups. The third section reviews the 
empirical evidence on the effects of the tax-transfer system and stresses the progressive role 
of transfer benefits. The fourth section is concerned with the empirical analysis of poverty, 
the thorny question of the measurement o f income inequality and the ineluctability of value 
judgements.
2.1 POSTWAR TRENDS IN THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a widespread feeling that industrialized countries
were converging towards greater income equality. It was believed that reductions in income
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differences would eventually spillover either from economic and technological development 
or from universal suffrage. Kuznets's (1955) inverted U-relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth suggested that equality dropped in the early stages of 
economic growth but grew in more advanced economies as per capita income increased 
(Lydall, 1979: 205-226).
Faith in the equalizing impact o f economic development implied that no social and 
political forces could hamper the movement towards greater equality. This belief was 
sustained during the 1960s when industrialized countries apparently reached the second part 
o f K uznets's inverted U, and enjoyed high levels of economic well-being. Against this 
background Obler claimed that the distribution o f income presented 'the shape o f a diamond 
with only a small minority o f the population mired in poverty and the great majority of the 
population living on relatively comfortable incomes' (1979: 535). For some political 
scientists, income groups improved their economic position by availing themselves of the 
opportunities offered by electoral politics. Downs affirmed that universal suffrage narrowed 
the gap between rich and poor, because 'the equality o f franchise in a democratic society 
creates a tendency for government action to equalize incomes by redistributing them from a 
few wealthy persons to many less wealthy ones' (1957: 198). Longitudinal studies suggested 
that social security benefits enhanced political consensus (Flora and Alber, 1981: 58; 
Wilensky, 1975: 50-68). Democracy, it was argued, promoted redistribution by improving 
the opportunities for less privileged groups to have their interests represented. As Przeworski 
and Sprague wrote, this view rested on the naive persuasion that '[bjarricades were no longer 
needed when workers could cast ballots: votes were "paper stones"' (1986:1). Consequently, 
the phenomenon o f income polarization was perceived as 'an anti-historical trend in 
industrial-capitalist systems, b u t .. almost inevitable in every dictatorial regime1 (Zamagni,
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1981:43).'
If the contention that universal suffrage paved the way for liberation from poverty is 
correct, we should expect declining inequality trends in western democracies. Table 2.1 
provider a picture of inequality trends for those LIS countries which have information 
stretching back to the mid-1970s. The evidence offers broad support to the convergence
Table 2.1 Trends in income inequality in 5 OECD countries. Gini coefficients for post/tax- 
post/transfer adjusted income. *
Country mid-1970s late 1970s/ 
early 1980s
% change 
mid-1970s/ 
early 1980s
United States 34.6 33.0 -4.8
Canada 32.4 31.1 -4.2
United Kingdom 31.9 27.6 -15.5
West Germany 23.9 23.0 -3.9
Sweden 23.2 19.9 -16.5
Source: computed by the author from LIS datasets for the United States, 1974,1979; Canada 1975,1981; United 
Kingdom, 1974; 1979; West Germany 1973, 1978; Sweden 1975; 1981.
♦Income is adjusted with the OECD equivalence scale (see section 2.4). Countries are ordered according to the 
value of the Gini coefficient for the mid-1970s, with the highest value at the top.
hypothesis, since inequality fell between the mid-1970s and the late 1970s/early 1980s in the 
countries covered. In Sweden, the Gini coefficient for adjusted post/tax post/transfer income 
dropped from 23.2 percent in 1975 to 19.9 percent in 1981, a percentage change o f 16.5 
points. Similarly, in the United Kingdom income inequality decreased with Gini falling from 
31.9 percent in 1974 to 27.6 percent in 1979, a drop of 15.5 percentage points. In the United 
States, Canada and West Germany reductions were more modest, but there was a clear trend 
towards less inequality.
The second wave of LIS datasets assembled between the late 1970s and mid-1980s
translated by the author.
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fortunately supplies a larger sample of countries. Table 2.2 sets out the Gini coefficients for
Table 2.2. Gini coefficients in 9 OECD countries for post/tax- post/transfer adjusted income.
Country late 1970s 
early 1980s 
(%)
mid-1980s
(%)
% change 
1970s-1980s
Canada 36 .0 34.3 -4.7
Israel 33.7 33.0 -2.1
United States 33.0 35.5 +7.0
France 30.8 30.4 -1.3
Australia 30.2 30.9 +2.3
United Kingdom 27.6 34.9 +20.9
Norway 24.9 24.3 -2.5
West Germany 23.0 26.4 +12.8
Sweden 19.9 22.9 +13.1
Source: computed by the author from LIS datasets for Canada 1975,1981; Israel, 1979,1986; United States 
1979,1986; France 1979, 1984; Australia 1981/82-1989/90; United Kingdom 1979,1986; Norway 1979,1986; 
West Germany 1978, 1984; Sweden 1981, 1987.
nine LIS countries with comparable information for the late 1970s and mid-1980s. It is 
important to note that the two data points are not the same in each country, and the results 
need to be interpreted in view of the different macro-economic climate.
Table 2.2. paints a surprisingly different picture from Table 2.1. It reports a wide 
diversity o f experience across countries, with growing inequality in more than half of the 
sample. The sharpest increase occurred in the United Kingdom where the Gini coefficient 
rose from 27.6 percent in 1979 to 34.9 percent in 1986, an overall 20.9 percentage change. 
Considering the fact that income distributions change very slowly this increase must be 
considered substantial (Fritzell, 1993). In Sweden, the Gini coefficient grew from 19.9 
percent in 1981 to 22.9 percent in 1987, an increase o f 13.1 percentage points. This inversion 
in inequality trends was not universal. Figure 2.1 clearly shows that inequality continued to
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fall in Norway, Israel, Canada and France, with the percentage drop in Gini ranging from a 
minimum of -1.3 percent in France to a maximum of -2.5 percent in Norway. The inequality 
pattern traced in Figure 2.1 is one of sharp rises and modest drops, with an average increase 
of about 11.2 percent and an average fall of only -1.9 percent. Another way of looking at 
inequality trends is to disaggregate the population into quantiles. Summary measures may be
Rgure2.1. Percentage change in income inequality in 9 OECD countries
(Gini index)
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unsatisfactory if, following John Rawls (1971), one is solely concerned with the welfare of 
the least advantaged group. Table 2.3 sets out the percentage share in total adjusted 
disposable income of the bottom 20 percent of the population compared to the top 20
Table 2.3. Share in total post/tax-post/transfer adjusted income o f  bottom 20 percent and top 
20 percent o f  the population in 9 OECD countries.
Country bottom 20% top 20%
late 1970s mid-1980s late 1970s mid-1980s
United States 6.2 5.6 39.2 41.0
Canada 6.4 7.6 38.2 38.2
Israel 7.3 7.4 40.8 40.5
Australia 7.7 7.7 37.3 38.1
France 8.2 8.2 39.1 38.9
West Germany 9.1 9.5 37.0 35.9
United
Kingdom
9.2 8.0 36.5 38.8
Norway 9.7 9.9 34.4 34.0
Sweden 9.8 9.4 32.4 32.2
Source: computed by the author from LIS datasets for Unites States 1979, 1986; Canada, 1975, 1981; Israel, 
1979,1986; Australia, 1981/82, 1985/86; France 1979, 1984; West Germany 1978, 1984; United Kingdom 
1979, 1986; Norway 1979, 1986; Sweden 1981, 1987.
percent. The values confirm the wide variety of experience within OECD countries. In the 
United States, for instance, the income share o f the bottom 20 percent o f the population 
dropped from 6.2 percent in 1979 to 5.6 percent in 1986. At the same time, the income share 
of the top 20 percent of the population increased from 39.2 percent in 1979 to 41.0 percent 
in 1986. In this country, as Danziger and Gottschalk argue in Uneven Tides, more income 
was carried over into the pockets o f the rich and less into those o f the poor ( 1993: 3-18).
The Swedish trend is less clear cut. The income share of the bottom quantile declined 
from 9.8 percent in 1981 to 9.4 percent in 1987, but the share o f the top 20 percent of the
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population fell modestly from 32.4 percent in 1981 to 32.2 percent in 1987. In Israel, Norway 
and West Germany the least advantaged groups were slightly better off, while in Canada their 
income share was stable. These computations illustrate that over the 1970s and 1980s 
inequality trends converged in some countries, diverged in others or remained constant for 
selected income groups. Hence the general impression gained from the larger sample of LIS 
datasets calls into question hypotheses based on convergence in income equality.
One reason for the inconsistency between empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanations is that:
in prosperous times it is easy to forget the importance o f power in the making of 
policy. Social systems appear stable, and the economy works with sufficient 
regularity that its rules can be modeled as if they functioned without social referent.
In difficult economic times this comfortable illusion disintegrates. Patterns unravel, 
economic models come into conflict, and policy prescriptions diverge. Prosperity 
blurs a truth that hard times make clearer: the choice made among conflicting policy 
proposals emerges out of politics. (Gourevitch, 1986: 17)
The economic recessions of the 1970s, in fact, were not tackled in the same ways by all 
Western democracies (Boltho, 1982: 9-38). Austria and Sweden preferred to stimulate 
aggregate demand, which generated lower levels of unemployment, whereas West Germany 
resorted to deflationary policies (Pierson, 1991: 141-178; Scharpf, 1991: 3-16).
Several countries reacted to the economic downturn by slashing spending for 
antipoverty programmes and social security benefits. Politicians seemed:
to have embraced the conclusion that slow growth and large deficits [were] caused 
by redistributive programmes. How this proposition - the truth o f which has not been 
proved - became conventional wisdom was left as a mystery. (Danziger and 
Smolensky, 1985: 262)
Conventional wisdom concealed the fact that redistributive programmes were the product of 
intensely political choices, because they established who was most worthy o f favourable 
treatment by the political community (Castles and Mitchell, 1993: 115). Ongoing disputes
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over matters that may at first seem technical and abstruse, such as old-age pension, 
indexation, waiting time, are in reality conflicts for redistributive advantages among social 
groups (Baldwin, 1990: 1-50). As Schumpeter more generally remarked, the budget is the 
skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies and this makes it the best starting 
point for the study of politics (Schumpeter, 1954: 6).
2.2 REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
The key importance ascribed to transfer policies springs from its impact on the personal 
distribution of income, that is, on the living standards of many individuals (Gustafsson and 
Uusitalo, 1989: 73-95). Yet economics textbooks only discuss the functional distribution of 
income, which is the division of the sources of income by factor shares : income from work 
and income from capital (rent, dividends and interest). The situation in current economic 
writing is similar to that described by Gruen over fifteen years ago:
It may appear that analyses of the distribution of income will be intimately connected 
with policies to redistribute income and to reduce poverty. By and large this is not so. 
Discussion of the observed distribution of income has mostly concentrated on full­
time adult male earnings. Policies to redistribute income, on the other hand, are 
concerned primarily with family incomes and especially with the relation between 
family income and need. (Gruen, 1979: 11)
Thus the redistributive role of governmental policies cannot be neglected. The relation 
between family income and need is defined by entitlement and eligibility rules for the receipt 
of transfer benefits. As Table 2.4 illustrates, the second most important income source after 
income from work is that of cash benefits (with the exception of West Germany). In Sweden 
cash benefits account for almost 30 percent o f gross income; in the UK cash benefits are four 
times the amount of self-employment income. Hence the share o f transfer benefits on total
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Table 2.4. Average value o f  income components as a percentage o f  average gross income.
variable Canada USA UK West
Germany
Sweden Norway
wages or 
salaries
75.5 75.8 72.0 63.1 64.5 69.9
self-empl.
income
4.5 6.7 4.5 16.7 3.7 11.1
property
income
7.2 5.8 2.7 1.1 2.7 2.7
occup.
pensions
1.8 2.6 2.5 2.3 0.0* 1.2
market 
incomes •
90.1 90.8 81.7 83.3 70.8 84.9
cash
benefits
9.1 8.0 17.2 16.5 29.2 14.1
Source: computed by the author from LIS. datasets for countries as in Figure 2.2.
* In the data-collection process occupational pensions in Sweden are treated as part of transfer payments.
household gross income may be quite substantial. This says that transfer income is an 
intermediate mechanism between market income and take-home pay, adding weight to the 
contention that the redistributive role of governments is a crucial factor in shaping the size 
distribution of income (Brandolini, 1992).
Figure 2.2. sets out the Gini coefficients for pre/transfer, post/transfer and post/tax 
income (only direct taxes) for the same countries o f Table 2.4. It is clear that the major 
recorded redistribution is that associated with cash transfers. The figure illustrates a 
remarkable redistribution in Sweden where the post/transfer Gini coefficient almost halved. 
The effect o f direct taxes appears more pronounced in the United Kingdom where the drop 
from pre/transfer to post/transfer Gini was about the same as that between post/transfer and 
post/tax Gini. The effect of direct taxation was less significant in all the other countries.
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Figure 2 .2  Incom e inequality in pre-transfer, post-transfer and post-tax income 
in 6 OECD countries
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In the United States, the narrow gap between the Gini values for pre/transfer and post/transfer 
income suggests a less effective redistributive system. West Germany and Canada recorded 
a lower pre/transfer inequality, further reduced in West Germany by generous cash benefits.
Traditionally, political scientists have examined the redistributive role of governments 
by looking at total public expenditure (Cusack, 1995). The criticism levelled at this approach 
is that it neglects the issue of the distribution of government outlays (Ringen, 1987: 168). As 
Esping-Andersen notes 'by scoring welfare states on spending we assume that all spending 
counts equally' (1989: 19). To avoid this problem economists often evaluate the impact of
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the tax-transfer system by employing the first incidence method which compares the 
distribution of disposable income (take-home pay) with market income (Dodge, 1975). The 
difference between the two distributions is regarded as a measure of the redistributive impact 
of direct transfers and taxes.
We can see the usefulness of the first incidence method by looking at Figure 2.3
Figure 2 .3. Ftercentage share in total market, gross and diqoosable adjusted income 
of bottom 40  percent of the population in 6 OECD countries
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Source: computed by the author from LIS.
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which illustrates the share of market income and take-home pay accruing to the bottom 40 
percent of the population in six LIS countries between the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
disposable income
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data show that the share of disposable income was on average about 11.8 percent higher than 
that o f market income, with a range between 8 percent (in Canada) and 15.4 percent (in 
Norway). The difference between the two income distributions was substantial in the United 
Kingdom and in West Germany, where the take-home pay was about 14 percent higher than 
the market income share. Figure 2.4 presents the results for the upper tail of the distribution 
in the same countries. It shows that the disposable income accruing to the top quantile of the 
population was on average 7.8 percent less than their market income share, ranging from 5.1 
percent ( in Australia) to 10.4 percent (in West Germany). It is worth noting that these 
findings may be misleading if taken as evidence of the redistributive effects of the tax- 
transfer system, in that they ignore initial conditions o f pre-tax earnings. For instance, the 
share of market income of the top quantile was 1.8 percentage points lower in Australia than 
in West Germany. This divergence may indicate that the primary distribution of income 
(before government intervention) was more equal in the former than in the latter country.
The main drawback of the first incidence method is that it assumes, rather 
unrealistically, that government intervention does not affect the distribution of market income 
(van Arhnem and Schotsman, 1982). The implication is that it may overestimate the 
redistributive impact of the tax-transfer system (Danziger and Smolesky, 1985). Leaving 
aside the contentious issue of the link between government policies and the primary 
distribution o f income, I will confine the empirical analysis mainly to cash transfers. The 
reason is that transfer benefits 'address the major social problem of contemporary societies - 
the poverty remaining after the initial distribution of incomes through the market mechanism' 
(Castles, 1993: 12).
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Figure 2 .4. Percentage share in total market, gross and disposable income of top 
20 percent of the population in 6 OECD countries
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Numerous empirical studies support the contention that transfer benefits are 
progressive (Gustaffson and Uusitalo, 1989: 93; Jantti and Danziger, 1992; Saunders, 1994: 
44-50). The fiscal incidence literature confirms that, in any given year, social security cash 
transfers have substantial redistributive effects, both vertically and horizontally (Saunders, 
1985). By contrast, comparative research indicates that tax policy has little impact on overall 
income distribution, with direct taxes being moderately progressive and indirect taxes 
moderately regressive (Harding, 1993: 179; Ringen, 1987: 174). In addition, the ambiguity 
of tax incidence and the possibilities of tax avoidance mean that the redistributive effects of 
tax policy are likely to be very small (Gruen, 1979: 41). For this reason transfer payments 
offer more reliable opportunities for redistribution and are therefore regarded as 'the main 
mechanism o f redistribution' (Ringen, 1987: 175).
The general validity of these findings is sustained by case-studies linking cutbacks 
in redistributive programmes to growing income inequality. Gramlich et al find that changes 
in government policies in the USA increased the Gini coefficient by approximately 40 
percent over the 1980s (1993: 14). In a similar vein, Johnson and Webb (1988) attribute 
almost half the rise in inequality in the United Kingdom to changes in the tax-transfer system. 
Danziger and Smolensky (1985) highlight the fact that modifications in anti-poverty policies 
contributed to the rise in poverty rates. These results strongly suggest that to understand 
income inequality one needs to examine the dynamics o f redistributive policies.
2.3 SOCIAL CLASSES AND SOCIAL SECURITY RECIPIENTS
Examinations o f redistributive policies are often undertaken within a 'class politics' view 
(Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Hibbs and Dennis, 1988). There are two variants o f the 
class politics view. One variant is known as the social democratic model, and suggests that
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the partisan control of the government is the independent variable; a more strictly 'class 
politics' view maintains that what matters is not the party in office but the working class 
pressures to which it is subject (see Castles, 1985: 3). The scenario usually describes coherent 
class actors striving for redistributive advantages in the form of more generous benefits. The 
struggle is not always dichotomous between upper and lower income classes. Rather, through 
'beneficial involvement' middle classes are regarded as relevant actors in the creation, 
expansion and dismantling of redistributive programmes (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 3-16).
Historically, however, the identity o f social security recipients has varied 
considerably. In the 'Politics o f  Social Solidarity' Baldwin argues that beneficiaries are:
first and foremost risk categories that translate only indirectly and variably into the 
usual definitions of class and social group. Risk categories are actors identified and 
given interests in common by their shared relations to the means o f security, by their 
stake in or against the redistribution of risk promised by social insurance. (Baldwin,
1990: 11-12)
Although low income classes and risk categories often overlap, the Australian chapter points 
out the fact that the industrial working class was not a risk-prone group at the time social 
insurance was developed. If risk categories and social classes are disjointed groups, 
redistributive costs and benefits might be apportioned between coalitions of groups.
This view shifts the focus from  the social determinants o f redistributive policies to 
the construction o f social identities by redistributive policies (Alber, 1983: 121). Several 
studies have suggested that status and ascriptive (or presumably ascriptive) elements such as 
age, sex, and ethnic boundaries have come to intersect with class boundaries (Pampel and 
Williamson, 1989: 167; Janowitz, 1985: 93). The aged, for instance, have been an active 
political force and the social insurance programmes they most influence comprise a large part 
o f welfare spending. Pensioners have the highest voting rate of all age groups (Hudson and
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Binstock, 1985) which explains why politicians have often been reluctant to cut old-age 
pensions (Moon, 1986).
The general significance of these findings is that the politics of redistributive policies 
cannot be reduced to social class politics. By reallocating costs and benefits politicians may 
create new social identities which transcend class-based identities. As Boulding remarked, 
redistributive policies are 'profoundly concerned with questions of personal identity whereas 
economic policy centres around exchange or bilateral transfer' (quoted in Titmuss, 1987: 
150). Hence this perspective raises important theoretical questions regarding the role of 
politics in the formation of privileged and less privileged groups.
2.4 THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
A rigorous analysis of the redistributive impact o f parties inevitably addresses a number of 
long-lasting questions associated with empirical work on poverty and inequality. How 
sensitive are poverty estimates to where the poverty line is drawn? How confident can we be 
in the empirical results and how should these results be presented and interpreted? How can 
we analyse the constituent components o f the structure of income inequality? Reduced to 
their essence, it may appear that these are purely formal problems; yet, although the subject 
matter of the empirical analysis of poverty and inequality is largely technique, the techniques 
involved are an essential prerequisite for coping with the analysis o f economic problems in 
a rigorous fashion (Cowell, 1995: 16).
Assessing the redistributive impact of governing parties raises formidable difficulties 
of data collection, of identification and measurement of poverty, of choices between different 
principles o f equality, etc. (see appendix D). Whilst a comprehensive treatment of all these 
issues lies beyond the scope of this work, some attention must be paid to methodological 
problems - not least to evaluate the statistical reliability of my results. Furthermore, in the
43
empirical analysis I identify demographic and market effects on inequality, I use several 
inequality indices, and I compare the relative economic position o f sub-groups of the 
population at one datapoint and between different periods. This kind of work raises 
innumerable statistical problems and soon becomes unmanageable, unless we reduce its 
complexity with the aid o f analytical techniques.
Poverty head-count
Two important aspects of any empirical study of inequality and poverty are what are known 
as the identification and the aggregation issues (Abul Naga, 1994). The identification 
problem confronts the decision regarding who is poor, and sometimes it also deals with the 
question of how poor is that person. It emerges whenever income is not observed or when the 
data are subject to measurement error (see appendix B).2 The aggregation problem is 
concerned with summarizing the individual poverty data into a measure o f poverty.
This study deals with the problem of aggregation, comparing poverty between 
different years, different sub-groups o f the population and between different countries. These 
comparisons are obviously affected by what conception o f poverty one has in mind. The 
literature on poverty typically distinguishes between the absolute and the relative approach 
to poverty (Abul Naga, 1994). In the absolute approach to poverty, the poverty standard is 
defined in terms of consumption of specific goods, and is not influenced by the general living 
standards o f the society. It takes into account basic needs for survival, such as nutritional
2
The income status o f a family may be measured with error because it is systematically under­
reported. There is a vast array of reasons why household heads may have an incentive to 
understate their resources. Some authors believe that families may benefit from welfare 
programmes when their income is low (Glewwe, 1990). Others maintain that the identification of 
poverty can be impaired by the existence of market imperfections, such as imperfect information, 
discrimination, obstacles to trade, and suggest the adoption o f multiple indicators o f poverty as 
a solution (Abul Naga, 1994).
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requirements, clothing and housing.
The main problem with this approach is that minimum cost diets vary widely among 
individuals and with the level of development of a society. For this reason I have opted for 
the relative approach to poverty, which makes explicit the view that poverty standards should 
reflect changes affecting the general standard of living of a particular society (Korpi, 1980). 
By adopting the relative approach to poverty, it is possible to evaluate whether governing 
parties employ cash transfers to adjust social relativities, thus changing the relative economic 
position of specific sub-groups of the population.
One way of defining relative poverty is in terms of 'economic distance' from a 
specified average standard. The most widely used economic distance measure is one half of 
median income. This poverty standard has the advantage of taking directly into account 
changes in society through changes in median income. The median is probably the best 
measure of'average' income because the income distribution is typically skewed to the right. 
Hence the arithmetic mean would report higher values than the median because it is affected 
by extreme values.
Summary measures for the analysis of poverty are often presented in the form of 
head-counts, that is, the proportion of the population below a given poverty line. One major 
drawback o f the head-count is that it is very sensitive to where the poverty line is drawn. 
Head-counts can vary quite dramatically with a small variation in the poverty line. The most 
common reason for this sensitivity is the 'clustering' of income units around the poverty line. 
Clustering effects are problematic for assessing the redistributive impact of governing parties 
because they may significantly alter the estimates. For example, if  we observe that the 
proportion o f the population below 50 percent of median income has dropped in the past ten 
years, we might be inclined to think that overall poverty has fallen. But if  the proportion of 
the population below 60 percent of the median has remarkably increased, then it is clear that
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our previous impression of declining poverty was misguided.
To avoid clustering effects, I have handled the problem by using three poverty lines. 
In addition to setting the usual poverty line at 50 percent of median income, one line was set 
slightly lower at 40 percent and another line was set slightly higher, at 60 percent of median 
income; I then reported poverty rates at each of these levels. This methodological rigour 
means that a more accurate assessment of the redistributive impact of governing parties is 
possible. I am able to provide a more comprehensive picture of poverty rates among the 
population dependent on cash transfers; I am also able to identify and compare movements 
between poverty lines between different datapoints.
Equivalence scales
Problems of aggregation and reliability emerge ffom comparisons of economic well-being 
among households with different 'needs'. A single person with disposable income of £300 
per month will, for instance, enjoy a very different level o f economic well-being ffom that 
of a family with three children but with the same disposable income. It is therefore important 
for a sound distributional analysis to capture this difference.
In this study I 'equivalize' the income of households with different economic needs 
by taking into account their size and composition. The 'equivalent income' is the standard of 
living available to each member of the household unit, assuming income pooling. Cash 
income is adjusted by the number of equivalent adults in a family in order to construct a 
measure o f the level of economic welfare available to the family. Equivalence scales are 
valuable tools in assessing the redistributive impact o f governing parties because they take 
into account fundamental differences in need between households. As noted in Chapter One, 
shifting coalitions of party elites may be connected to shifting coalitions o f the state- 
dependent population. In order to detect the role of transfer policies in shaping alignments
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between party factions and categories of welfare recipients (lone-parents, families, elderly 
etc.), it is crucial to evaluate the level of economic well-being enjoyed by these different 
groups.
Several equivalence scales have been constructed to allow comparisons across 
households and their members. The use of a particular equivalence scale can greatly influence 
the distributional analysis of economic welfare within and between societies (Coulter, 1992; 
Atkinson et al, 1993). Unfortunately, there is no agreement on the appropriate equivalence 
scale, although research findings show that inequality and poverty results are sensitive to 
changes in the incorporation of needs (Duclos and Mercader, 1993: 39-40). In this study I 
adopt the OECD equivalence scale which is one of the most commonly used in developed 
countries for distributional assessments. This scale was suggested in the 'OECD list of social 
indicators' (1982) and it distinguishes only between children and adults.
It is clear from the above that studies of income inequality involve several 
methodological choices: choices of scale relativities, o f inequality measures and poverty 
indicators, of definitions of resources (e.g. money income, expenditures, market income etc.) 
and the choice of the unit o f analysis. The role of these factors is directly or indirectly 
affected by the use of a particular equivalence scale. This means that while equivalence scales 
make it possible to take into account differences in economic needs, they only partially 
remove the sensitivity of distributional results to the choice o f the income unit within which 
resources are shared.
Decomposing income inequality
Because results are sensitive to scale choice, I have tried to strengthen the robustness of my 
empirical results. This I have done by decomposing aggregate inequality into a series of sub- 
comparisons of the distributions for specified population groups (e.g. household type, age-
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group). 'Comparisons of corresponding within-group inequality terms are independent of the 
choice of equivalence scale, and so robust conclusions can be derived' (Coulter et al, 1992: 
1081). As Cowell put it, a drop in inequality could be an optical illusion if we have not taken 
into consideration demographic changes, or how income varies between and within different 
age groups (1995: 130). Alterations to the age structure, such as lower birth rates or the 
growing number o f elderly may affect the distribution o f income among individuals ( von 
Weizsacher, 1995). Elderly people are overrepresented in lower income groups and therefore 
the ageing o f the population may widen income differentials. By the same token, rising 
inequality could be the outcome of changing household size and composition. In the post-war 
period the number of large families steadily declined while the number of single households 
and lone parents gradually increased. Smaller households may have a negative distributional 
impact because they prevent income pooling.
To assess the impact of demographic effects on the size distribution of income I 
decompose distributional comparisons for age-groups and household types into between and 
within-group comparisons. Disentangling the within-group and between-group inequality 
components is essential in order to study the structure o f inequality and the impact of 
governing parties: the higher the contribution of the 'between-groups' components, i.e. the 
stronger the association of the grouping factor with aggregate inequality, the more negligible 
the distributional role of transfer policies.
Inequality aggregation results can be expressed in simple terms, because total 
inequality is an additive function of between-group and within-group inequality. The 
between-group component of inequality is found by assuming that everyone within a group 
receives that group's mean income: it is independent of redistribution within any of the 
groups. Within-group inequality is a weighted average of inequality in each sub-group. By 
using decomposition techniques, I can detect the impact o f three main components on the
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inequality trend: changes in the size of selected demographic groups (e.g. elderly, young, 
single households, families, etc.); shifts in the level of inequality within each group; relative 
variations in the groups' mean incomes.
2.5 MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
Several methodological choices need to be made when comparing income distributions 
between and within subgroups of the population, or within and between countries (Atkinson 
and Micklewright, 1992; van Ginneken and Park, 1984; Lydall, 1979: 119-129). The first 
choice to be made is related to the concept of income: inequality o f what? In the three case 
studies, I use several income concepts according to the question posed.3 Market income, for 
instance, is more appropriate when I discuss market effects on overall inequality. Net cash 
income, on the other hand, is the most accurate measure available in the LIS datasets for 
'spendable income'. This measure includes all income ffom employment and self- 
employment, property income, occupational pensions and private cash transfers, as well as 
other cash income minus direct taxes. A broader definition of income would take into 
account non-cash transfers, such as social services,4 as well as indirect taxes, capital gains 
and imputed rent which are not considered in most national surveys.
The second choice refers to the problem of the time-span, inequality when? 
The time period adopted affects the measurement of inequality. Life-time income, for 
instance, reduces the dispersion observed across the population. Since information on life­
time income is seldom available I follow the convention among economists to identify the
3 Other individual resources, such as health and education, are important in assessing inequality. 
Their potential distributional impact, however, is outside the scope of this work.
4The inclusion of non-cash transfer, however, would not necessarily reduce measured inequality.
Le Grand and Winter (1987), for instance, find that almost all expenditure in social services in 
Britain benefits the better off to a greater extent than the poor.
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contribution o f age differences on overall inequality by employing income decomposition 
methods (Jenkins, 1991).
A second set of questions is related to the thorny issue of whether one can 
unambiguously say that one distribution is more equal than another. The construction of 
inequality indices involves value judgements that are not necessarily desirable (Atkinson, 
1989; Cowell, 1995: 60-65, see appendix D). Some indices, for instance, are bottom- 
sensitive, that is, transfers to lower income groups yield larger effects on the index. Others 
are top-sensitive which means that their value increases if upper income groups are worse off. 
Thus the differing sensitivity of each index may reflect different rank orderings. Table 2.5 
sets out the ranking of 10 OECD countries according to the bottom-sensitive Theil index. The
Table 2.5. Ranking o f  10 OECD countries according to the bottom sensitive Theil 
Index. (Householdpost/tax-post/transfer adjusted income).
Country* THEIL INDEX
United States .213
France .179
Italy .166
United Kingdom .165
Australia .161
Canada .158
Netherlands .157
West Germany .135
Sweden .100
Norway .098
Source: Computed by the author from LIS. * The countries datasets are the following: US, 1986; Australia, 
1985-86; Italy 1986; Canada, 1981; France 1984; United Kingdom 1986; Netherlands 1983; West Germany, 
1984; Sweden, 1987; Norway 1986.
table shows that in the mid-1980s the United States was the most unequal country, followed 
by France and Italy; West Germany and the Scandinavian countries were the most equal, with
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much lower Theil values. The United Kingdom, Australia and Canada were located in the 
middle of the ranking.
Table 2.6 sets out the inequality ranking among these 10 OECD countries when 
inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, which is a middle (modal)-sensitive index. 
Some countries change their position quite dramatically, including Australia which moves 
from fifth position in Table 2.5 to second in Table 2.6; Canada also shifts from the sixth to 
the fourth position. Hence the distribution of income in both countries appears less
Table 2.6. Ranking o f  10 OECD countries according to the middle- sensitive Gini coefficient.
Country GINI INDEX
United States .355
Australia .309
Italy .307
Canada .306
France .304
United Kingdom .303
Netherlands .294
West Germany .264
Norway .243
Sweden .229
Source: Computed by the author from LIS.
Country datasets and income concept are those in Table 2.5.
equal when inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient. The differences between Table 2.5 
and Table 2.6 derive from the construction of the inequality measures: the Theil index is 
bottom-sensitive and the Gini coefficient is sensitive to transfers at the mode of the 
distribution. Assuming that modal-income groups overlap with middle-income groups, the 
latter fall behind when Gini is higher; in contrast, the poor are worse off when Theil 
increases.
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In order to provide a more complete picture of the sensitivity o f inequality indices 
used in the three countries. Table 2.7 sets out the values for a top-sensitive measure, the 
Coefficient of Variation. The first point to note about this table is the remarkable
Table 2.7. Ranking o f  10 OECD countries according to the top sensitive Coefficient o f  
Variation.
Country COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION
France 1.48
Italy .744
West Germany .729
United States .699
United Kingdom .647
Canada .625
Australia .599
Sweden .570
Netherlands .546
Norway .443
Source: Computed by the author from LIS.
Country datasets and income concept as in Table 2.5.
change in the rank ordering. France ranked fifth when inequality was measured with the Gini 
coefficient but now ranks first, replacing the United States as the most unequal country. West 
Germany undergoes a similar, albeit less dramatic, shift in the ranking. According to the 
values of the Coefficient of Variation, the living standards o f upper income groups slipped 
in France and West Germany. Other countries, such as Canada and the Netherlands, 
maintained a stable position in the middle, while the Scandinavian countries invariably were 
the most equal countries.
The examples above highlight the limits and the risks of choosing only one summary 
measure of inequality because it inevitably embeds views regarding distributional justice. The 
answer given by Atkinson to this problem was to 'seek to parameterise differences of
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judgment, giving numerical measures of the degree of inequality conditional on the choice 
o f a parameter which incorporated the distributional judgment' (Atkinson, 1989: 29). The 
inequality aversion parameter (epsilon) of the Atkinson index increases the bottom-sensitivity 
o f the index when e > 1 (Atkinson, 1970).
Table 2.8 displays two rankings of 10 OECD countries produced by altering the 
numerical value of epsilon. The most striking result is the discrepancy between the two rank 
orderings for Australia, which depict her as one of the most equal countries when e=.5, and 
as one of the most unequal when €=1.5. Since higher values for epsilon emphasize transfers 
to lower income groups, this result probably means that less privileged groups were worse 
off in Australia than in other OECD countries. Italy changed its ranking in the opposite
Table 2.8. Ranking o f  10 OECD countries fo r  two-aversion parameters o f  the Atkinson Index.
Country* ATKINSO N INDEX% Country
€=.5 €= 1.5
United States 12.6 99.1 Australia
Netherlands 10.7 96.4 Netherlands
France 10.3 94.4 United States
Italy 9.7 91.4 France
Norway 9.2 87.9 United Kingdom
Sweden 9.0 76.4 Canada
United Kingdom 8.7 31.6 Sweden
Canada 8.3 25.0 Italy
Australia 8.2 24.3 Norway
West Germany 8.1 16.1 West Germany
Source: Computed by the author from LIS.
* The countries datasets and the income concept are the same as in Table 2.5.
direction, moving from the fourth position when e=.5 to the eigth position when e=1.5,
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suggesting that the living standards of poor groups were slipping.
Fortunately for the other OECD countries the results are robust. Norway and West 
Germany are consistently at the bottom of the inequality ranking while France and the United 
Kingdom are stable in the middle range positions. Since results are sensitive to 
methodological choices, a carefully chosen small set of inequality measures is necessary. A 
reasonable choice is to use one bottom-sensitive index, another middle-sensitive and the third 
top-sensitive (Cowell, 1995: 54-65). If all measures agree on a comparison of two or more 
income distributions we can then be moderately sure o f the results. If they disagree no 
unambiguous ranking is possible.
Conclusions
Tracing income inequality trends over the 1970s and 1980s in 9 OECD countries illustrates 
that hypotheses based on convergence towards greater income equality are based on shaky 
foundations. Evidence from the LIS microdata sets suggests that Western democracies have 
undergone a variety of experiences, with inequality rising in some countries and falling in 
others. These results warn against the risk of making any generalization about the world-wide 
pattern o f change in inequality trends. By examining the separate components of total 
income, it was possible to highlight the role of national policies in the distribution of income. 
Transfer benefits were clearly an intermediate mechanism between market income and take- 
home pay. Hence my findings support the contention that while 'common economic forces 
have undoubtably been at work, we have also to look at national factors, and particularly 
national policies, in seeking an explanation o f changes in inequality' (Atkinson, 1993: 23).
The methodological difficulties addressed in this chapter underscore the fact that 
some problems have no easy answer. As Le Grand writes, 'perhaps the most that can be 
expected from researchers in the area is that they show an awareness of the problems
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concerned, and of the extent to which those problems might limit their analyses' (1987: 31). 
My analysis suggests, however, that despite their limits results can be robust: Irrespective of 
the inequality index employed, the Scandinavian countries invariably ranked as most equal 
while the United States often ranked as most unequal. The robustness of these findings is 
reassuring, and I can be relatively confident that my work is based on reliable estimates. 
Because empirical analyses hold explanatory power only if embedded in theoretical 
frameworks, in the next chapter I assess different theoretical perspectives on the incentives 
for income redistribution in a liberal democracy.
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CHAPTER THREE-POLITICAL PARTIES AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The essence of politics is redistribution, and political 
conflicts centre on matters of distribution.
Karl Brunner
3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES: ESTABLISHED 
APPROACHES
What are the incentives for income redistribution in a liberal democracy? At two rather 
distant ends o f the spectrum stand interpretations based on rational choice theory and political 
sociology. For the former, political parties redistribute income to maximize votes, for the 
latter, parties have contrasting distributive goals that are consistent with the interests o f their 
core constituencies. This chapter reviews established theories on the redistributive impact of 
parties. It then highlights their strengths and limitations by drawing upon the developing 
literature on party goals, party competition and party organizations. Recent advances in the 
theory of political parties suggest that focusing on the internal arena may shed some light on 
the driving forces behind redistributive policies.
Traditionally, there has been a tension in the literature on the redistributive impact o f 
parties between two separate schools of thought, apparently unable to communicate with each 
other. There is assumed to be a fundamental conflict between the view centred on the role of 
a party as vote-maximizer and the view based on the role of a party as a representative of 
social interests. The two approaches have been espoused, respectively, by rational choice
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theorists and political sociologists (Ware, 1996: 8-10; Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989).
3.1.1 Rational choice explanations of redistributive policies
Rational choice theorists endorsing Downsian analyses believe that voters have specific 
preferences on redistributive policies, and that they select parties which are closest to their 
position in the policy space (Denters, 1993). In plurality-rule systems, if  the frequency 
distribution of voters is single peaked, vote-maximising parties adopt policies close to the 
median voter (Downs, 1957: 114-122; Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 8-14).1 Parties alter their 
position in the electoral space to capture the maximum number of voters and therefore one 
should not expect that parties alternating in power formulate distinctive redistributive 
policies. On the assumption that median voters and median income groups overlap, this view 
posits that middle classes benefit from redistributive efforts (Tullock, 1983: 102-106). Along 
these lines many scholars have conducted studies focusing on the median voter as the key to 
understanding the politics of income redistribution (Bishop et al, 1991; Colburn, 1990; 
Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Scully and Slottje, 1989).
For other rational choice theorists variations in redistributive policies are triggered 
by the timing of elections. The 'key economic element in the electoral-economic cycle is real 
disposable income' (Tufte, 1978: 29). The political business cycle, therefore, best explains 
the impact of vote-maximizing parties on transfer benefits (Nordhaus, 1975; Griffin and 
Leicht, 1986). The model assumes that parties manipulate instruments o f budgetary policies, 
such as taxation and expenditure, to achieve short-term electoral benefits. The political 
business cycle is typically characterized by spending cuts early in the term, followed by
1 Vote-maximising parties will not implement redistributive policies aimed at capturing the median 
voter if: a) there are multiple issue dimensions; b) there is a single dimension, but the frequency 
distribution o f voters is double-peaked and alienation/abstentions are significant (Lindbeck and 
Weibull, 1987); c) there is a single dimension but differential alienation/abstention across two 
parties; d) there are more than three parties and easy entry for new parties.
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generous redistributive policies later in the term. The pattern is expected to recur cyclically, 
with parties deferring the costs of pre-election increases in the level of transfer benefits until 
after the election.
To many political scientists, vote-maximizing explanations of policy-making are 
unwarranted because they place unrealistic demands on both party leaders and voters. Scarce 
information on what actually influences voting suggests that party leaders necessarily rely on 
ideological assumptions about the nature o f the electorate (Budge, 1994). Incomplete 
information, coupled with mobility between income classes that has been induced by social 
programmes and market forces, means the 'median voter is never entirely certain about his 
future position in the income distribution' (Bishop et al, 1991: 53). This conclusion is also 
reached by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989), who posit that voters have diffuse 
preferences over certain directions, rather than an ordered set o f preferences along the policy 
space. Seen in this light, ideology becomes a 'natural basis for action' (Roemer, 1994: 327).
The definition of parties as vote-maximizing teams begs the question of what defines 
a given party and what determines its boundaries. It also side-steps issues related to the birth 
and diffusion of parties. In particular, vote-maximizing explanations leave unanswered the 
question of why some voters identify with one party instead of another (Campell et al 1960; 
Pizzomo, 1983).
3.1.2 Political sociology explanations of redistributive policies
Political sociologists address some of the weaknesses of rational choice theory. Parties are 
conceived as agents representing deep-rooted social cleavages in the electoral arena (class, 
religion, ethnicity, agrarian) (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 1-65). These cleavages reflect the 
interests of well-defined social groups and trace the electoral boundaries of political parties 
Party strategy is directed towards garnering support within a given constituency and, through
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a process of integration, towards the protection of that constituency from rival parties. For 
political sociologists parties emerge to express and manage social cleavages through the 
political process. The key element for the development of political parties is therefore the 
existence of solidarity between and among social groups.
Against this background, it is not surprising that political sociologists concerned with 
the redistributive impact of parties primarily focus on socio-economic cleavages. A typical 
assumption is that 'parties have contrasting income distribution goals that are consistent with 
the locations of their core constituencies in the hierarchy of income classes' (Hibbs and 
Dennis, 1988:469). Lower income-classes, which make up the core constituency of left-wing 
parties, have greater exposure to rising unemployment and normally bear a disproportionate 
share of the social costs o f economic recessions. Their relative position in the income 
distribution is therefore improved by a generous system of social security. For this reason 
'[vjertical redistribution and the oblivation of poverty...are goals which one might expect 
would distinguish the social policy stance of parties and groups ostensibly espousing lower- 
class interests' (Castles and Mitchell, 1993: 116). Research findings reinforce the contention 
that income redistribution is a governmental response to the divergent priorities of the parties' 
core constituencies (Brown, 1995; Dryzek, 1978). These works suggest that redistributive 
struggles are inherently 'zero sum' games, with one social class getting what the other one 
loses.
At first sight, the conventional views on the redistributive impact of parties 
summarized above appear incompatible. On the one hand, party leaders are portrayed as 
selfish and amoral vote-seekers, redistributing income in order to expand their share of votes. 
On the other hand, the redistributive policies of left-wing and right-wing parties seem 
sharply differentiated, with Conservative parties exacerbating income differences and 
Socialist parties levelling them. These facts, since they seem to be anomalies within both the
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rational choice and sociological perspectives, can be a starting point for reassessing the 
redistributive role of political parties.
3.1.3 Empirical evidence or theoretical question?
Some authors have questioned tout court the influence of parties on the redistributive process 
(Boyne, 1995; Cutright, 1966; Hoggart, 1987; Jackman, 1980). One of the reasons is that 
structural imperatives, both national and international, economic and bureaucratic, limit the 
margin of manoeuvre of political leaders (Rose, 1974:139-170; Hall, 1986: 231-234). Parties 
alternating in power seem to yield marginal and incremental/decremental changes in 
redistributive policies.
The alleged interchangeability o f governing parties has stimulated a flurry of 
intellectual activity around the question Does Politics Matter? (von Beyme, 1985; Rose, 
1984; Sharpe and Newton, 1984). 'Visions and realities' (Castles and Wildenmann, 1986) of 
party government have even led scholars to wonder Where is the Party? (Kriehbel, 1993). 
Much has been written on the crisis and decline of parties as relevant actors in the policy­
making process (Sainsbury, 1990; Selle and Svasand, 1991). In the mid-1970s, neocorporatist 
arrangements seemed to supersede parties in some countries (Schmitter, 1974), while in 
others parties surrendered under the burden of governmental 'overload' (see Birch, 1984; 
Brittan, 1975). Apparently brushed aside by direct links between interests groups and public 
administration, parties have ostensibly failed to meet the demands of democratic societies. 
Yet the emphasis on the failure of parties may be largely misconceived (Katz and Mair, 1995; 
Ward, 1993). Perhaps unrealistic hopes on the policy-making impact of parties have sparked 
deep dissatisfaction among policy analysts (Calise, 1990: 13). If this is the case, then one 
should really allude to crises of expectations rather than crises o f parties. In fact, despite
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assertions to the contrary, Katz and Mair find that:
there is little real evidence to suggest that the age o f party has waned. On the 
contrary, while in some respects parties are less powerful than before - enjoying in 
the main, less intense partisan loyalties, lower proportions o f adherents, less 
distinctive political identities - in other respects their position has strengthened, not 
least as a result of the increased resources that the state (the parties in the state) places 
at their disposal. (1995: 25)
A further consideration is that discussions o f party decline have prompted remarkably few 
re-examinations of the nature of parties (Ware, 1985: 6). Arguably, if  research on party 
government generates inconsistent results, it is less a problem of lack of evidence and more 
a question of an adequate theoretical framework (Blondel, 1995; Cansino, 1995).2 Following 
this line of reasoning, Lindbeck and Weibull observe 'that the driving forces behind 
government-induced redistributions o f income and wealth are still not well understood' 
(1987: 273). Therefore, before dismissing the redistributive impact o f parties as a non-issue 
an effort might be made to develop a better theoretical understanding of the ways in which 
competition and party politics shape these policies (Denters, 1993).
3.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
While the traditional views on the redistributive impact o f parties have proceeded along the 
above lines, two very different approaches to the study of party behaviour developed under 
the headings of party goals and party organization. The primary contribution of these lines 
of research is to extend the framework used to examine political parties, by integrating earlier 
results. These developments have been compounded by advances in the analysis o f party 
competition which question the basic assumptions underpinning Downsian demand-driven 
models.
2 The International Political Science Review has recently devoted an entire issue to the theoretical 
lacuna on the topic of party government (see volume 16, 1995).
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The literature on party goals has recently highlighted the fact that parties pursue a 
plurality of aims (Harmel and Janda 1994; Strom 1990). Most studies find that vote-seeking 
and policy-seeking behaviour are not mutually exclusive (Budge and Keman, 1990: 26-31; 
Laver and Schofield, 1990: 36-39; Schwarz, 1994; Wittman, 1983). On the contrary, there 
is clear evidence that political parties seek multiple aims in their struggle for power 
(Schlesinger, 1991: 135-149).
Scholars of party politics have also reconsidered the teachings of the 'founding fathers' 
of the discipline, who maintained that a preliminary step for understanding party behaviour 
was to analyse their organizational core: strategic interaction within the party organization 
was just as important as external strategies and competition. Finally, the emergence and 
diffusion of New Right ideologies in the 1980s has probably caused scholars to search for 
reformulations of Downsian analyses which downplay the role of ideology. The general thrust 
of these developments is that party politics is more articulated than it is often believed.
3.2.1 Party goals
The existence of a plurality of aims raises the question of how parties choose between 
conflicting goals. Working class interests, for instance, cannot be fully represented when left- 
wing parties expand their share of votes to include middle class votes (Przeworski and 
Sprague, 1986: 55-56). Egalitarian objectives may be thwarted by vote-maximizing 
behaviour. More generally, if ideologies are tied to social classes and political parties try to 
appeal and attract voters from different social strata, the ideological dimension is inevitably 
blurred (Kirchheimer, 1966). The implication is that either reasons exist for undertaking one 
course of action instead of another, or alternatives must be equivalent.
A solution is to posit a 'trade-off frontier' between the achievement of one objective
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against another. Strom declares that 'a theory of competitive political parties requires an 
understanding of the interrelations and trade-offs between different objectives' (1989: 570). 
Likewise, Budge and Laver contend that '[w]hen we consider policy and office payoffs 
simultaneously, it is clear that policy concessions may be compensated by portfolios, or vice 
versa, in one o f a number o f possible ways' (1986: 498).
The idea of trade-offs between goals is compelling, but it does raise some empirical 
problems. For instance, although trade-offs entail no goal being subordinate to another, 
Budge and Laver claim that '[s]uch subordination is, however, an implicit but fundamental 
consequence of the role that the theories typically accord to some form of "winning" criterion' 
(1986: 498). A few illustrations may suffice to substantiate this claim. Perhaps the best 
known example is Downs's dictum that 'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, 
rather than win elections to in order to formulate policies' (Downs, 1957: 27- 28); others find 
that parties are policy-seekers and win elections to implement their programmes (Budge, 
1994; Klingemann et al, 1994: 27-30); yet others contend that 'leaders...want to be party 
leaders first, and to gain government power second' (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: 38-39). 
It is evident that party goals are generally perceived to be o f unequal significance. As Harmel 
and Janda affirm, '[tjhough all parties have numerous goals, each party has a 'primary goal" 
(1994: 265). The essence of this criticism is that party actors necessarily operate within a 
system of priorities. Thus a substantial literature challenges the view that trade-offs are 
applicable to all goals.
There are at least two reasons adduced for the subordination o f goals. First, it is 
highly plausible that party leaders have a 'salience ranking' in their choices (Robertson, 1976). 
The assumption that two policy dimensions, such as taxes and expenditure, are ranked in the 
same order of importance is often unrealistic (Taylor, 1970). Newly available evidence from 
the Comparative Manifesto Project, for instance, suggests that the most salient goal for party
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leaders is maintaining the allegiance of their followers (Klingemann et al, 1994: 246-247).
The second reason is found in decision theory and refers to the cognitive limitations 
of the human mind (Simon, 1957: 241-260). Because of imperfect information and bounded 
rationality '[t]he situation is searched for alternatives that are related to the main [goal] and 
the alternatives are evaluated in terms of if (Lindenberg, 1988: 45). In setting priorities to 
their strategies, decision-makers resort to one particular goal. The combined effect of 
cognitive limits and salience ranking explains why '[ajlmost everyone who has seriously 
thought about the objectives in a complex problem has come up with some sort of hierarchy 
of objectives' (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993: 41).
Recognizing that party leaders pursue multiple goals within a system of priorities is 
a step towards bridging the gap between conventional views on the redistributive impact of 
parties. As discussed in Section One, in those views redistributive policies stem from either 
vote-seeking or policy-seeking behaviour. This dichotomy seems now misleading since the 
literature has established that parties adopt a plurality of aims.
It is also worth noting, though not explicitly discussed in the literature, that rational 
choice theorists have often been concerned with short-term benefits,3 while political 
sociologists have focused on long-term loyalties. Inconsistent evidence on the redistributive 
impact of parties may simply reflect the tension between short-term and long-term benefits. 
It follows that the bifurcation on party behaviour rests on narrow conceptions of party goals 
(D'Alimonte, 1991; Marsh, 1991).
3 It is only fair to point out that since the mid-1980s rational choice theorists have attempted to 
overcome the limits inherent in short-run frameworks by elaborating models on repeated games 
or centred on the role o f reputation (see Axelrod, 1984; Tsebelis 1990).
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3.2.2 Party competition
The idea that different party goals are compatible is also sustained by Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald in the 'directional' model of party competition (1989). These authors assume that 
voters have a diffuse understanding of policies and then argue that vote-seeking parties will 
offer clear policy alternatives. Convergence to the centre of the policy space may not be 
important because voters are attracted to candidates who are on the same side o f an issue as 
they are. Thus the key role played by ideology in interparty competition is reaffirmed (Budge,
1994).
Directional theory disputes the role of Euclidean distance in voting behaviour and 
throws light on why redistributive policies may differ when parties alternate in power. 
However, it endorses the assumption of exogenous preferences and hence o f demand-driven 
strategies. Consequently, like other theories discussed so far, the directional model would be 
unable to answer a fundamental question: When are party leaders prepared to accept the 
trade-off between the government's budget constraint and social security contributions? All 
these theories therefore suffer from the same weakness. One reaction to this weakness is to 
argue that it is not really a weakness at all: income redistribution is a response to exogenous 
factors, such as the location of voters in the electoral space or the interests of the party's core 
constituency. Political parties are conceived as inputs that mechanically link the demands of 
society to redistributive outputs.
Recently, demand-driven models o f party behaviour have come under attack for 
neglecting the independence of parties in coping with changes to their environment 
(Deschouwer, 1992). Party leaders do not merely articulate social cleavages, but instead 
actively engage in defining those cleavages. Drawing upon evidence from seven European 
countries and 37 political parties, Iversen finds that 'the emergence o f new political cleavages 
(conflicts over political issues) cannot be reduced to the study o f the emergence of new social
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cleavages (divisions in people's life experiences)' (1994: 174). His conclusions add weight 
to the suggestion that parties may mould the demands of social groups. Parties are not merely 
vote-takers, but act as vote-makers by shaping the choices of the electorate (Dunleavy, 1991: 
105-111). In a similar vein, Przeworski and Sprague have forcefully argued that 'collective 
identity, group solidarity, and political commitment are continually transformed - shaped, 
destroyed, and molded anew - as a result of conflicts' in the course of which political parties 
strive to impose a particular form of organization upon the life o f society (1986: 8).
Social cleavages are salient in any society only to the extent that political parties 
mobilize the groups affected by those cleavages. These findings corroborate research on 
electoral behaviour which indicates that electoral movement is positively correlated with 
political mobilization (Corbetta et al, 1988: 305-334; Huckfeld and Sprague 1992); when 
parties mobilize voters electoral turnout is higher (Patterson and Caldeira, 1988; Frendreis 
et al, 1990). Political parties are thus viewed as autonomous actors who can manipulate 
policies to forge collective identities.
This formulation may exaggerate the ease with which the electorate can be swayed 
by party leaders (Iversen, 1994). Stigler (1970), for instance, draws attention to Director's 
Law of income redistribution which states that middle classes have historically benefitted 
from income redistribution by strategically repositioning themselves in different voting 
coalitions. In the nineteenth century when only excises and real property were feasible bases 
of taxation, the distribution of tax revenues by income class would be relatively regressive; 
as taxation became proportional and expenditure consisted of universal benefits, the potential 
rewards from redistribution rose for the lower income classes. 'In the long run the middle 
classes may have been beneficiaries o f this process because they were in coalition with the 
rich in the nineteenth century, and are entering into coalition with the poor today' (Stigler, 
1970: 9). The general significance of Director's Law is that the coalition of voters forming
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the majority can differ dramatically. Since 'different fiscal programs would be preferred by 
different income classes,.. the program to be chosen must represent a compromise' (1970: 
7). We may deduce, therefore, that governing parties could alter the redistribution of costs 
and benefits to mould different coalitions of voters.
At the same time, viewing parties as autonomous actors does little to clarify the issue 
o f trade-offs, considered earlier, between the budget constraint and social security 
contributions. Rather, it shifts the debate from demand-side factors to supply-side factors, 
leaving open the matter o f trade-offs. Perhaps more fundamentally, it raises the question of 
what limits the margin of freedom of party leaders.
3.2.3 Party Organizations
One way to resolve the question is spelled out in the literature that views the party as an 
organization. Introduced in the pioneering studies of Michels (1959) and Ostrogorski (1902), 
and expanded in the early postwar works o f Duverger (1959) and Neumann (1956), the 
conception of parties qua organizations has recently come back into the limelight (Harmel 
and Janda, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1994; Panebianco, 1988; Schwartz, 1990). These 
developments have been sparked off by:
a new recognition that what parties do within the broader arena is determined not 
merely by the conditions they find there, but also, and perhaps most significantly, by 
what they have been doing - and how they have been doing it - in the relative privacy 
of their homes. (Lawson, 1990: 108)
The core idea o f this literature is that a party is a political system in miniature, where the 
making and breaking o f coalitions between factional leaders is 'the driving force of party life' 
(Katz and Mair, 1992: 12). The implication is that 'there is little we can understand and 
discuss as long as the assumption remains that the party underworld is all alike, all made of
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one and the same stuff (Sartori, 1976: 106). This view challenges conventional approaches 
based on unitary models of party behaviour. Most rational choice theorists and political 
sociologists conceived of parties as monolithic entities striving for success in the electoral 
arena. The justification for this approach is that simplicity is necessary in order to make the 
world intelligible (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 15-35). But the best rejoinder to this argument 
is as follows. It holds if, and only if, by adding new variables the explanatory power of our 
results is not significantly enhanced.
Puzzles in party behaviour have prompted some analysts to reconsider the heuristic 
value of unitary models. There seems to be a growing awareness, especially among rational 
choice theorists accustomed to the unitary assumption, that a disaggregated view of political 
parties may yield fruitful results. Laver and Shepsle, for instance, consider the general area 
of intraparty politics :
to be one o f the most exciting and underdeveloped in the entire literature, since it 
generates the potential to provide some motivation for the actions of political parties, 
hitherto unrealistically seen by most theorists as anthropomorphic unitary actor.
(Laver and Shepsle, 1995: 120)
If these observations are correct, the scholarly search for the driving forces behind party 
behaviour seems to have missed a substantial portion of that phenomenon.
The personalization of the party, implied by views of parties as policy-seekers or vote- 
seekers, rules out important questions such as, What is the range of strategies that intraparty 
elites can play? and, Is the mobilization o f resources a response to the actual or expected 
bargaining position o f intraparty players? The crucial point is that the unitary assumption 
treats as parametric what is instead strategic, that is, it takes as given intraparty bargaining 
processes. It ignores the fact that party actors are like Riker's (1986: 52-65) 'herestheticians', 
who strategically invent new policies to exploit underlying dissensions or to head off internal
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opposition (Nagel, 1993); it hampers the analysis of internal networks of coalitions which 
constantly exchange the resources necessary for the fulfilment of their tasks (Schwartz, 1990: 
9-15); and it requires that artificial assumptions be made about preference homogeneity 
within parties (Laver and Shepsle, 1990: 506). In a nutshell, the unitary assumption precludes 
the study of power relations within the party.
Leaving aside the debate on the definitions of power, suffice it to note that scholars 
o f party organization have endorsed a concept of power in the tradition of social exchange 
theory, where power is considered a 'relation of unequal exchange' (Blau, 1956: 173-141; 
Crozier and Friedberg, 1980: 145-174; Panebianco, 1988: 21-25). A relational concept of 
power, however, raises the question o f what is exchanged, o f what the resources of power 
are. Scholars of party politics use Crozier's (1964: 145-150) concept of 'zones of 
organizational uncertainty' to identify the resources o f power. As a concept in organization 
theory, a 'zone of uncertainty' relates to a vital activity that can jeopardize the survival o f the 
organization, thus creating uncertainty. Studying the resources o f power within party 
organizations involves focusing upon unpredictable areas o f organizational activity 
(Panebianco, 1988: 33-36; Mair, 1994). Accordingly, the crucial resources of power in party 
organizations are essentially four: recruitment and selection, financing, decision-making 
authority, and the distribution of incentives.
It is worth stressing that a conceptualization o f power only in terms of resources is 
insufficient (Barry 1989: 226-229). There must also be the desire to use the resources and the 
willingness to bear the costs of using them. Despite these limitations, I agree with the 
contention that 'the best starting point for the study of the relative power of groups in society 
is an examination of their resources, given the rules of the game they are playing' (Dowding, 
1991: 77). The way power resources are controlled within the party deeply affects the margin 
o f manoeuvrability of party leaders (Laver and Sheplse, 1990: 502). Different decision-
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making regimes within party organizations constrain the manner in which party actors take 
and enforce strategic decisions.
The typical distinction is between centralization and decentralization of control 
(Duverger, 1959: 52). In centralized parties, such as the British Conservative Party, the 
leadership is endowed with effective decision-making authority; funding flows directly to the 
centre and the election o f the party leader is monopolized by the parliamentary party. The 
concentration of power at the top drastically limits the prerogatives of the extraparliamentary 
wing. By contrast, decentralization bestows the factions with autonomous control over at 
least some 'zones o f uncertainty'. More specifically, decision making authority is usually 
dispersed between the party sub-units, and activists play a prominent role in the selection of 
the parliamentary party.
What emerges from this discussion is that the difference in the way power is 
distributed within the party is a key to bargaining relations. Much of bargaining theory is 
merged with game theory (Binmore, 1992: 167-216). The main contribution of game theory 
is its logical rigour which helps in highlighting the problems of cooperation and in exploring 
the strategies that change the payoffs; it cannot, however, constitute a free-standing 
explanation because it takes strategic opportunities as given (Ward, 1995: 19-20); therefore, 
it does not shed light on how bargaining costs are altered by the complexity of different 
organizational settings (North, 1990: 27-35). To encompass this complexity I submit that 
game theory should be integrated with organization theory.4
These remarks lead to the endorsement of a concept of party organizations as 
'politically negotiated orders' (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980: 1). The value of this concept lies 
in its focus on organizational slack, that is, the use of discretionary power between 
organizational actors (Cyert and March, 1992: 41-44). Organizational slack entails that
4 For an early attempt at integrating organization theory and game theory see Peaucelle (1969).
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information may be hidden or its disclosure postponed; rules may be changed or not applied; 
communication and coordination may be hindered or facilitated.5 The consequence is that 
conflicting goals, including participation and cooperation in government coalitions, 
preservation of policy preferences, stipulation of alliances etc., must first be reconciled within 
the party (Belloni and Beller, 1978; Gillespie et al, 1995).
In the light o f these considerations, theorists o f party organizations have pushed the 
argument on party goals one stage further by noting that leaders are 'motivated above all by 
a desire to remain party leaders' (Luebbert, 1986: 46). There seems to be little doubt that 
controlling the internal arena takes precedence over any other party goal (Mair and Katz, 
1992; Panebianco, 1988: 33-44). Innumerable examples show that battles over party 
platforms are often acrimonious because the outcome stands as symbolic evidence o f who 
controls the party, rather than as a guideline for the making of public policy (Ware, 1987: 
125-126). Since the outcome of party platforms reflects the equilibrium of power within the 
party, it follows that changes in the internal balance of power may alter party policy. Harmel 
and Janda aptly remark that:
if rival factions differ strongly on the 'basics' o f the party's identity, strategy or 
organization, then displacement of one faction (or coalition of factions) as 'dominant' 
by another would create a circumstance under which party change - at least on the 
dimension(s) of greatest dispute - would be possible if not likely. (Harmel and Janda, 
1994:267)
What this means is that bargaining games within the party in power may shed light on the 
party-policy link. The implication is that governing parties may level or exacerbate income 
differences irrespective of, on the one hand, the ideology and the social class bases o f the
5 The key role played by organizational slack in the internal dynamics o f organizations is also 
acknowledged in recent work on the organization o f the firm, see Hart (1989).
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party in power, or, on the other hand, the frequency distribution of the electorate and the 
timing of elections. Hence the redistributive impact of parties may be affected by intra-elite 
competition and therefore be indeterminate.6
3.3 THE PARTY ’UNDERWORLD’ AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES
Previous explorations of the party underworld have proved invaluable in detecting the party- 
policy link. The relative strength of factions in the legislative or executive arena may be a 
crucial factor in shaping public policy making (De Winter, 1989; Laver and Shepsle, 1990). 
In Ireland, for instance, Sinnott (1986) found that intraparty politics influenced several policy 
areas such as capital taxation, abortion and divorce. In a similar vein, Posner (1977) argued 
that foreign economic policy in post-war Italy was characterized by improvisation and 
personalism because internal wrangling prevented Christian-Democratic leaders from 
elaborating coherent policies.
Most scholars of party politics highlight the importance of two organizational 'faces', 
the leaders and the activists (Graham, 1993: 244-254; Katz and Mair, 1992). A complete 
description of the internal dynamics of parties must therefore take into account both the 
horizontal channels of influence among organizational leaders and the vertical channels 
between leaders and followers.
3.3.1 Intra-elite relations
Horizontal interactions between party elites are usually considered games of position, power 
and status (Shubik, 1984 : 655). Not surprisingly, the bulk o f recent rational choice research 
concentrates on bargaining between party elites, especially between members of national
6 A similar conclusion is reached by Frolich and Oppenheimer (1984), but in their model this is a 
consequence o f vote-maximizing behaviour.
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legislatures (Cox and McCubbins, 1994; Weingast and Marshall, 1988). Empirical research 
indicates that rivalries between factional leaders are a most powerful source of internal 
conflict (Cole, 1989; Maor, 1995).
Intra-elite games are often non-cooperative because each faction is trying to maintain 
or expand its power to the disadvantage of other factions. In order to operationalize the 
strategies devised by party leaders, I integrate the following concepts which up until now 
have been treated separately. Preference-accommodating and preference-shaping strategies, 
introduced by rational choice theorists (Dunleavy, 1991: 128-136), are combined with 
'defensive' and 'offensive' strategies, described by political sociologists (Katz and Mair, 1992: 
9). Preference-accommodating strategies, which assume voters' preferences are fixed, are 
similar to defensive strategies, which aim at guarding the interests of the party's core 
constituency. I operationalize these strategies by associating them to the maintenance of 
social relativities, that is, the protection of the relative social and economic position of social 
groups. By contrast, preference-shaping strategies are akin to offensive strategies, which aim 
at broadening the electoral appeal; operationally, they both attempt at adjusting social 
relativities, that is, governing parties intervene to alter the relative position of target groups.
The first point to note is that disaggregating the party throws light on the possibility 
that one faction may opt for maintaining social relativities, while another prefers to adjust 
social relativities (Schwartz, 1994). This approach highlights the fact that party elites may 
have more than one policy position. It thus enables one to detect the links between different 
factions and different segments of society. Party leaders, for example, may appeal to different 
income groups, by cutting taxes on one income group, while offering more generous social 
security benefits to another group.
Another important point is that faction leaders have to consider not only which 
redistributive proposal maximizes electoral support but also which proposal fosters enduring
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internal alliances. The implication is that the ' income redistribution game which is zero-sum 
from the point of view of citizens need not be zero-sum from the point of view of elected 
representatives' (Frolich and Oppenheimer, 1984: 130). In party organizations, in fact, power 
games are not zero-sum, though benefits are often asymmetrical with one side gaining more 
than the other (Panebianco, 1988: 22).
If party leaders endeavour to pre-empt internal competition by outmanoeuvreing their 
rivals, it follows that a change or a credible threat to their leadership will affect either the type 
or direction of redistributive policies. There is no lack of evidence to show that factions make 
concessions to rival factions only when they are under threat (Zuckerman, 1979: 137-163).
3.3.2 Elite-activist relations
The discussion so far has been concerned with horizontal channels o f influence. Most 
accounts o f intra-party politics, however, centre around the leader-activist relationship. The 
vast majority of parties in liberal democracies require voluntary labour to conduct a variety 
of activities. Most of this work is provided by activists who join parties because they believe 
in a cause. For this reason leaders must induce followers to cooperate by distributing 
ideological and solidaristic incentives (Ware, 1992; Whiteley et al, 1993). Activists, 
moreover, may affect the selection of leaders. A recent illustration is provided by the 
leadership contest in the British Conservative Party in July 1995. The decision of the right­
winger John Redwood to fight for the leadership raised concerns about the solidity of Major's 
support within the party. Jeremy Hanley, then party chairman, warned Conservative MPs that 
Major's re-election reflected the wishes of the party constituencies. In his words, '[i]f MPs 
forget who sent them there, then they forget one of the most basic rules of politics. They were 
all selected by people who work very hard for the party.' As the Guardian editorialist 
continued '[t]he unstated warning is that any more messing around by dissidents would lead
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to deselection' (Guardian, 5 July, 1995: 3).
Research on leader-activist relations usually depict leaders as vote seekers and 
activists as policy-seekers, more committed to ideological or purposive goals7 (Aldrich, 1983; 
Erikson et al 1989; Robertson, 1976: 32). The general rule is that rank-and-file, more 
concerned with ideology and less in line for the other spoils of office, tend to resent..policy 
compromises..' (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 24). The strategies adopted are sometimes a 
function of voters' sensitivity to variations in policy (Davis et al, 1970). A volatile electorate 
magnifies the role of marginal or undecided voters, urging activists to engage in offensive 
strategies, such as adjusting social relativities. If, by contrast, the electoral arena is stable, or 
'frozen' by the structure of cleavages, maintaining social relativities may be preferred.
One can see the potentially disruptive effect o f this diversity with a 'sequential 
elections' example (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1972). Sequential elections obtain because in 
order to gain office, leaders must win more than one election, for instance intraparty 
elections, conventions, primaries and national elections. A typical dilemma of party leaders 
is to capture the median voter without alienating the median activist (Aldrich, 1989; 
Coleman, 1971). Page believes that one of the best illustrations o f this dilemma was the 
electoral campaign of Barry Goldwater, 'the very issue stands which brought forth his core 
of activists [were] likely to alienate much of the general public' (1978: 119). Sequential 
elections exemplify the dilemma of party leaders when the wishes of party activists differ 
from those o f the wider electorate.
7 There is a lively debate in the literature on May's 'Law of Curvilinear Disparity' which asserts that 
activists are more radical than party elites (May, 1973). For an excellent review see Kitschelt 
(1989). For a recent reappraisal and empirical refutation with reference to the British case, see 
Norris, 1995.
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3.3.3 Party competition, internal rivalry and redistributive policies
Disaggregating the party into horizontal and vertical channels of influence indicates that party 
leaders simultaneously strive for both power and the distribution o f ideological incentives. 
One of the advantages o f viewing parties as organizations is to reconcile the opposition 
'between party as a tool and party as a faith' portrayed by rational choice analysts and political 
sociologists (Pomper, 1992: 148). Organizations, in fact, 'are for the most part mixed-motive 
settings. In other words parties have tentatively consented both to cooperate and compete. It 
is through the bargaining process that parties resolve the competition versus cooperation 
dilemma' (Bacharach, 1983: 361).
O f course, party organizations can sometimes act as cohesive teams resembling 
unitary actors. The history of party politics offers compelling evidence that external threats 
may cement internal cohesion. It is well-documented, for example, that Bismark's anti­
socialist laws were crucial in the development of oligarchical control within the German 
Social Democratic Party (Roth, 1979). In representative democracies, moreover, it is 
generally believed that when electoral competition intensifies, internal wrangling wanes 
(Berry and Canon 1993). 'Once partisans focus on the general election, the interparty 
competition redefines the race and helps to mend intraparty factions and divisiveness 
dissipates' (Atkeson, 1993: 275). Hence viewing parties as organizations does not vitiate 
conventional models in toto\ it only places limitations upon them by suggesting 'that the 
components o f competition are far more complex than such simple minded tests' (Davis et 
al 1972: 442-43). For Robertson this complexity impairs the heuristic value of Downsian 
spatial models because, as they are set up, there are no costs attached to competitive 
behaviour (1976: 138).
Changes in the electoral arena, such as the availability and credibility o f outside
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options, may impinge on the outcome of bargaining games within the party. One o f the 
potential costs o f interparty competition is therefore a threat to the internal balance of 
organizational power (Mair, 1994). For this reason '[o]ne should 'keep well in mind that 'the 
outer moves o f a party - the inter-party competition - are also a function of its inner moves, 
that is, of intra-party competition' (Sartori, 1976: 347). Party actors are constantly confronted 
with the need to maintain, stipulate, or redefine alliances with their partners or with sectors 
of the electorate.
Disaggregating the political party into sub-units indicates that the payoffs 
gained in multiple arenas are not as interchangeable as often believed. Rather, payoffs in the 
internal arena carry more weight because they are linked to the equilibrium of power within 
the party. This conclusion reinforces the contention that party leaders can either level or 
exacerbate income differences to improve or secure their own position within the party. The 
central hypothesis of this dissertation is that party leaders respond to the redistributive 
demands of their traditional supporters if the dominant faction is not replaced by another 
faction or challenged by an external or internal threat. To mitigate threats to its position, the 
dominant faction may devise strategies aimed at moulding new social identities by 
manipulating entitlement and eligibility rules.
Conclusions
Scholarly work on the incentives for income redistribution in a liberal democracy has 
produced fundamentally different interpretations. The main theoretical division within this 
field is drawn between those who seek sociological explanations on the one hand, and those 
who focus on instrumental rationality and strategic moves o f parties on the other . The 
difference between the two camps rests on the emphasis placed on questions of identification 
and self-interested, egoistic behaviour. Their similarities lie in the endorsement of the unitary
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actor model and preference- homogeneity among party leaders.
The central problem for sociological accounts remains their disregard of non-societal 
cleavages; their approach contains no acknowledgment o f elite-induced conflicts. This 
perspective reflects a general tendency in post-war political science 'to see the causal links 
between society and polity as running from the former to the latter, rather than the other way 
round1 (March and Olsen, 1984: 735). Established rational choice models fall prey to a 
similar difficulty. The independent role of political parties in the redistributive process cannot 
be adequately addressed by prevailing demand-driven models. If governing parties are vote- 
takers, their moves are inevitably dictated by exogenous factors.
Supply-side explanations in many ways complement and integrate established 
approaches by suggesting that the driving forces behind income redistribution may be 
endogenous to the redistributive process. Governing parties may try to persuade voters to 
support new redistributive programmes. Yet a central difficulty remains. Assessing whether 
redistributive policies are demand or supply driven does not explain why governing parties 
accept trade- offs between social security benefits and budget constraints. One way to address 
this issue is by identifying the linkages between party factions and different groups of welfare 
recipients. The apportionment of redistributive costs and benefits can also be viewed as the 
outcome of bargaining between party factions. This analytical step, however, requires moving 
beyond unitary models, and endorsing a conception of parties as complex organizations. In 
this way redistributive policies appear as the product of variable sum games which factions 
play in multiple arenas - with priority given to internal payoffs.
In the next three chapters I analyse income distribution and redistribution in Australia, 
the United Kingdom and Canada. Their aim is to bring together valuable insights about the 
personal distribution of income offered by economics and political science. There I apply the 
methods and the theories examined and summarized so far.
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CHAPTER FOUR-RISING INEQUALITY UNDER BOB HAWKE, 1981-1990
Ahead of us lay the polemical exercise o f 
persuading the Labor Party to abandon the tired 
certitude o f an earlier age and to prepare for the 
future.
Bob Hawke (1994:252)
4.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
In 1983 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) returned to office after a lengthy period in 
opposition. Under the leadership o f Bob Hawke the party succeeded in winning four 
consecutive elections, breaking the historical pattern of short-term Labor governments 
followed by long-term Liberal-National (former Country) Party coalitions. When Labor took 
office Australia was undergoing dramatic economic and social changes. The economy had 
been struck by the most severe recession since the 1930s. Inflationary pressures were 
mounting and unemployment was soaring. Adverse terms of trade meant the budget deficit 
in 1983 reached almost $4.5 billion compared with an estimate of less than $1.7 billion.1
A significant determinant of Australia's vulnerability was the structure o f her trade: 
a small economy dependent on a narrow range of exports (Castles, 1988: 36-60; Gregory, 
1991: 103-123). As the price of raw materials plummeted in the late 1970s, Australia 
registered large monthly current accounts deficits which precipitated the AS$ depreciation 
in February/March 1985. The perceived economic imperatives were to improve international
1The true estimate o f the deficit had been suppressed by the outgoing Fraser Government. This 
was an important element in subsequent elections, since the ALP were able to recast themselves 
as the party o f fiscal responsibility.
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competitiveness, restructure the Australian industry, and deregulate the financial market 
(Fagan and Bryan, 1991: 11; Halevi and Kriesler, 1993: 3-14; Kearney, 1993: 25-33). Hawke 
wrote in the Labor Times that 'restructuring the economy - creating a more competitive, 
diversified, productive and export-oriented Australian economy - is the only sure way 
towards lower unemployment and higher living standards' {Labor Times, 1983: 2). A crucial 
step in this direction was to forge an industrial relations system more flexible to the demands 
of international markets (Thomas, 1991: 37). For this reason the Hawke government pursued 
an incomes policy, the so-called Accord, which provided widespread consensus among 
business pressure groups and trade unions (Singleton, 1990: 121-154).
The general thrust of these developments was to reduce the size and scope o f 
government intervention. In the words of the Federal Treasurer, Paul Keating:
the logic o f our economic policies leads to an expectation of smaller government as 
a proportion o f the economy over future years..Australia's need for budgetary 
restraint in the years ahead occurs precisely because the private sector is expected 
to expand solidly. Public stimulus in this context is not only unnecessary; it would 
be positively harmful to the prospect o f sustained growth. (Keating, 1985: 20)
Sound economic management apparently required cutbacks in welfare spending, despite 
available evidence suggesting that the social security system improved equality by providing 
income support to the lowest income households (Harding, 1984). Over the 1980s 
government spending fell by over 4 percentage points o f GDP and social security outlays 
declined. The slowdown in spending was partly a consequence of economic developments, 
most significantly a growth in employment that was impressive by international standards. 
The trend was reinforced, however, by redistributive policies directed specifically at cutting 
spending by improving the targeting o f income support payments (Saunders, 1991).
Entitlement for social security benefits in Australia has been conditioned by the
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private means of those eligible (Saunders, 1994: 21-33). The selectivity of the social security 
system was one component of the strategy of 'domestic defence' which distinguished 
Australia from other capitalist states from as early as the beginning of this century (Castles, 
1988: 91-108). Domestic defence involved strong regulative intervention to protect labor, 
such as full employment policy, restrictive immigration, industrial protection and an 
arbitration system. The early mobilization of the working class led to compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, which aimed at protecting living standards 
by achieving a minimum wage (Castles, 1985: 83). Consequently, unemployment benefits 
have been funded from general revenue and have not been related to the claimants' previous 
earnings. A potential difficulty with a non-contributory scheme is that it may have less 
legitimacy than unemployment insurance, because there is no explicit perception o f the 
employees having 'earned' their benefit through their years in the labour force (Cass, 1988: 
37).
An important implication of the strategy of'domestic defence' is that cash transfers 
have been of secondary or residual importance in securing social policy objectives, in sharp 
contrast to the social democratic concern for universal welfare (Beilharz, 1994: 82; Manning,
1995). Comparative research on the welfare state indicates that the Australian social security 
system is one of the most selective in the western industrialized world (Mitchell, 1991: 187- 
190; Saunders, 1991). Australia has typically been depicted as a 'laggard' in the expansion 
o f the Welfare State because it has one of the lowest expenditures in transfer benefits 
amongst OECD countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 74-76). Trends in government outlays, 
however, may conceal that Australia enjoyed high levels of employment and a young 
demographic profile. These factors contributed to the development o f a wealthy and 
relatively egalitarian society (Castles, 1988: 30-33).
Like most industrialized countries, it was not until the 1970s that Australia underwent
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deep socio-economic changes. The decline of the traditional family of wage-earning father, 
non-earning mother and dependent children affected the distribution of income. Higher rates 
o f marital breakdown, for instance, increased the number o f one-parent families (Gibson, 
1990: 180). In addition, double-digit inflation meant low income families had seen the 
erosion of the real value of the family support programmes which led to substantial increases 
in the level o f child poverty (Whiteford, 1986). As a result the coverage of social security 
programmes steadily improved.
The expansion of social security outlays was also a reaction to significant change in 
the rate, duration as well as distribution o f unemployment. In 1975 only 19 percent of 
unemployment beneficiaries received benefit for more than 6 months, by 1985 this 
proportion had increased to 53 percent and 35 percent of beneficiaries had been in benefit for 
over 1 year (Cass, 1986: 5). In 1975 there were 161,000 people in receipt of unemployment 
benefit, comprising 2.6 percent of the labour force. By 1985 the number of beneficiaries was
561,000 comprising 7.8 percent of the labour force.
Labor, therefore, came to power with a sharp increase in welfare dependency; yet one 
of the most significant features of the Hawke government's approach to social security policy 
has been greater targeting of those most in need. Table 4.1 shows that while the number of 
social security beneficiaries grew until the early 1980s, the advent o f Labor to power 
coincided with a reversal o f the trend. Between 1983 and 1989 the recipients o f old-age 
pension declined by 4 percent and family allowance recipients dropped by 10.6 percent. 
These facts seem to raise doubts about claims o f 'creeping universalism' in the Australian 
welfare state (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 108-126).
Cutbacks in government outlays were justified on the basis that resources had to be 
diverted to 'productive' rather than 'unproductive' sectors. The new creed o f the Hawke- 
Keating alliance was that socially protective activities hindered 'wealth production'. As
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4.1. Trends in the number o f  social security beneficiaries (Thousands)
Australia, 1975-1989.
Year 
ended 
30 June
old-age
pension
invalid
pension
sole
parents
benefits*
UB** special
benefit
sickness
benefit
family
allowance
1975 1097 197 36 160 5 25 n.a.
1977 1205 246 50 250 8 33 2051
1979 1292 275 62 312e 13e 32e 2059
1981 1347 279 106 314 18 49e 2092
1983 1390 277 140 635 20 64 2155
1984 1358 307 153 584 18 62 2179
1985 1331 335 168 561 18 63 2191
1986 1324 357 176 569 18 65 2153
1987 1322 379 179 550 19 70 2136
1988 1328 388 182 475 22 75 1948
1989 1334 402 188 390 25 78 1927
Source: Australian Department of Social Security, Annual Report 1988-1989, various tables.
* supporting parent's benefit was replaced by sole parent's pension in March 1989. Figures do not include 
benefits from March to June 1989.
** UB= unemployment benefit
a) includes numbers in receipt of job search allowance introduced in 1987. 
e) estimate.
Hawke wrote in his memoirs, 'Keating shared my desire for a modem, relevant party 
committed to economic growth rather than merely more equitable shares of a diminished 
cake '(Hawke, 1994: 235). The policies implemented, such as the incomes policy, aimed at 
benefitting those involved in relations of production. For this reason some analysts believe 
that Labor's redistributive policies over the 1980s were consistent with the ALP tradition, and 
should be considered largely in pragmatic terms (Head, 1985; Manning, 1995; Mishra, 1990: 
79-92; Singleton, 1990: 3-10). Since the ALP had never been a revolutionary party, its 
policies were not 'constrained by the politics of the past' (Piven, 1991: 12).
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A different view holds that the overall direction of Labor social security policies in 
the 1980s challenged the philosophical underpinnings of the ALP platform and principles 
(Beilharz, 1994: 179-206; Sharp and O'Leary, 1991, ix). The Labor governments under 
Curtin and Chifley introduced social security policies that were an advance on those o f their 
conservative predecessors and devoted an increased proportion o f government expenditure 
to them (Johnson, 1989: 101). Under Curtin and Chifley several important measures were 
introduced, such as child endowment in 1941 and the widows' pension in 1942. When Labor 
came back to power in 1972, the Whitlam government expanded income support for the poor 
and progressively abolished the means test for persons over 70 years-old (Bryson, 1988: 
492).
These developments buttress the contention that Labor traditionally aimed for more 
social and economic equality and favoured a method of more effective social control over the 
dynamics of the economy to achieve these aims (Elliott, 1986; Jeansch, 1983: 171; Maddox, 
1989: 161-179). To some authors the emphasis on targeting and selectivity appeared a retreat 
from social equity and social reform (Elliott, 1986: 134; Gibson, 1990: 180-203). Hawke 
stressed in his memoirs that '[t]he world of Ben Chifley was not... the world o f the 1980s' 
(1994: 252). By the late 1980s virtually all income support payments in Australia were 
subject to means tests, with the main exception being the invalidity pension to blind 
individuals (Saunders, 1991: 305).
For others the key to understand Labor's redistributive policies rests on the dynamics 
o f party competition, rather than on free market principles (Jaensch, 1983: 74-100; Duncan, 
1989). With respect to party competition, Australia is perhaps the best example of:
non-plurality majoritarian systems [which] are quite similar to plurality systems 
except that they tend to create two blocs (strong coalitions) o f parties instead o f a 
two party system, and parliamentary majorities for one o f the blocs rather than for 
one party. This seems to be especially true for Australia.(Lijphart, 1994: 143)
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The Australian party system has officially three government parties, comprising the right o f 
centre Liberals, the primarily agrarian National Party and the left o f centre Labor Party. 
Competition, however, is bipolar because the National Party has competed against Labor in 
virtually permanent alliance with the Liberals. The National Party is a small party with its 
main base in Queensland and the rural parts of Victoria and South Australia. The 
programmes of the National Party have a narrow set of concerns and thus it can hardly be 
regarded as a serious contender for power without the Liberals.
During the 1980s these two blocs contested three general elections, the first on 5 
March 1983, the second on 1 December 1984, and the third on 11 July 1987. Whether the 
market economy or party competition were the driving forces behind income redistribution 
can only be assessed after a close examination of inequality trends.
4.2 TRENDS IN INCOM E INEQUALITY
Before investigating inequality trends it is important to note that the processes generating and 
redistributing income in Australia have several unique features as compared with those o f 
other OECD countries (Saunders, 1993b). The most relevant factors are the incomes policy, 
a social security system financed from general revenue and paying flat-rate means-tested 
benefits2, and a tax system which relies heavily on personal income taxation but raises total 
revenue in relation to GDP which is low by international standards. During the 1970s, 
comparative research on income distribution showed that the Gini index for Australia was 
consistently amongst the lowest of the countries studied (see Gruen, 1979: 10-15). The
2 Means-tested benefits are used either to decide whether a person should be exempted or 
refunded from a charge or to allocate income maintenance benefits, such as supplementary 
benefits. Universal benefits are provided at the same level to all who qualify.
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international trends reported in Chapter One, however, suggest that in the 1980s Australia 
fared less well, finding itself in the middle of the inequality ranking.
International trends, however, rely on one or two data points, leaving unanswered 
many questions regarding the nature and the changes taking place in the distribution of 
income in each country. For this reason Table 4.2. describes the inequality trend in Australia
Table 4.2. Trends in Income Inequality in Australia, 1981/82-1989/90. 
(Adjusted householdpost/tax-post/trcmsfer income).
YEAR ATKINSON CV GIN I THE EL
6=5 6=1.5
1981/82 .792 .776 .561 .302 .150
1985/86 .823 .812 .599 .309 .161
1989/90 .901 .850 .653 .322 .178
percentage change
1981/82-
1985/86 3.9 4.2 6.7 2.3 7.3
1985/86-
1989/90 9.8 4.7 9.6 4.2 10.5
Source: computed by the author from LIS. Income is adjusted with the OECD equivalence scale.
over the 1980s according to five inequality indices. Table 4.2. shows that whichever index 
is used there is less equality in 1989/90 than 1981/82, the most substantial changes occurring 
in the second half o f the decade from 1985 to 1989.
These results corroborate recent works analysing information on the distribution o f 
income in Australia (Lombard, 1991; Gregory, 1993). Saunders's longitudinal study covering 
a period from 1942 to 1989-90 shows that the magnitude o f the trend towards increased 
income inequality in the 1980s is substantial in a longer run context (1993b: 361). In
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addition, the distribution of wealth was increasingly concentrated. Eaton and Stilwell (1993:
3) find that the 'prosperity of the wealthiest Australians during this period was truly
spectacular'. These findings reinforce the contention that '[f]amiliar generalizations about
Australia's unique 'egalitarianism' seem strangely irrelevant to the factual picture' (Connel,
1991: 147). In a comment reported by the British press, the former Australian Liberal Prime
Minister, Malcom Fraser, observed that:
At the beginning of the decade the top 1 percent o f the population owned as 
much as the bottom 10 percent. Now that 1 percent owns as much as the 
bottom 20 percent. What an epitaph for a Labour government, for any 
government. (Guardian, 20 December 1991)
Fraser seemed to believe that growing income disparity between rich and poor was the 
outcome of Labor redistributive policies. The validity of this statement can only be assessed 
after investigating other potential sources of inequality, including demographic and market 
effects. A variety of factors not directly connected to government policies may have 
influenced the distribution of household income. For example, the age structure o f the 
population or the household composition may affect the distribution of income by changing 
the number of people in different income-groups. Other factors, such as wage-differentials, 
affect income per se.
4.2.1 Demographic effects
The most significant demographic change over the 1970s and 1980s in Australia was the 
ageing of the population and the slowdown in birth rates (Cass, 1988; Gibson, 1990; 
Saunders, 1993b). These demographic trends altered aggregate distribution and this may have 
given the appearance that inequality increased if  measured with unsophisticated techniques 
(Harding and Landt, 1992). In order to assess the contribution o f the age structure to total
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inequality we need to evaluate trends within and between age groups. However, not all 
inequality indices are decomposable into sub-groups of the population. To analyse structural 
changes I adopt the Generalized Entropy Index with 0=.5 because it is ordinally equivalent 
to the Atkinson Index with e= .5, which I have used as a summary measure, but it is much 
easier to decompose.
Table 4.3 sets out the results o f income decomposition methods which disaggregate 
the contribution to total inequality o f changes within and between age groups. It is evident 
that the age effect is stable throughout the 1980s which means that the ageing of the 
population had almost no distributional impact. By contrast, changes in within-group
Table 4.3. Contributions o f  changes within and between age groups to the trend in total 
inequality in adjustedpost/tax-post/transfer income. Australia 1981/82-1989/90.
(Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy Index Q=.S).
Year Total inequality Within group 
inequality
Age effect 
(between group 
inequality)
1981/82 39.1 14.3 24.7
1985/86 39.4 14.8 24.6
1989/90 41.5 16.0 24.3
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
inequality significantly affected changes in aggregate inequality, implying that other factors 
had important distributional effects.
The second step in the age decomposition analysis is to consider how inequality 
would have changed had there been no modifications in the population shares. Table 4.4 
reports the actual values o f the inequality index and its hypothetical values with fixed 
population shares. The first simulation combines population shares o f 1981/82 with the
income figures of 1985/86 and 1989/90 and shows that aggregate inequality increased 
slightly from 39.5 to .39.7 in 1985/86 and from 41.5 to 41.7 in 1989/90. Inequality also grew 
when I combined the population shares of 1985/86 with the income figures o f 1989/90.
Reversing the simulation and combining the population shares of 1989/90 with the 
income figures for 1981/82 yielded a marginally lower index. These findings are reassuring 
for the robustness of our previous results. Between-group inequality during the 1980s was 
stable, with hypothetical values very close and in some cases the same as actual values. By 
contrast, within-group inequality was higher in the second half of the decade for both actual 
and hypothetical values. The general significance o f the age-decomposition analysis is that 
inequality in Australia during the 1980s was not affected by changes in the age structure.
Table 4.4. Age decomposition o f  inequality in adjusted post/tax-post/ transfer income. 
Australia 1981/82-1989/90 (Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy Index with 0 = .5).
Year Actual values% Hypothetical values with fixed population shares%
1981/82 1985/86 1989/90
Total inequality
1981/82 39.1 39.1 38.3 38.8
1985/86 39.5 39.7 39.5 39.4
1989/90 41.5 41.7 41.6 41.5
Between-group inequality
1981/82 24.7 24.7 24.6 24.6
1985/86 24.6 24.8 24.6 24.7
1989/90 24.6 24.7 24.6 24.6
Within-group inequality
1981/82 14.3 14.3 14.2 14.2
1985/86 14.8 14.9 14.8 14.7
1989/90 16.8 17.0 16.9 16.8
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
89
Explanations of aggregate inequality founded on the ageing of the population are therefore 
called into question.
The demographic structure, however, may affect aggregate inequality also when 
household size and composition change. The trend towards smaller households in Australia 
may give the mistaken impression that inequality has increased because they prevent income 
pooling. Figure 4.1 shows that the proportion of the population that was living in households 
comprising childless adults grew over the 1980s. The proportion of households headed by
Figure 4.1 Distribution of the population by household type. Australia 1 9 8 1 /8 2 - 1 9 8 9 /9 0
1 adult
2 adults
3 adults
1 adult and children
2adultsand children
3adultsand children
0 5 10 15 2 0  2 5  30
percentage
|  1 9 8 1 /8 2  |  1 9 8 5 /8 6  □  1 9 8 9 /9 0  
Source: comDuted bv the author from LIS
■
i i v'
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a single parent declined in the mid-1980s but grew again in the third period. This suggests 
that the economic recession had a profound impact on the possibility of single parents raising 
children. One area of sharp decline was in the 'representative' household comprising two 
adults with children. Table 4.5 presents the results of inequality decomposition when the 
grouping variable is household size. The growing proportion o f smaller household sizes had 
a slight impact on inequality, as revealed by the growth in the values of the Generalized 
Entropy Index for between-household inequality from 24.0 in 1981/82 to 24.9 in 1989/90. 
The strongest influence lies in the growth o f within household inequality from 15.1 in 
1981/82 to 16.6 in 1989/90. This suggests that the trend towards smaller households had a
Table 4.5. Contribution o f  inequality trends within and between different household sizes in 
total inequality. Adjusted post/tax-post/transfer income. Australia 1981/82-1989/90.
(Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy Index with 0 = .5).
Year Total Inequality Within-household inequality Between-household
inequality
1981/82 39.1 15.1 24.0
1985/86 39.5 14.9 24.6
1989/90 41.5 16.6 24.9
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
negligible effect on aggregate inequality. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the 
decomposition analysis is that the distributional impact of changes in the demographic sphere 
was remarkably low. The proportion o f aggregate inequality attributable to 'between-group' 
inequality was not very significant.
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4.2.2 Market effects
For most economists the major source of inequality stems from the market sphere because 
wage differentials shape the income distribution (Jenkins, 1991; Gregory, 1993; Saunders, 
1993b). When trying to pinpoint the location of changes in a distribution, summary measures 
like the Gini coefficient or the Generalized Entropy Index are not adequate. For this purpose 
I follow Fritzell's (1993) suggestion of using a descriptive categorization and I adopt the 
categories he defines.
An in-depth study of market-related differentials is of course outside the scope of this 
work. I will simply glance over some explanations concerning the pre/tax-pre/transfers 
income distribution by focusing on families with a household head aged 20-64. The 
interesting aspect is whether the growing inequality was affected by changes in the lower or 
upper part o f the earnings distribution (or both). The income classes are the following:
1. Market income less than 50 percent of the median;
2. Market income equal to or greater than 50 percent but less than 150 percent of the median;
3. Market income equal to or greater than 150 percent but less than 200 percent of the 
median;
4. Market income equal to or greater than 200 percent of the median.
The cut-off values o f the income classes do not give classes of equal size but there is one 
category for very low market incomes, a very broad middle category and two well-off 
categories.
As mentioned in section one, during the Labor decade wages were regulated by the 
Accord. The agreement was sustained by strong personal links between members o f the 
Cabinet and the Australian Council o f Trade Unions (ACTU). Prime Minister Bob Hawke 
was ACTU president from 1967 to 1980 and Ralph Willis, Labor Minister o f Employment 
and Industrial Relations, was also a former ACTU official. The reforming ideas o f Hawke
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and Keating were shared by the ACTU new men, Kelty, the head o f the ACTU and his 
associate, Simon Crean (Gruen and Grattan, 1993: 111-134).
The economics of the Accord was in sharp contrast to the previous monetarist and 
'restrictionist' experiment of the Fraser Liberal government (Stutchbury, 1990: 55). It 
guaranteed wage restraint by the ACTU in exchange for increases in the social wage and 
commitment to tax reform to achieve greater vertical and horizontal equity. Its main 
achievement was the reduction in long-term unemployment, which had been a major concern 
in the mid-1980s (Flatau et al, 1991: 135-161). One of the central tenets o f the Accord was 
improved support for low income groups. As the document stated:
The parties have reached the agreement that the objectives of such an approach 
should be to protect the living standards of Australians including wage and salary 
earners and non-income earning groups. {Statement o f the Accord, 1983: 5)
Thus underpinning the Accord were redistributive concerns flagrantly defied by Hawke’s 
social security reforms. The partners agreed on ’the equitable redistribution of income as well 
as basic economic objectives' and pursued the aim 'to foster social equity by striving to 
improve the relative position o f the most disadvantaged' (Statement o f the Accord, 1983: 
6/24).
Contrary to these expectations, Table 4.6 shows that over the 1980s the proportion 
of the population with net income below 40 percent of the median grew from 17.3 percent 
to 18.9 percent, an overall increase of 1.6 percent. The table also confirms our previous 
findings that poverty mainly increased in the second half of the 1980s when the economy was 
booming. These figures support the contention that by dismantling important aspects
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Table 4.6. Proportion o f  the population with gross and net adjusted income below different 
poverty lines. Australia 1981/82-1989/1990.
year income 1981/82 1985/86 1989/90 percentage change
81/82-
85/86
85/86-
89/90
81/82-
89/90
Gross
Income
< 40% 18.6 18.3 18.6 -.3 + .3 0.0
< 50% 25.5 25.9 25.7 + .4 -.2 + .2
< 60% 30.1 31.5 31.2 +1.5 -.3 +1.1
Net
Income
< 40% 17.3 17.3 18.9 0.0 +1.6 +1.6
< 50% 24.9 25.9 26.3 +1.0 + .4 +1.4
< 60% 31.2 32.9 32.7 +1.7 -.2 +1.5
Source: Computed by the author form LIS
of the welfare system, Labor 'treated redistribution questions in an unsophisticated way, as 
a byproduct of growth' (Jennet and Stewart, 1990: 9).
In principle the Accord should have restrained wage dispersion. Figure 4.2 shows, 
however, that over the 1980s the distribution of market income was more spread away from 
the middle. The proportion of households earning between 50 and 150 percent o f median 
market income declined by 3.8 percent from 1981/82 to 1989/90. The falling number of 
workers with middle range incomes was associated with growth in the lower and upper tails 
of the distribution. The proportion of households earning less than 50 percent o f the median 
grew by 1.7 percent, while those earning over 200 percent of the median increased by 1.8 
percent.
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Market income inequality was therefore a significant factor in the trend towards wider 
income differentials. As in other industrialized countries, income polarization reflected the 
phenomenon of the shrinking middle, a fact which produces disequalizing effects on the 
distribution o f income (Duncan et al 1991; see OECD Employment Outlook, 1994).3 It is 
worth noting, however, that while the pattern of Australian wage growth is not unique, the 
Accord may have had more noticeable effects on other areas, such as combating 
unemployment (Dowrick, 1991: 137).
4.2.3 The distributional impact of transfer income
Leaving aside the important issue o f whether trends in market income are genuinely 
independent of governments' actions (van Arnhem and Schotsman, 1982), we may address 
the issue o f the relative influence of market income and transfer income on aggregate 
inequality. By contrast to the problem of decomposition by population subgroups there are 
relatively few inequality measures which can be conveniently broken down by income 
component (see Appendix D). The squared coefficient of variation in equation 1.1, allows 
to decompose the total change in inequality into changes arising from each income 
component. The direct effect of each income component is measured by deriving the partial 
derivatives from equation 1.1; their indirect effect is measured by the correlation coefficient 
(p). This decomposition illustrates that increases in transfer income inequality will affect 
total inequality not only through the increase in transfer income inequality but also if 
transfers become more dependent on market income, as expressed by the correlation
3 Wolfson (1993) has pointed out that income polarization and income inequality are two 
different concepts. The population included in analyses of income polarization is not 
representative of the whole population because it comprises of only the labour force and in most 
studies, the male labour force. It also goes without saying that the share of the population with 
middle level incomes going up or down partly depends on how 'middle' is defined.
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coefficient.
In equation 1.1 total inequality is a weighted sum of market income inequality (Cm 
= coefficient o f variation of market income) and transfer income inequality (Ct= coefficient 
of variation o f transfer income), X is the share of market income to total income:
1 1  C2=A2C2+(1-A) 2c 2+2A (1-A) c  C p1*1 m t r a t
We first substitute the values reported in Table 4.7 and differentiate with respect to Cm. The
Table 4.7. Income Decomposition. Values fo r  the Coefficient o f  Variation o f  Market Income 
(Cm), Transfer Income (Ct) and the correlation coefficient (p). Australia 1981-1990. (Gross 
Income)
variable 1981/82 1985/86 1989/90
Cm 0.88 0.84 1.005
Ct 1.42 1.38 1.63
X. 0.87 0.9 0.88
Pearson's coefficient 
( p )
-0.4376* -0.4154* -0.3969*
*signif.LE. 01 two-tailed
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
results of these computations are set out in the first row of Table 4.8. Their substantive 
meaning is that market income inequality had a stronger distributional impact in the late 
1980s, reflecting the process o f income polarization discussed in section 4.2.2. We then 
differentiate with respect to Ct, the coefficient of variation o f transfer income. The results are 
set out in Table 4.8 and show that transfer income inequality exerted a stronger impact in the 
mid-1980s. One of the reasons is presumably the persistence o f higher unemployment rates
Table 4.8. Results o f  partial derivatives from  equation L I. Australia 1981/1989
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partial derivative 1981/82 1985/86 1989/90
dC/dCm 0.84 0.88 0.85
dC/dCt 0.82 0.89 0.83
Source: computed by the author.
combined with more stringent eligibility and entitlement rules. The decomposition analysis 
points out that transfer income inequality played an important role in aggregate inequality, 
which means that variations in social security benefits had important effects on inequality 
trends.
4.3 EXPLAINING CHANGES IN TRANSFER POLICIES: ECONOMIC CYCLES 
AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
In earlier sections I have mentioned that one of the most noticeable difference between 
Australia and other OECD countries is that international trade is only a small fraction of 
economic activity. This aspect of Australian trade may lead to the conclusion that 
international fluctuations have little or no effect on its domestic economic cycles. Yet 
Australian export prices fluctuate more that export prices in other OECD countries because 
they consist chiefly of raw materials, such as rural and mineral products (Gregory, 1991: 
103). Labor's macroeconomic policy over the 1980s must be viewed against Australian 
vulnerability in international trade, the deterioration of the terms of trade in the early to mid- 
1980s, and the massive budget deficit it produced.
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4.3.1 Macroeconomic cycles
Any account of redistributive policies in Australia must therefore be qualified by reference 
to macroeconomic variables. Some analysts claim that reductions in government outlays were 
triggered by economic imperatives, which led Hawke to place redistribution of wealth second 
to wealth production (Duncan, 1989: 20). Figure 4.3 illustrates that the dramatic drop 
in real GDP growth in the early 1980s was associated with sharp rises in unemployment and 
inflation rates. Growing inequality in the mid-1980s might have been a consequence o f the 
economic depression, corroborating hypotheses on the anticyclical nature of inequality. From 
the mid-1980s onwards, however, a world wide economic recovery was under way and 
Australia gained from favourable terms of trade. Figure 4.3 shows an impressive surge in real 
Gross Domestic Product growth in the mid-1980s, rising employment rates and a relative 
slowdown in inflation. By 1987 these developments, coupled with draconian spending cuts, 
meant that government expenditure was heading back towards the level that had prevailed 
in the early 1970s, before Whitlam's expansionary policies (Parkin and Bade, 1990: 628- 
629). Positive prospects of economic growth after the mid-1980s were not accompanied by 
expansionary redistributive programmes. On the contrary the 'Hawke government..became 
one of the most fiscally conservative governments that Australia has had' (Parkin and 
Bade, 1990: 637). Note that tight fiscal policy was not a consequence o f Labor's flirtation 
with monetarism. In the mid-1980s the Reserve bank abandoned monetary targeting because 
structural changes in the demand for M3 made interpreting the growth rate o f that, or any 
other monetary aggregate, too difficult (Parkin and Bade, 1990: 633). In the wake of 
deregulation and financial innovations, monetary aggregates became unreliable indicators o f
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Figure 4 .3 .Trends in unemployment rate, real GDP growth and consumer price index. 
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the money supply. The abandonment of monetary targeting was a conscious decision not 
to use the money supply as an instrument to curb inflation (Argy, 1992: 202).
If one endorses the New Right belief in 'trickle down' effects, economic recovery 
should have been accompanied by lower levels of income inequality. According to the results 
presented in the previous section, however, between 1985 and 1989 all inequality indices 
rose. This discrepancy is rather puzzling since Figure 4.3. clearly illustrates that the main 
macroeconomic indicators were improving between 1986 and 1989. These facts suggest that 
macroeconomic variables cannot be considered the determinants of income inequality in the 
second half of the decade.
100
4.3.2 Electoral politics: median voter and political business cycles
A widespread interpretation of Labor's redistributive policies rests on the dynamics of 
electoral competition. Demand-side explanations suggest Labor's redistributive policies 
aimed at winning middle class votes, located at the centre of the ideological space. It is well- 
documented that the ALP made inroads into the Australian middle class since the late 1960s 
(Hughes, 1994; Maddox, 1989: 94-137). Labor concentrated its efforts in appealing to the 
suburban middle class not only to win more votes but also to redress the bias associated with 
malapportionment. Arguably, Labor's major electoral drawbacks were the over-representation 
o f rural districts combined with the vote-seat distortion resulting from the geographical 
concentration of its electorate (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979: 166-167).
For some authors, the 'middle-classing' of Australian politics had structural roots. 
Drawing on Przeworski and Sprague's thesis (1986) that socialism cannot be attained in 
liberal democracies, Duncan (1989) maintains that vote maximization led Labor leaders to 
abandoning socialist principles. Others believe that the transformation of Labor into a catch­
all party reflected the decline of blue-collar workers and the growing number of white-collar 
workers (Jaensch, 1989: 46-58).
Spatial proximity may also stem from the mechanics of the electoral law. A well- 
known feature of Australian politics is that a majority of seats is regarded as safe for one 
party or another. In the 1980s a seat was 'safe' if a swing o f over 10 percent was needed to 
lose it; it was 'fairly safe' if  the swing was between 6 to 10 percent, and 'marginal' if  it was 
less than 6 percent (Wright, 1986: 130). Some psephological explanations suggest that 
Australian parties converge to the centre because they feel confident about the votes o f their 
core constituency. The relative stability o f the electoral arena combined with compulsory 
voting means that 'parties seek support among the 'swinging' voters, and this has added to the
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impetus of both Labor and non-Labor to spread to the 'centre' o f politics in Australia' (Bean 
and Butler, 1991: 98).
Hypotheses based on centripetal competition would lend support to the view that 
redistributive policies mainly benefitted middle income classes. The expectation is that 
higher shares of disposable income accrued to the median income decile. Figure 4.4 shows 
the disposable income share o f population deciles between 1981/82 and 1989/90. It is clear 
that households in the middle deciles lost between .2 percent to .3 percent of their disposable 
income from 1981/82 to 1989/90. Although this is a slight decline, it runs contrary to 
expectations. It is worth noting that the largest absolute changes occurred at the top, where 
income increased by 1.7 percentage points. The relative lowering o f living standards for the 
middle income classes suggests that the 'middle-classing' o f Australia is not as 
unquestionable as often assumed (see also Manning, 1992: 17).
A different view holds that associations between voting behaviour and redistributive 
policies may be related to the timing of elections. In Australia there is a three-year electoral 
cycle and this should be taken into account when interpreting the evidence. A detailed 
examination of social security policies suggests that some changes were compatible with the 
predictions o f the political business cycle. In the 1984 Budget, for instance, the Labor 
government accepted the unions' proposal of a tax cut of $7.60 a week for incomes between 
$12,000 and $25,081. According to the LIS dataset of 1985/86 median gross income was 
$21,650. Since most unionized workers were employed in skilled jobs, they presumably 
earned between $12,000 and median income. These figures, therefore, support the contention
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that 'the tax cuts were blatantly tailored to favour the ACTU's constituency' (Carew, 1992: 
83).
Before the general election of 1984, indexation was restored for the single adult rate. 
In line with the predictions of the PBC, the Labor government promised to eradicate child 
poverty during the electoral campaign of 1987 to shore up its traditional working class 
support (Warhurst, 1988). Since the decline in living standards was perceived to be connected 
to cuts in government outlays, Brian Howe, the Minister of Social Security, announced a
h h h
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'family package' aimed at protecting the needy. For Hawke the new family package ensured 
that '[b]y 1990, no Australian child will be living in poverty' (Hawke, 1994: 403). The 
package was to cost $405 million in a full year. Of this $234 million was to be spent on a 
family allowance supplement of $22 per week to be paid to mothers from 1 November 1987. 
An additional teenage (13-15 years) supplement o f $6 per week was to be paid from 24 
December ($69 million). The Family Plan was well-received by both welfare lobbies and 
Labor's voters at large (Simms, 1988: 435)
Apart from some generous benefits being introduced before elections, other 
restrictions were enacted after elections. One year after the 1983 election, unemployment 
benefits for those aged 18 to 20 were excluded from full indexation. An asset test for those 
aged 25 and over was introduced which operated alongside the normal income test. The 
waiting period for school leavers to apply for benefits was extended from six to thirteen 
weeks soon after the 1987 election. The Women's Electoral Lobby noted a range of measures 
which discriminated against women (Simms, 1987). The government reduced to 15 the 
maximum age for children to enable the parent to qualify for allowances. In addition, the 
means testing of the family allowance 'hurt women because it had always been a payment to 
the 'purse' not the 'wallet' (Simms, 1988: 431).
Throughout the 1970s women had been more likely to support non-Labor parties. 
During the electoral campaign of 1983 Labor strategists stressed women's issues and were 
rewarded with electoral gains for the Labor Party (Burgmann, 1993: 273). Yet the emphasis 
on gender issues had practically disappeared after the next election in 1984 (Simms, 1993: 
30). Stiffer entitlement rules which penalized women re-opened the traditional gender-gap 
in Labor's support (MacAllister and Ascui, 1988: 227-228; Jupp and Sawer, 1994: 14).
If  these facts appear to corroborate the predictions o f the PBC, other modifications 
were in stark contrast to the model. Most striking was Hawke's announcement o f the asset
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test for pensioners during the 1984 election campaign policy speech (McAllister and Moore, 
1991: 20). The Australian McNair Anderson exit poll reported that pensioners concerned 
with the assets test contributed to the swing against the government of 1.4 percent (Galligan, 
1985b: 177). One year before the election of 1987 the government announced the 'harshest 
budget for decades' {Guardian, 20 August 1986). The British press commented that 
Australia:
[had] a socialist government doing things which Thatcherism has never ventured, 
like deferring pension increases, abolishing student grants and introducing identity 
cards to counter tax and social fraud., all these measures [were] to be imposed 
simultaneously. {Guardian, 20 August, 1986: 5)
A few months before the election o f 1987, the government introduced work tests which 
tightened provisions by increasing review and surveillance o f both eligibility and entitlement 
rules (Cass, 1988). It is reasonable to assume that changing bureaucratic procedures may 'be 
a more politically acceptable way of restricting scope than direct (and transparent) legislative 
changes to eligibility criteria' (Saunders 1991: 113). What is important here, however, is not 
so much the form of the changes, but rather their timing. Introducing these modifications 
before the election of 1987 is incongruent with political business cycle explanations of 
variations in redistributive policies
Furthermore, in the run-up to that election, the Federal Treasurer, Paul Keating 
announced the so called 'mini-budget' which estimated that $400 million was taken off social 
welfare spending. The measures included tighter eligibility criteria for pensions, the abolition 
o f unemployment benefits for 16 and 17 year-olds, and means testing family allowances 
(Galligan, 1986; Stutchbury, 1990: 70). An important point is that welfare benefits are 
usually targeted at the poor groups whereas taxation policy is often targeted at the rich 
(Bryson, 1988:496-498). Although this work is not centrally concerned with taxation policy,
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it should be noted that between 1975 and 1982 wages and salaries increased by 98.8 per cent 
and the tax paid on these income sources increased by 148.1 percent. By contrast, income 
from rent, dividends and unincorporated enterprises rose more quickly, by 125.4 per cent, but 
the tax paid on it rose only by 73.6 percent (Bryson, 1988: 496). The change in the balance 
was mostly because the wealthier sections of the population were favoured with a network 
o f tax exemptions. It is remarkable that Labor did not substantially alter the balance during 
the 1980s.
All in all, the development o f social security policies over the 1980s reveals 
inconsistent evidence supporting the PBC. This conclusion is reinforced by time series 
analyses o f Australian fiscal policies which show that associations between elections and 
transfer policies often yield unexpected signs (Swank, 1992). The implication is that political 
actors may rely on strategic priorities that demand-driven, vote-maximizing explanations 
neglect.
4.3.3 Opposition effects
One priority might have been the hastening of the process of'modernization' within the ALP, 
which significantly shifted Labor's redistributive policies to the right of the ideological 
spectrum. Spatial repositioning was facilitated by the weakness o f electoral rivals. Labor's 
unpopular redistributive policies carried low risks in the mid-1980s because the Opposition 
was in a shambles (Adams, 1987; Warhurst, 1988: 35). Tensions between the Liberal and 
National Party, stemming from the desire of the National Party to go its own way, prevented 
the Coalition partners from forging a credible alliance against Labor (Jennet, 1987). 'The 
Liberals were battling to keep the more traditional Nationals on side' (Simms, 1988: 433). 
Internal wrangling culminated in a further loss of support. During the electoral campaign o f 
1984 it 'failed to impress even its usual media supporter' (Galligan, 1985b: 175).
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The national Liberal Party came increasingly under attack from several state branches. 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, the belligerent premier of Queensland and staunch supporter o f single­
rate taxation, launched a fierce campaign against prominent Liberals, such as Senator Peter 
Baume, Ian Macphee and Max Burr (Jennett, 1987: 102). Disputes about the leadership 
succession racked the Liberals from 1983 onwards. Andrew Peacock, the Liberal leader who 
replaced Fraser in 1983, had to hand on the leadership to John Howard in 1985, but returned 
to his position in 1989 after Howard was ousted. Internal wrangling fuelled disunity and 
disharmony (Kuhn, 1989).
The disputes pushed the Liberal Party further to the Right o f the ideological 
continuum, providing Labor with margins of discretion previously unknown. Defining 
discretion as the range of potential policies that can be selected (Steunenberg, 1995), the 
Liberal shift equipped Labor with a new set of feasible policies.
4.4 FROM VOTE-SEEKING TO POLICY-SEEKING
Most statements about Labor's social security policies have focused on their electoral 
significance and have given little or no attention to the party's own decision-making process 
in affecting those policies. Consequently, social policy analysts have usually underestimated 
a fundamental process of internal realignment unparalleled in Labor history, which saw the 
once dominant left-wing faction displaced by the right-wing faction. Left-wing groups had 
fuelled Whitlam's redistributive policies but were delivered a hammer blow by the scale of 
Labor's defeat in 1975 (McAllister, 1992: 124). Right-wingers gained influence after Labor 
returned in opposition at the end of 1975 (Lloyd, 1983:247). The ensuing electoral debacles 
o f 1977 and 1980 led to an internal backlash against the Left which culminated in the right- 
wing push to secure the leadership of the Labor party for Bob Hawke. Right-wingers 
eventually succeeded in controlling the leadership by replacing Bill Hayden, who was
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supported by the Left, with Hawke in 1983. The change of leadership from Hayden to Hawke 
marked the last severing of ties with Whitlam's government (Jaensch, 1988: 82). As Weller 
recalls ' Hawke was an avowed enemy of the Left faction' (1984: 63).
Alterations in the balance of power between Left and Right had momentous 
consequences for Labor's redistributive policies. The differences in the social policy aims of 
the two factions were fairly sharp (Wheelwright, 1983: 55). Right-wingers endorsed free 
market principles, neo-classical economics and the minimalist state. Hawke, for instance, 
believed the Left was 'simply out of touch with the realities of the nation and o f the world in 
which we lived' (Hawke, 1994: 102). Keating's biographer, Edna Carew, recounts that the 
Federal Treasurer was concerned 'with "making the pie bigger" not squabbling about who was 
getting what-size slice' (1991: 58). By contrast, left-wing Laborites valued the socially 
protective activities of the government and believed in social reform and income 
redistribution.
The Right wished to 'modernize' the ALP by reshaping its aims and identity. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, redistributive policies are chiefly concerned with issues of 
identity; hence moulding the party's identity also meant changing Labor's redistributive goals. 
Despite these developments, it is surprising that, with few exceptions, national factionalism 
in the ALP has often been a neglected area (Lloyd and Swan, 1987: 100).
4.4.1 National factions and redistributive policies
The development o f a national system of factions is considered to be one o f the 
distinguishing features of the Labor decade, and 'the most transcendental source o f enduring 
change' in the ALP (Lloyd and Swan, 1987: 108; McAllister, 1992). To understand the 
significance o f the internal realignment for redistributive policies a brief summary o f the 
events which led to the formation o f national factions is in order.
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Historically, the power of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) had 
stemmed from a double source of legitimacy. On the one hand, the ALP was created by the 
industrial labour movement to be its political wing; on the other, non-unionized individuals 
could join the party through direct subscriptions. In the formal rules o f the ALP, it was the 
extraparliamentary wing which claimed supreme authority in the party (Warhurst, 1983:17). 
This authority rested on the fact that funding for the ALP derived from affiliation fees. 
Unions, moreover, were affiliated directly to the state branches and controlled 50 to 60 
percent o f the votes for the preselection of parliamentary candidates. Since the membership 
o f parliamentary bodies was and continues to be determined largely by those who control 
preselection in safe seats, it follows that '[w]ho controls pre-selection wields power' (Jaensch, 
1983: 5). State branches, therefore, have always controlled two vital resources: the flow of 
funds to the national party organization and pre-selection procedures. From the late 1960s, 
however, the ALP has steadily become a party where power is concentrated within the 
federal parliamentary organization and the National Executive, at the expense o f state 
branches. The general scenario is one of a Party historically rooted in its State Branches 
becoming a national party' (Manning, 1995: 11).
The centralization process culminated in the early 1980s with a fundamental 
institutional change. Proportional representation for the election of state delegates to national 
decision-making bodies was introduced at the Melbourne Conference in 1981 (Warhurst, 
1988). The new electoral procedure endowed the major factions with a significant basic 
representation and sanctioned a transfer of power to the larger states, New South Wales and 
Victoria (Lloyd, 1983:234; O'Connell, 1991:150). This development strengthened the power 
o f the national organization with respect to state organizations because it abolished the equal 
representation o f state branches at the federal level (Lloyd and Swan, 1987; Stokes, 1983: 
158). The impact on the ALP was dramatic.
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Cross-state alliances developed and a national system of factions emerged. Power 
shifted significantly 'from the so-called <machine> itself largely controlled by unions, to a 
<system> of factions' (Manning, 1995: 12).4 Other explanations for the rise of national 
factions rest on their ability to absorb potentially destabilizing internal conflicts after a period 
o f dramatic social and economic change (McAllister, 1991: 218). For others, the reshaping 
o f the internal topography o f the ALP stemmed from the rapid decline in the blue-collar 
percentage o f the workforce and the continuing increase in white-collar employment 
(Burchell and Mathews, 1991: 11). Structural changes in the labour market affected the 
strength o f trade unions, which were traditionally linked to the Left and the Right.
These modifications paved the way for the emergence of the Centre-Left faction, 
chiefly supported by individual members. The Centre-Left quickly became a coherent and 
influential grouping that controlled a quarter of the parliamentary party and a third of the 
Cabinet. Among its prominent members were Cabinet Ministers Hayden, Young and Walsh, 
Health Minister Blewett and Senator Cook. This new faction had a crucial role to play in 
caucus and in the party organization in balancing the traditional Right and Left, based in New 
South Wales and Victoria. Most importantly, the formation of the Centre-Left seems to have 
evolved also out of redistributive concerns (Maddox, 1988: 9-20). Support for this view is 
offered by the programmatic commitments of the new faction. According to its manifesto
The Centre Left is committed to democratic socialist principles. As such, its 
distinguishing characteristics are the pre-eminence it gives to social, economic and 
political equality, the emphasis on achieving this through redistributional 
programs., (quoted in Galligan, 1984b: 299, my emphasis)
4 Formalized factions came to prominence in the states of Victoria and New South Wales in the 
1950s and 1960s (Jupp, 1983; Wheelwright, 1983). However, organized national factions only 
emerged after Labor took office in 1983 (Bean and McAllister, 1988).
110
Thus the question of income redistribution played an important role in the changing 
topography o f the ALP.
The formation of the Centre-Left was a catalyst for factional development. By the 
mid-1980s three national factions could be clearly discerned. The National Right5 led by Bob 
Hawke, and other prominent leaders o f the New South Wales branch such as Paul Keating, 
Robert Ray and Graham Richardson. The Right was ideologically committed to the free 
market economy and the minimalist state. At the other ideological extreme, the Socialist Left 
controlled by Brian Howe, Gerry Hand and Bruce Childs emphasized the socialist objectives 
o f the ALP and rejected the capitalist system. Between these two positions, the Centre Left 
led by Bill Hayden, Peter Cook and Rosemary Crowley, appealed to socio-economic equality 
through democratic means. As Lloyd and Swan claimed:
real power in the ALP now lies in Faction Caucuses where faction delegates take 
key decisions on how they will vote and what they will do within the formal organs 
of the ALP-Parliament, Conference, Executive, Pre-Selection machinery. (Lloyd 
and Swan, 1987: 103)
National factions were parties in miniature with a fee-paying membership, regular 
conferences and elected party officials. Party and political offices were apportioned to 
particular factions in accordance with their strength (Bean and McAllister, 1989: 80). All 
factions to some extent represented a particular ideological position within the party, 'but this 
was corrupted enormously by the exigencies of power politics, patronage and feudal empire- 
building' (Burchell and Mathews, 1991: 15).
The distribution of power between the three factions was institutionalized in a 
'hierarchy o f states within a state' which mirrored the place o f the respective factions in the
5 Formally the National Right is called Centre Unity but in practice it is referred to as National 
Right.
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second Hawke Government (Pusey, 1991: 106). In a process akin to the political 
'colonization' of the public administration in Italy under the Christian-Democracy, the Labor 
government subjected the Civil Service to strong political control. The ministers 
representative of the Right faction controlled the 'central agencies', the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet Finance and the Treasury. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
ministers o f the Left held the less strong programme and service departments. Ministers o f 
the Centre-Left faction controlled the 'market' departments, the Department o f Finance, and 
the four departments of Trade, Resources and Energy, Primary Industry, and Industry, 
Technology and Commerce (Pusey, 1991: 76-110).
The basis of power of the three factions lay in their control of specific state branches, 
which provided membership and funding to the party organization. The Right had been 
traditionally represented in New South Wales, the largest state in the federation, and had been 
strongly supported by the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) (Hagan and Turner, 1991). The 
surge in unionized workers during the 1970s in NSW was an important determinant in the 
rise and strength of the Right (Wheelwright, 1983: 35). The Left, by contrast, had mainly 
developed in Victoria, where Bob Hawke pursued his political career (Stokes, 1983: 132- 
142). The predominance of the Right and Left in NSW and Victoria meant that the Centre 
Left could only penetrate smaller states such as Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and 
Western Australia. This suggests that in Australia the centre-periphery cleavage was fought 
from within rather than between the parties (Parkin and Marshall, 1993: 18-39).
The picture that emerged was that of three strategic groups within the party competing 
against each other as parties would in the political system. The Right steadily improved its 
strategic position in the key national organs of Parliamentary Caucus, Conference and 
Executive (McAllister, 1991). By the mid-1980s it became the most numerous group with 
40 percent of parliamentary members against the Left's 35 percent. In the 1987 federal
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election 25 percent more Right-wing candidates were electorally successful than the 
candidates of the Left (Bean and McAllister, 1989: 89). Table 4.9 illustrates that part of the 
Right's success rested on the growing strength of the New South Wales (NSW) state-branch. 
The table traces the development of membership recruitment over the 1980s in each state 
branch. What is immediately apparent from Table 4.9 is that crosscutting trends developed 
in membership recruitment. Between 1984 and 1986 membership increased by 5.8 percent 
in NSW while it declined by 3.7 percent in Victoria. Membership dropped in South Australia 
and West Australia and slightly improved in ACT and Northern Territories. Hence NSW was 
the state-branch with the fastest growing membership.
Table 4.9 ALP state-branch membership 1978-1986.
State 1978 1980 1984 1986
absolute
change
'84-86
NSW 34.0 38.5 33.2 39.0 +5.8
Victoria 24.6 25.0 24.7 21.0 -3.7
Qld 13.0 10.5 13.0 14.0 +1.0
SA 12.4 12.5 13.7 10.3 -3.4
WA 7.0 7.0 10.2 9.0 -1.2
Tasmania 7.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 + 1.0
ACT na 1.0 1.0 2.0 +1.0
NT na .7 .7 .7 0.0
total* 100 100 100 100 -
n 49,850 51,948 58,620 55,610 -3,010
Source: computed by the author from ALP membership data published in Ward, I. (1989: 166).
* Percentages may not add to total because of rounding off.
Legend: NSW= New South Wales; Qld= Queensland; SA= South Australia; WA= West Australia; ACT= 
Australia Capital Territories; NT= Northern territories.
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4.4.2 Moulding the party identity
The growing strength of NSW meant that by the early 1980s Right-wingers had displaced 
Left-wingers in most o f the party's policy committees (Wheelright, 1983: 47-40). This 
displacement was a momentous shift in the balance of power within the ALP because it 
triggered a transformation of the party identity. Like the recent abandonment of Clause IV 
by the British Labour Party, the ALP leaders pressed for modifications of the 'Objective'- 
the statement o f Labor's policy aims first drafted in 1890. The pressure for change mounted 
at the Annual Conference held in Melbourne in 1981. The debate centred on whether the 
ALP should be committed to extensive nationalization and collective ownership if  elected 
to power, or whether 'democratic socialization of industry, distribution, production and 
exchange' should be undertaken to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation' (Lloyd, 
1983: 244). The Conference eventually endorsed the idea of undertaking the socialization of 
the means o f production only 'if necessary' with 28 votes in favour and 22 against (Lloyd, 
1983: 254).
This transformation represented a critical step in the evolution o f the ALP identity 
because the Objective was a symbol of what the ALP stood for, both for Laborites of many 
generations and for their political rivals. Most importantly, 'the Objective was essentially an 
intra-party statement, the product of discussion and compromises within the party, important 
as an expression o f the party to the party' (Jaensch, 1989: 87). As mentioned in Chapter 
Three, changes o f the party platforms are often acrimonious because the outcome stands as 
symbolic evidence o f who controls the party. Modifications to the 'Objective' reflected a new 
balance o f power within the party. The Right effectively controlled most ALP policy 
committees (Wheelwright, 1983: 47).
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Against this background, reformulations of Labor's social policy signalled that Labor 
was embarking on a new course. To reinforce this perception it was necessary to mould a 
new party image by brushing away the legacy of the previous Labor government. An 
editorialist o f the Economist noted th a t' [a] central part of Keating's strategy has been to lay 
the ghost o f former minister Mr Gouge Whitlam' (The Economist, 8 October, 1988). For 
Warhurst the Whitlam experience 'influenced the Labor's party approach to a range o f 
electoral, procedural and policy matters (1994 : 1). Hawke confirms this point by stressing 
that:
Labor's years of ambitious bidding for government from the Opposition benches 
followed by the profligacy of the Whitlam years had given it a reputation for 
financial recklessness. From the beginning we were determined to eradicate this 
perception. This meant that many of our moves would be unpopular. (Hawke, 1994:
293)
Unpopular moves included cutbacks in welfare spending to reconstruct Labor's reputation, 
against the ramshackle image of the 1970s. As Hawke recalls in his memoirs, the stiffening 
o f eligibility rules was an integral part of this strategy, despite its electoral price:
In 1984 our resolution to clamp down on middle-class welfare caused a furore; this 
centred on our decision to apply an assets test to pensions and to impose an income 
test on pensioners over seventy years of age. We pressed on with this reform despite 
electoral misgivings in our own ranks. Some colleagues wanted to abandon the 
move when the heat was turned up. I refused to budge because it was intrinsically 
correct. (Hawke 1994: 293, my emphasis)
Cutbacks in welfare spending were 'intrinsically correct' because the formation of a new party 
identity involved shedding the old ideological baggage and distributing new symbolic 
incentives. The ALP National Secretary, Bob Hogg, recently asserted that 'there has been a 
number of..symbols that have been removed or changed' (Hogg, 1991: 54). Some Labor
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supporters deeply resented the loss of traditional symbols. 'To attack the ideology is to assail 
the foundations of the party itself (Maddox, 1989: 8). The main reason is that:
ideology may be used as a weapon, or as a means of intra-party control...one of its 
main purposes is to build up an image of a party not only in the minds of the voters 
but in the minds of the party members...And it is from this intraparty component, 
and to it, that statements of ideology emerge and are directed. (Jaensch, 1983: 190 
and 194)
Traditional ideological wording, such as 'the democratic socialization o f industry', were 
replaced with appreciations of the private sector; in Keating's words '[pjroperly functioning, 
the market mechanism is a powerful engine of economic growth... competition can facilitate 
the transformation to a structure that encourages growth. The benefits o f the market economy 
are therefore widely appreciated by this government' (Keating, 1985: 20). Hawke shared 
Keating's preference for free market solutions and deregulation; their partnership mitigated 
the traditional hostility of the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) for the Labor 
government (McEachem, 1986: 23). The collaboration between Labor leaders and the 
business community signalled a break with the past.
The emphasis on the private sector provided a sense of purpose to the young 
Laborites who were coming to the fore supporting free market principles and neo-classical 
economics (McAllister and Ascui, 1988:220; Galligan, 1985a: 203). For Bob Hogg, boosting 
the number o f individual members was necessary for the success o f the party: In his words 
'..if we are to stay viable as a political organization, we have to be broadly representative in 
our membership, both through union affiliations and direct membership (Hogg, 1991: 55-56). 
Hogg's account, however, seems to overlook some of the reasons behind the individual 
membership drive:
there was more to the membership drive than increasing the amounts of funds 
available and locking more people into active support for the party, especially 
during election campaigns. The drive also had the aim of countering the increasing 
control of the organization of the party by the Left, essentially through its traditional
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base in the union movement, but increasingly through take-over of sub-branches. 
(Jaensch, 1989: 48)
Thus, while the position of the Left in key national organs was deteriorating it still retained 
considerable control in the state branches. Right-wingers attempted to shield themselves from 
potential Left-wing challenges also by moulding the party identity in a way which was more 
appealing to individual members. Strengthening the role of individual members in the party 
organization was tantamount to weaken the influence of state branches and trade unions - and 
therefore of the Left faction.
In the light of the above, it is clear that the dynamics o f power within the ALP are a 
key to understanding Labor's redistributive policies. Specific policy initiatives were 
undertaken on key client groups such as pensioners and low income families, traditionally 
linked to the Left (Jennet and Stewart, 1990: 9). Since 1983, for instance, there was increased 
targeting o f income maintenance on the aged pension through the re-introduction o f the 
income test for those over 70 years old and the re-introduction in 1985 of the assets tests 
(both abolished by the Whitlam government). As a result, the election of 1984 returned Labor 
to power with a reduced majority, although many disgruntled voters might have returned to 
the ALP through the second preferences of minor parties (Galligan, 1985b).6
Figure 4.5 shows that between 1981/82 and 1985/86 the proportion o f poor 
pensioners increased significantly. Although most empirical studies of poverty use the OECD
6 The alternative vote requires voters to rank alternative candidates in order of preference, 1,2,3 
etc. If no majority is secured on the first count the candidate with the lowest number of votes is 
eliminated and his or her second preferences are distributed among the remaining candidates. 
If this does not produce an absolute majority, then the next lowest candidate is eliminated and 
his or her second preferences are distributed until an absolute majority is secured.
117
Rgure 4.5. Percentage of pensioners below or above different 
poverty lines Australia 1981/82-1989/90.
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50 percent poverty line, the figure illustrates that different cut-off points can significantly 
alter the picture. For instance, between 1981/82 and 1985/86 the overall percentage change 
of poor elderly below the OECD poverty line (50 percent of median income) grew by only 
.3 percent, from 5 percent to 5.3 percent; yet the percentage of poor pensioners just above the 
OECD poverty line, with income below 60 percent of the median, grew from 24.7 percent 
in 1981/82 to 29.5 percent in 1985/86, an overall increase of 4.8 percent. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, the main reason for using different cut-off points is that results are very
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sensitive to the exact placement of the poverty line.
A further consideration arising by looking at Figure 4.5 is that in the second half of 
the decade economic recovery did not compensate pensioners for stiffer eligibility and 
entitlement rules. A similar picture is offered by Figure 4.6 which shows the proportion of 
the population living in households consisting of 'couples with children' with income above 
or below three different poverty lines. If one limits the analysis to the OECD poverty line one 
reaches the mistaken conclusion that poverty rates declined by .4 percent. On the contrary, 
Figure 4.6 shows clearly that under the first term o f the Labor government overall poverty 
increased. The proportion of couples with children with income just above the percent OECD 
poverty line grew from 6.3 percent in 1981/82 to 7.8 in 1985/86. When the poverty line was 
set at 40 percent of the median, the proportion was exactly the same in both years.
Rising poverty rates meant that by early 1985 several issues of concern regarding the 
Family Income Supplement (FIS), the benefit for all low income families, had emerged. 
Partly as a result of narrow targeting on very low income working families and partly because 
o f low take-up rates, there was evidence that many families entitled to FIS were not claiming 
for it (Pech, 1986: 3). The take-up rate, which is the proportion of eligible families receiving 
the payment, was almost less than half. If take-up rates fall with increased targeting 'then the 
success o f targeting as an overall strategy is brought into question' (Saunders, 199L: 311)
The data presented in this section indicate that Labor was actively engaging in social 
engineering by changing the categories identified as needy. A good example o f this strategy 
was the severe attack on youth welfare. The Young Homeless Allowance of $76 introduced 
in 1986 was well below the poverty line and so strictly targeted as to be received by less than 
10 percent of the young homeless in 1988 (Gibson, 1990:196). The waiting period for school 
leavers under age 21 was extended from 6 to 13 weeks and unemployment benefits for young 
unemployed aged 16-17 were abolished (Carson and Fitzgerald, 1989). This policy
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exacerbated the plight of low income families because over 50 percent of young unemployed 
were living in households with at least one other person who was also dependent on social 
security (Frey, 1986). Figure 4.7 disaggregates the population into six age categories. It
shows that over the 1980s income inequality, as measured by the Theil index, was relatively 
stable in prime age adults (25-54) but substantially increased within the other three age 
groups. In particular, young individuals aged under 25 experienced more inequality after a 
fall in the mid-1980s. These facts suggest that cutbacks in welfare spending, especially the 
abolition of youth unemployment benefit, had major implications for the standards of living 
among the young population. Similarly, the dramatic rise in elderly inequality at the end of
Figure 4 .7 . Within-age group inequality. Australia 1 9 8 1 /8 2 -1 9 8 9 /9 0
0.22
0.2
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the decade points to the failure of the old age pension reform to achieve higher standards of 
living for the elderly. The third category, which includes individuals between 55-64 years-
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old, was severely affected in the mid-1980s by soaring unemployment rates. This age group 
was unable to benefit from the economic recovery in the second half of the 1980s as did 
prime age adults {Labour Statistics, 1990). Hence, the stiffening of eligibility and entitlement 
rules for unemployment benefits had tremendous consequences for ageing workers with 
family responsibilities.
Labor leaders, however, were particularly careful not to alienate completely their core 
constituency. The redistributive strategy was to 'check the growth in [social security 
recipient] numbers in order to sustain real benefit increases' (Saunders, 1991: 324; see 
Harding, 1992). The best illustration of this twin goal was the means-testing o f all social 
security benefits except those for the disabled. The effectiveness of this policy is summarized 
by Brian Howe, Minister for Social Security in Hawke's second and third governments:
Labor's efforts in achieving social justice for people with disabilities represent our 
progress as a party committed to improving the quality o f life for all people. The 
struggle for disability reform has epitomised the broader struggle for fairness, for 
expanded opportunities, and for better communities. (Howe, 1992: 39).
The emphasis on disability signalled that 'New Labor' was willing to protect only those social 
categories marginalized by the private market for their alleged inefficiency.
In a similar manner, after the report of the Social Security Review in 1986 which 
highlighted poverty trends, the government sharply increased some social security payments, 
including the Family Allowance Supplement and the Family Assistance Plan, but partly 
financed these increases through tighter income tests and stiffer eligibility requirements 
(Harding and Mitchell, 1992). The redistributive effect of these measures was offset by the 
slow demise of progressive income tax with significant cuts to the marginal tax rate (Krever, 
1991: 152-153; Saunders et al 1988). The Hawke government could claim to defend market 
freedom and at the same time protect the most disadvantaged social categories. Redistributive
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policies appear therefore as an instrument which Labor leaders deployed to reshape the 
identity o f the ALP party.
4.4.3 The changing ACTU-FPLP relationship
The second wedge in the process of'modernization' of the ALP was the changing relationship 
between Labor and trade unions. A most surprising fact during the 1980s was that unions 
raised little or no opposition to Hawke's departure from traditional Labor redistributive goals. 
Yet historically the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) was created to represent and 
strive for the interests of the union movement (Manning, 1992). This meant that the FPLP 
legislative actions should in principle have reflected the wishes o f the extraparliamentary 
organization (Parkin, 1983: 17). Unions were the main source o f legitimacy for the party 
organization because they provided both the funding and the loyalty of affiliated members. 
Moreover, unions wielded considerable control on the decision-making process through the 
preselection of parliamentary candidates.
Tensions between the party sub-units constantly surfaced throughout Labor history 
(MacIntyre, 1991: 21). When Labor took office friction between the ACTU and the FPLP 
often occurred, because the interests of the two Labor wings typically diverged. By contrast, 
over the 1980s the ALP-ACTU relationship was surprisingly smooth and largely 
constructive. Most analysts believe that the roots o f this harmony lay in the recognition of 
mutual dependence sanctioned by the Accord (Manning, 1995; Singleton, 1990; Stutchbury, 
1990: 58). Robert Ray, Minister of Defence, makes a strong case for this argument by 
pointing out that Hawke's strategic manoeuvring ensured 'many prominent left-wing union 
officials., enjoyed a new enhanced status in renegotiating, redefining and reassessing the 
ALP-ACTU Accord' (Ray, 1991: 32). Central to this approach was the role played by 
interdependence between the political and the industrial wing of the Labor Party.
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A different view, however, is expressed by Lindsay Tanner, the Victorian secretary 
of the Federated Clerks Unions, who contends that the 'gap between the interests and 
obligations o f the two wings of the movement has progressively widened' (1991: 76). Tanner 
describes the weaker links between unions and ALP as 'the soft underbelly of the Labor 
movement' (1991: 76). However significant the harmonious interdependence may have been, 
for Tanner this interpretation pays insufficient attention to the growing asymmetry between 
trade unions and ALP. One expression of this asymmetry was the incipient organizational 
decline of trade unions on the one hand, and the string of electoral successes accumulated by 
the ALP on the other. This bifurcation was reflected in the growing percentage of votes 
gained by the ALP and the declining percentage of trade union officials in Parliament. 
Between 1971 and 1983 union officials in parliament dropped from 20.9 per cent to 10.5 
percent (Kemp, 1988: 344).
What is more, over the 1980s union membership as a percentage of the labor force 
dropped by 8 percent (see table 4.10). For Manning these figures indicate that the 'creator of 
the Labor Party faced a less than certain future due to the cancer of membership decline' 
(Manning, 1995: 3). Table 4.10 indicates that de-unionization is not a universal trend. In the 
Scandinavian countries there were gains in trade union density rates and in Canada the trend 
was stable. The table shows that in Australia both trade union density rates and collective 
bargaining coverage rates declined. By contrast, in Portugal, Spain and France, trade union 
density rates fell while collective bargaining coverage rates rose. Only in the United Kingdom 
trade union coverage rates seemed to decline more sharply than in Australia. Several factors 
affected union density rates, most notably the expansion of jobs in traditional non-unionized 
sectors, such as non-manual service, female employment and part-time work. In addition to 
structural shifts, the drop in union membership was caused by wider earning differentials 
induced by the Accord (Keynon and Lewis, 1992). Between 1980 and 1988 the real value of
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Table 4.10. Trade union density rates and collective bargaining coverage rates in selected 
OECD countries.
Country data* trade union density rates bargaining coverage rates
1980 1990 absolute change 1980 1990 absolute change
Portugal R 61 32 -31 70 79 +9
Spain E 25 11 -14 67c 68 +1
United Kingdom E 50 39 -11 70d 47 -23
Netherlands E 35 25 -10 76 71 -5
Australia E 48 40 -8 88 80 -8
France E 17 10 -7 85 92b +7
Japan E 31 25 -6 28 23 -5
Portugal E 36 33 -3 91 90 -1
Norway E 57 56 -1 n/a n/a n/a
Canada R 36 36 0 37a 38 +1
Finland E 70 72 +2 95 95 0
Sweden E 80 82 +2 n/a n/a n/a
Source: calculated and adapted by the author from OECD Employment Outlook, 1994, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 
Countries are ordered according to the absolute change in trade union density rates.
*E= based on employed members only.
R=based on recorded membership, not corrected for retired, unemployed and self-employed members, 
a) 1985; b) 1985; c) 1985; d) Great Britain.
the federal minimum wage declined by 23 percent, mainly because the ACTU had agreed on 
wage de-indexation (King et al, 1992). De-unionization, moreover, was also a protest act 
against the economic consequences o f the Accord (Thomas, 1991: 32-56).
Generally speaking, exit from organizations has long been recognized as a symptom 
of dissatisfaction with the organization (Hirschman, 1970). De-unionization offered 
compelling evidence that unions were losing the monopoly of workers' representation, the 
most powerful resource they could deploy in bargaining with the ALP. As we have seen, with 
the exception of the United Kingdom, over the 1980s Australia experienced the sharpest drop 
in collective bargaining coverage rates amongst selected OECD countries. Hence the 
acquiescence o f trade unions to Labor's redistributive policies can partly be explained with 
the growing asymmetry between the ACTU and the FPL.
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4.5 FACTIONAL GAMES AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
It is clear, however, that the Hawke-Keating challenge to traditional redistributive policies 
was also a manifestation of intraparty warfare. As Robert Ray, Labor Minister of Defence, 
remarked:
No matter how much ideological verbiage an ALP faction may produce, reality is that 
it seeks to advance its position relative to other contending factions. What it then does 
with the command of some or all commanding heights within the party may well 
contribute to the Forward March of Human Progress...but will also incidentally 
involve the distribution of various forms of patronage...gaining a stranglehold on the 
party apparatus is a worthy political goal in itself. (Ray, 1991: 29 and 31)
Against this background, it may be surprising that any redistributive measures were 
introduced at all. Yet as mentioned above, in 1987 the Labor government implemented the 
Family Assistance Plan to support economically disadvantaged families. Since usually a time 
lag of two years is considered sufficient for policies to exert an impact, we could assess the 
redistributive effect of transfer benefits using the 1989/90 LIS dataset. Table 4.11 illustrates
Table 4.11 Gini Coefficients fo r  selected income definitions. Australia 1981/82-1989/90.
year
Pre-Tax 
Pre-Transfer Income 
(1)
Pre-Tax 
Post-Transfer Income 
(2)
Reduction from 
Transfers 
(D-(2)
1981/82 .465 .302 .163
1985/86 .496 .309 .187
1989/90 .493 .322 .171
Percentage Change
1981/82-1985/86 + 6.0 +2.0
1985/86-1989/90 - .6 +4.2
1981/82-1989/90 + 6.0 +6.6
Source: Computed by the author from LIS.
Income is adjusted with the OECD equivalence scale.
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that the drop from pre/tax-pre/transfer Gini to pre/tax-post/transfer Gini in 1989/90 was .171; 
this is lower than in 1985/86, when it was .187 but higher than in 1981/82, when it was .163. 
Although it is evident from Table 4.11 that the impact of Labor on inequality was weaker in 
the second half of the decade, there seems nevertheless to have been some reduction in 
inequality originating from transfer benefits.
4.5.1 Mitigating regressive policies.
By limiting the analysis to redistributive outputs and outcomes, however, we cannot capture 
the redistributive implications of non-decisions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). One advantage 
offered by focusing on intra-party politics is to detect which proposal never reached the 
agenda. For example, had Keating succeeded in introducing his regressive taxation policy at 
the Taxation Summit of 1985 lower income groups would presumably have been worse off.
Keating's taxation reform was essentially regressive since it was committed to shifting 
the tax burden from income to consumer goods. The provision was presented in the 
government's Draft Paper discussed at the Tax Summit in 1985, which included three 
options. Option C was prepared by Keating, endorsed by the Cabinet and strongly supported 
by the Treasury. It recommended a 30 percent cut in personal income tax supplemented by 
a broad-based consumption tax of 12.5 percent on almost all commodities. Option A 
proposed measures to broaden the tax base and introduce capital gains tax and cuts in income 
tax; Option B introduced a broad-based consumption tax at a rate of 5 per cent plus a 
wholesale tax of 10 percent to apply to a range of goods. The three Options had some support 
from different sections of the community. Option C was endorsed by the government and by 
significant sections of the business community (Singleton, 1990: 161). Welfare lobbies and 
Trade Unions accepted the general thrust of Option A (Carew, 1992: 134). Yet no agreement 
was reached and the consumption tax was abandoned.
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Most analysts attribute the eventual demise of the taxation reform to mounting 
pressures from within the party (Jaensch, 1989; Singleton, 1990). Hawke makes a strong case 
for this view in his memoirs:
On Thursday morning, 4th July, Paul and I met the Labor Premiers (Neville Wran,
New South Wales; John Cain, Victoria; Brian Burke, Western Australia; and John 
Bannon, South Australia) in my office.. They unanimously reiterated that they could 
not and would not support [the consumption tax]...after lunch I formally announced 
the death of [the tax]. (Hawke, 1994: 310)
This perspective suggests that vertical interactions between leaders and subleaders were the 
key for rejecting regressive taxation. I find this view rather unconvincing because other 
policies, notably financial deregulation and privatization, have been implemented despite 
bitter internal conflict.
A more convincing view holds that the Tax Summit was a disguised power play, an 
early test of strength between Keating and Hawke (Gruen and Grattan, 1993: xiii). Maddox 
reinforces this point by arguing that holding a summit on such a visible issue ensured taxation 
reform would not be implemented (Maddox, 1989: 131). A Financial Review editorial 
described the summit as a 'means of institutionalizing conflict' because each interest group 
emerged with more articulated and polarized positions (quoted in Galligan, 1986: 199). 
Anticipating these results, Keating had been reluctant to call a Summit and eventually 
perceived the abandonment of the consumption tax as a betrayal (Gordon, 1993: 127).
The outcome of the Tax Summit, therefore, constituted the first breach of trust in the 
Hawke-Keating relationship. Hawke derided Keating's protest of betrayal, by portraying him 
as a good actor who 'played the injured party whose pride o f authorship had been spiked by 
a Prime Minister who has abandoned his most cherished reform' (Hawke, 1994: 311). This 
quotation may suggest that internal warfare was fuelled by the confrontational personalities
of Keating and Hawke. However, explanations in terms of personalities sidestep the crucial 
question regarding the distribution of power within the party, which is the central concern of 
this work. Keating was the leader o f the most powerful faction in the party and it is 
reasonable to assume that the issue at stake was control over key posts, such as the party 
leadership, rather than questions of personality.7 These facts suggest that intra-elite 
manoeuvring mitigated the antiprogressive policies within the ALP. This is one of those 
instances in which factional politics may have acted as a stabilizing mechanism in a period 
of profound social and economic change.
4.5.2 Two-stage game over consumption taxation
To spell out the dynamics of Labor redistributive policies a useful starting point is to describe 
the probable alternatives. For simplicity I shall illustrate three basic choices. Redistribute (R) 
from rich to poor by increasing transfer spending and the progressivity o f taxation; adapt to 
change through minor reforms (r); anti-progressive policy (A) based on regressive taxation 
and stiffer eligibility and entitlement rules. Labor factions had the preference ordering 
reported in Figure 4.8. None o f the factions coincided in their first preference. The Centre- 
Left and Left coincided in their least preferred alternative and their first and second most
7 Hawke recalls in his memoirs how important it was to appoint to position of responsibility prominent 
factional leaders. When he formed the government in 1983, he appointed among his personal staff 'Peter 
Barron who was an important link with the Right, the dominant faction within the Labor Party - and in 
particular with the New South Wales branch. Robert Hogg, from the Victorian Left of the party, also joined 
my staff in those early days and was an effective factional counterpoint to Peter1 (1994: 164).
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Figure 4.8. Preference ordering o f  Labor factions with regard to redistributive policies.
Factions Left Centre Left Right
Most Preferred R r A
r R r
Least Preferred A A R
preferred alternatives were inverted. From Table 4.12* we see that none of the factions is 
sufficiently predominant to impose its first preference on the other two groups. Each faction
Table 4.12. ALP nationalfactions. Voting power expressed as a percentage o f total members.
Factions Right Centre-Left Left
National Conference 
1984
30 28 41
National Conference 
1986
41 19 39
percentage change 
1984-1986
+36 -32 -5
Source: calculated and adapted by the author from Lloyd and Swan, 1987, Table 1: 109.
must therefore enter into a process of exchange, concessions and compromises with at least 
one of the other factions to achieve its aim.
In a sense, the Centre-Left was Labor's power broker because it had the numbers to 
give victory to the Right or to the Left (Galligan, 1985a: 403). In Sartori's terms, its pivotal 
position endowed this faction with both coalition and blackmail potential (1976: 122-123). 
Since the Centre-Left lacked a strong organizational identity, it could rapidly change 
allegiance from one faction to the other. One o f the consequences was that the Centre-Left 
frequently allied with the Right to defeat the Left (McAllister, 1991: 213). The reason is that 
weak factions, like weak parties, typically avoid forging alliances with ideologically similar
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but stronger factions for fear of being absorbed by their ally (Colomer, 1991; Groennings, 
1970: 455). Coalescing with an essentially conservative faction enabled the Centre-Left to 
build a separate identity from the Left. By the end of the decade the Centre-Left apparently 
succeeded in its strategy because it became the only credible alternative to the dominant 
Right, while the Left was 'increasingly isolated on policy' (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 15).
Factional games, therefore, turned on the pivotal role played by the Centre-Left. Thus, 
Labor's redistributive policies can largely be explained by focusing on the interactions 
between the Centre-Left and the dominant Right. A simplified account of the strategic 
choices of the two factions is illustrated in Figure 4.9. This is a game of perfect information 
where one faction knows the choices its rival makes at each stage. The numbers at the end 
of each node represent the rank order of each choice for the two factions.
Figure 4.9 illustrates a game in extensive form, based on Rubinstein's (1982) 
backward induction argument, which proceeds from the second stage of the game when the 
Centre Left (CL) moves, and works out to the first. In stage two the CL may opt for
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Figure 4 .9  Redistributive policy and factional politics in the ALP
National Right (NR)
Centre Left (CL)
Pay offs 
CL NR
r = 2 A= 2
R = 1 r = 1
A = 0 R = 0
NL payoff 
CL payoff
Legend: r= minor redistributive measures 
R= major redistributive measures 
A= Antiprooresave measures
Redistribution (R) and go right. This is the worst solution for the National Right (NR)8 
because it undermines its chief article of faith, which is to reduce the influence o f government 
and devolve power to the individual. The Centre Left would also benefit from choosing r
8I introduce here the formal name of the Right faction, i.e. National Right, in order to avoid confusion in 
the following discussion between Right intended as the faction and right intended as direction.
132
because it offers higher payoffs. Since both factions have incentives to deviate from (R) and 
would rather choose r, the equilibrium solution at the second stage of the game is the pair of 
strategies (r,r).
In the first stage of the game the NR could choose A which is in line with its supply- 
side policy. However, the CL could retaliate in stage 2 and choose R (i.e. coalesce with the 
Left) to compensate for the lack of redistributive measures. For the NR this is the worst 
outcome with payoff 0 and it will therefore try to pre-empt this threat by choosing r. Thus, 
the equilibrium solution of the whole game is the pair of strategies (r,r) because both partners 
have no incentives to deviate. This is in essence the strategic manoeuvring which led to the 
failure of the Taxation Summit. Crucial was the role of the Centre Left as veto player to the 
antiprogressive policy of the Right (Gruen and Grattan, 1993: 30-32). Bob Hawke also 
preferred this outcome because it showed Keating was unable to rally the party behind him. 
Although the former ALP National Secretary, McMullan (1992: 67), criticized the 'all-too- 
common tendency to put faction before party', the empirical analysis indicates that factional 
politics had a stabilizing effect on Labor's redistributive policies.
4.5.3 A sym m etric  b a rg a in in g  and  social security  reform s
To clarify the dynamics which led unions to acquiescence in Labor social security reforms 
I use another simple game-theoretic model.9 The left-hand column of Figure 4.10 describes
Figure 4.10. The preferences o f  FPLP and ACTU.
FPLP ACTU
moderate aggressive
a) b)
Generous 2,3 1,4
c) d)
Stiff 3,1 4,3
the redistributive policy choices of the FPLP, Generous or Stiff entitlement and eligibility 
rules. The top right-hand side of the figure illustrates two strategies of wage policy pursued 
by the unions, moderate or aggressive. The numbers in the cells indicate the preferences of 
the two players in rank order from 1 to 4.
From the unions' point of view the best solution would have been cell (b) where the 
combination of aggressive wage policy and generous social security benefits increase real 
wages, abate de-unionization, and reduce poverty. From the FPLP point of view cell (b) 
would have been the worst outcome because it undermines its strategy of promoting an image 
of financial discipline as opposed to Whitlam's profligacy. It would therefore have preferred 
to choose cell (d) in which the unions end up with the worst possible outcome: the reputation 
of 'fiscal responsibility' of the FPLP translates aggressive wage policy and stiffer entitlement
9 This model is a variation o f Fritz Scharpfs (1987) monetarist coordination game. It differs form 
Sharpfs model in that the key for the bargaining outcome is the organizational decline of the Trade 
Unions.
rules into higher unemployment, poverty and wage dispersion, thus fuelling de-unionization. 
Unions would be better off by shifting to wage restraint to mitigate job losses, ending up in 
cell (c). Since the last is the best outcome for the supply-side economics beliefs underpinning 
the Hawke-Keating partnership, the government has no reason to deviate. Thus cell (c) 
represents the bargaining equilibrium, being a point of stability for both partners.
This analysis suggests that Hawke had restored a workable balance to the complex 
relationship between ACTU-ALP, but the fulcrum of that balance was the asymmetry of 
power. Labor leaders had a dominant strategy, that is a strategy preferred irrespective o f the 
choices o f the ACTU, which pushed Unions to accept the government's social reforms as the 
least worst solution. In the mid-1980s ACTU's choices were thus a function of ALP policies.
Needless to say, asymmetry meant the power o f the unions was lessening not 
subsiding. The government, in fact, paid off the cooperation o f the unions with the tax cut 
concessions reviewed in the previous sections. Galligan reported that in the Federal Budget 
o f 1984 trade unions:
had received virtually what its moderate Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
leadership demanded. ACTU president Cliff Dolan denied that this was 'A Dolan or 
an ACTU document' but admitted., 'it is one that the ACTU has had the most 
influence in.' (Galligan, 1984a: 429)
By protecting the Unions' core supporters, Labor leaders were responding to ACTU's concern 
regarding membership decline. The relationship between ACTU and FPLP reflected the 
changing pattern of Labor electoral support for the two wings of the Labor movement, and 
the loosening of organizational links in the ACTU-ALP alliance (Hagan and Turner, 1991).
The conclusion is that unions raised little opposition to Hawke's social reforms 
because the ACTU-FPLP alliance was increasingly unbalanced. This finding sharply 
contrasts with the widespread view that the cohesion of the ACTU-FPLP alliance under 
Hawke was the outcome of a balanced, mutually supportive relationship.
C o n clu s io n s
Income inequality in Australia during the 1980s rose significantly primarily because of 
income polarization in the market sphere. The shrinking middle-income class reflected a 
wider dispersion in income differentials apparently produced by structural and technological 
changes. By contrast, demographic effects had a low distributional impact. Since market 
income inequality had risen, government tax and transfers should have become more 
redistributive just to keep the distribution of post/tax-post/transfer income constant. On the 
contrary they became less effective.
The analysis pointed out that Labor's redistributive policies did not just 'happen' as 
a result o f external shocks. Policy changes were partly the outcome of strategic repositioning 
among Labor factions and of Opposition effects. In the mid-1980s stiffer entitlement and 
eligibility rules aimed at shedding the old Labor image associated with wealth redistribution 
and Labor Left-wingers, and moulding it as the party of wealth production led by Right­
wingers. Thus greater reliance on means- testing and the advocacy of ffee-market principles 
were also directed at shaping the party identity in order to forge electoral coalitions 
favourable to Right-wingers. This finding buttresses my contention that governing parties 
respond to the redistributive demands of their core constituency if the traditional leading 
faction is not superseded by a new dominant faction. The displacement of the Left by the 
Right triggered faction-voter re-alignments to sustain the new internal hierarchy.
The direct effect of factional politics on income redistribution was highlighted by the 
role of the Centre-Left faction. This faction countered the anti-progressive stance of the 
Hawke-Keating alliance by acting as pivotal player between Right and Left. We have seen
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how the Centre-Left threw the weight of its veto power against Keating's proposal of 
regressive taxation. This outcome is particularly interesting in that it supports earlier results 
which suggest that factional politics may foster the democratic control of governments (Geer 
and Shere, 1992). Furthermore, focusing on the internal arena brought to the fore the fact that 
the acquiescence o f unions in Labor's retrenchment of redistributive goals was the product 
o f asymmetric bargaining. These findings point out that by insisting on the primacy of 
electoral politics, conventional views of the redistributive impact of parties blur our 
understanding of the incentives behind the redistribution o f costs and benefits.
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CHAPTER FIVE-STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
UNDER THATCHER. 1979-1986
Let our children grow tall and some 
grow taller than others if they have 
it in them.
Margaret Thatcher1
5.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The aim of this chapter is to identify the probable causes of the pattern of income distribution 
in the United Kingdom. In Chapter Two we saw that the pace at which inequality increased 
in the UK was faster than in most industrialized countries. These findings are corroborated 
by recent publications, which call into question the widespread perception that the 
distribution o f income was moving in the direction of equality.
In June 1994 the Institute for Fiscal Studies reported that ’the proportion of the UK
population with income below half the national average has more than doubled in the past
30 years'; and most of the increases occurred in the 1980s. The report showed that the income 
share of the top decile o f the population rose from 22 percent to 25 percent during the three 
decades (Financial Times, 2 June, 1994: 10). In February 1995, the Rowntree Inquiry into 
Income and Wealth found that the trend towards increasing inequality accelerated rapidly 
between 1977 and 1990, reaching a higher level than recorded since the war.
When the Conservative Party took office in 1979 the socioeconomic scene in Great 
Britain was similar to that in Australia. The economy was in the throes o f the most severe
1 Quoted in The Independent, 10 February 1995.
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recession since the 1930s, with double digit inflation and soaring unemployment. As a 
trading nation Britain had been vulnerable to world-market trends. The economic crisis of 
the late 1970s, however had been exacerbated by Britain's demise as a great power (Gamble, 
1995a: 33).
Many supporters of the Conservative government viewed the welfare state as a main 
causes o f the economic downturn. Conservative intellectuals believed that 'egalitarianism 
[had] accompanied Britain's economic decline' (Joseph and Sumption, 1977:12). The welfare 
state allegedly imposed a burden on the taxpayer, stifled incentives to work and to save, and 
undermined individual self-reliance. Transfer benefits were deemed the principal reason of 
expenditure growth and budget deficits; stiffer entitlement benefits were therefore necessary 
to curb 'fraud and abuse' (Lister, 1991: 93).
Accordingly, the Conservative manifesto of 1979 was committed to cutting public 
expenditure and to 'rolling back the state'. These pledges were to have serious repercussions 
for social security spending which in 1978/79 represented over 46 percent o f government 
outlays. Part of the problem was that the system was supporting three times the number of 
people who had depended on it in the mid-1940s, when the National Assistance Board was 
set up (Donnison, 1982:11). Claimants of supplementary benefits had risen from one million 
to almost five million reflecting major changes in the British demographic structure. The 
number of elderly, single parents and students entitled to benefits rose faster than the rest of 
the population. Despite these changes no thorough overhaul of social assistance policies had 
occurred (Dilnot et al 1984: 23-26).
The assault on the welfare state grew out of the philosophical underpinning of the 
New Right (King, 1987: 28-62). Free-market principles and a staunch defence o f the 
minimalist state rested on the belief that 'trickle down' effects would benefit the least well-off 
- in the rising tide o f economic prosperity, not only the large boats o f the rich but also the
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small boats of the poor are raised. In some respects, New Right ideas were neither new nor 
inflexible. The Labour government in 1976-1979 curtailed transfer spending after the 
International Monetary Fund made new loans conditional on the reduction o f government 
outlays (Gamble, 1995a: 99). Over the 1980s, professional and managerial classes tempered 
the Conservative government's attack on the welfare state by protecting universal social 
services, such as the National Health Service (Le Grand and Winter, 1987: 150-151).
Welfare spending, however, followed a curious asymmetry. Although the provision 
o f social services was not substantially altered, the real break with the past came about in 
social security policies (Atkinson et al, 1986; Lister, 1991; Hill, 1990). The Economist 
pointed out that the Thatcher government was distinctive because 'none o f its predecessors 
had dared to cut social security spending' (22 December, 1979: 13). The Social Security Acts 
of 1980,1982 and 1986 established new rules which made take-up benefit more limited and 
difficult. These measures reduced the value and scope of universal benefits (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1988). As one analyst observed '[t]he practice of laissez faire  has not 
permeated social security. Since 1979 there have been almost annual Acts concerned with 
social security policy as well as countless changes in regulation and policy' (Bradshaw, 1992: 
86). During the period 1979-1988, 38 changes in the rules governing unemployment benefits 
were made which significantly reduced their scope and coverage (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1988: 125-126).
Table 5.1. shows that while the government was cutting social security spending the 
number of beneficiaries increased substantially. For instance, between 1980/81 and 1981/82 
the number of unemployment benefit recipients increased by 25 percent, yet the government 
had reduced both the coverage and the level of unemployment benefits. The drop in numbers 
receiving sickness benefits was the result o f the transfer to employers o f responsibility
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Table 5.1. Estimated numbers receiving social security benefits (Thousands). United 
Kingdom 1977/78-1984/85.
year retirement
pension
ub* sickness
benefit
invalidity
benefit
child
benefit
one parent 
benefit
fis
1977/78 8,430 620 540 550 13,680 210 85
1978/79 8,530 570 560 600 13,480 290 85
1979/80 8,680 550 490 620 13,330 370 80
1980/81 8,880 960 435 620 13,160 430 95
1981/82 9,015 1,220 445 660 13,145 470 125
1982/83 9,075 1,200 450 700 12,935 505 160
1983/84 9,095 1,260 175 730 12,720 540 175
1984/85 9,145 1,180 170 740 12,510 570 170
1985/86 9,260 1,170 170 740 12,330 600 170
Source: The Government's Expenditure Plans, 1983-4 to 1985-6 (Cmnd 8789). 
*ub=unemployment benefit.
for payment during the first eight weeks of sickness in a tax year. The most notable aspect 
of Table 5.1 is that between 1979/80 and 1985/86 the recipients of child benefit dropped by
7.5 percent. This outcome was probably the result of tighter eligibility criteria (Hills, 1987: 
92).
These facts suggest that the redistributive policies of the Conservative government 
were in stark contrast with the postwar political consensus on the desirability o f maintaining 
and developing a comprehensive system of social insurance. The basic principles of the 
system were established by the Beveridge Report published in 1942. This report proposed 
a shift away from the traditional means-tested benefits towards a more universalist system 
(Dilnot et al, 1984: 9-12). Universal benefits meant that social security was to be provided 
at the same level to all who qualified; by contrast, means-tested benefits were paid only to 
those in need.
Political leaders made considerable efforts to defend the innovative spirit o f the
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Beveridge plan. Although the return of the Conservative government in 1951 marked a 
reassertion of individualistic values and a shift away from the universalistic model o f social 
policy, the commitment to full employment was strong (Glennerster, 1995: 70-94). In the 
mid-1960s the Labour government expanded the social security system by incorporating an 
eamings-related tier into the structure of unemployment benefits (ERS) and by establishing 
the Supplementary Benefit Commission to report on the conditions of poverty. In June 1970 
the elections returned a Conservative government committed 'to develop and improve 
Britain's social service to the full' (Conservative Manifesto, 1970: 3). Prime Minister Heath 
initiated some new universal benefits, notably the constant attendance-allowance for the 
disabled and the new pension for those over-80s who could not previously qualify.
The Labour government of 1974-79 made further progress in social security policy 
by introducing non-contributory invalidity benefits, and the first benefit intended for the one- 
parent family. Prime Minister Wilson undertook the most important explicit reform of the 
Beveridge plan in the field of pensions. In 1975 the government brought in the state eamings- 
related scheme (SERPS), which gave retirement pensioners an eamings-related pension in 
addition to state pensions. The scheme introduced a 'ratchet' according to which pensions 
were indexed to prices and earnings, whichever rose faster.
By 1979 a system of annual review of benefits had been established which resulted 
in uprating national insurance benefits in line with wages and prices, whichever grew faster. 
For the entire postwar period British party leaders agreed on the definition o f poverty 
(Banting, 1979: 74). This problem was caused by a variety of factors, including personal 
misfortune, low wages, large families, disability, sickness etc., and the solution proposed was 
setting a national minimum standard of living.
Consensus on redistributive policies allegedly showed that party politics and electoral 
considerations had little influence on the final decisions (Banting, 1979: 75; Rose, 1984: 48).
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Social policy was either the product of incremental/decremental decision-making or the result 
o f pressure group activity. The Thatcher experience, however, presents a radically different 
picture. According to the book-length study of Social Security Bills in Britain undertaken by 
a team of lawyers, under Thatcher:
The primary role o f bureaucrats in formulating [social security] policy options has 
been maintained but the emphasis has changed: the parameters within which reform 
is perceived as possible have been determined by politicians rather than 
administrators. (Ogus et al 1988 : 11)
These observations validate the widely held view that in the 1980s the core executive control 
over the state apparatus was much stronger (Dunleavy, 1990: 96-125). With the election of 
a Conservative government in 1979 a new, more active and impositional style o f government 
was attempted (Richardson, 1994).
Thatcher made skilful use of advisers to extend her influence in the government and 
in her party, by establishing links with Right-wing think-tanks and intellectuals. Through this 
network of advisers Thatcher launched an attack on the social security system. First she 
wanted to reverse the trend in social security policies by reducing the role o f universal 
benefits and increasing that of means-tested benefits. Although the controversy between 
selective and universal benefits was not new in British politics (Weale, 1990: 199), Thatcher 
was the first party leader to elevate it to a primary policy objective.
The Conservative government did not merely introduce new policies to affect transfer 
benefits. There were also areas where the method of calculation of the benefits was changed. 
In 1986, for example, the government succeeded in substantially reducing the value of 
pensions just by modifying the formula for deriving them. As set out in section 6 o f the 
Pensions Act, the formula changed from 25 percent o f the best 20 years of earnings to 20 
percent of the lifetime average, and the pension inherited by the spouse was halved (Ogus et
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al, 1988: 207). The halving of inheritance rights on a partner’s pension will presumably have 
the greatest impact on lower-income families.
In other areas the lack of change was just as important. Despite the sharp rise in 
unemployment in the early eighties, no variations were made on the level and duration of 
unemployment benefits. The cumulative effect of these measures was that between 1978-9 
and 1983-4 the number of social security claimants increased by 138.4 percent but spending 
on income-related benefits increased by only 110.6 per cent in real terms (Atkinson et al. 
1986: 30). This indicated a real decline in the benefit per claimant produced by the abolition 
of the eamings-related supplement and the taxation of benefits.
The percentage of people with National Insurance benefits also declined by 10 percent 
because o f more stringent entitlement rights. Therefore, a much larger proportion o f the 
unemployed were dependent on supplementary benefit. The data collected on state transfers 
in Britain show that between 1975 and 1985 average take-home pay rose by 2 percent 
whereas the real value o f social benefits for a single unemployed person rose less than 1 
percent per annum on average (Atkinson, 1991).
Lastly, the tax system was made more regressive than ever. There was a shift away 
from direct to indirect taxation by replacing the previous split rates o f Value Added Tax 
(VAT), 8 and 12.5 percent, with a single rate of 15 percent. The Conservative government 
initially cut the top marginal tax rate on earned income from 83 to 60 percent, and later 
reduced it to 40 percent. It also cut the basic rate of income tax from 33 to 30 percent, later 
reduced to 25 percent. Raising the Value Added Tax at 15 percent added about 4 percent to 
the Retail Price Index, at a time when inflation was resurgent and oil price rising. Higher 
indirect taxation was needed to finance part of the reductions in income tax at both the top 
marginal tax rate and the basic rate.
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5.2 TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
An overview of inequality trends from 1969 up to the second Thatcher term is given in Table
5.2. The United Kingdom is one of the few LIS countries with datasets going back to the 
1960s; this information provides an opportunity to trace the inequality trend over a longer 
period than it is possible in the other two case studies. The picture that emerges from Table
5.2. suggests that the inequality trend in Britain is divided into two periods, 1969-79 and 
1979-86. It is noteworthy that inequality indices show contradictory values for the first
Table 5.2. Income Inequality in the United Kingdom 1969-1986.
(adjusted household post-tax/post-transfer income).
YEAR ATKTNSON CV GINI THEIL
6=5 e=1.5
1969 7.3 25.0 67.9 29.8 15.9
1974 10.1 27.2 67.3 28.7 14.8
1979 6.3 49.0 53.8 27.6 12.7
1986 8.4 87.9 64.7 30.3 16.5
percentage change*
'69-79 -13 + 99 -21 - 7 -2 0
'79-'86 +33 + 80 + 20 + 10 + 30
Source: computed by the author from LIS. 
* percentage changes are rounded.
period. Although the Gini, Theil and CV clearly drop, the Atkinson indices are ambiguous. 
When e=.5 inequality increased from 1969 to 1974, decreased from 1974 to 1979 and 
increased again from 1979 to 1986; but when e=1.5 the index constantly grew throughout
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the period. Since higher values of epsilon raise the sensitivity of the Atkinson Index to lower 
income groups, its steady growth throughout the period suggests a consistently less 
favourable outcome for the poor in an otherwise more affluent society.
The striking feature of Table 5.2. is that under the Conservative government there is 
a clear reversal of inequality trends. All indices increase, wht the rise ranging from 10 percent 
to percent. The unanimity of the five indices is important because it reduces the possibility 
that results are dependent on the particular index used. Snapshots of a few years, however, 
prevent us from identifying the turning point in the trend. Several authors have suggested that 
the period between 1977 and 1980 marks the start o f a sustained and substantial increase in 
inequality (Atkinson, 1991; Jenkins, 1991; Coulter et al. 1991; Stark, 1989: 179). As in the 
previous chapter, I employ inequality decomposition methods to identify non-governmental 
determinants o f income inequality. I first examine demographic and market effects and then 
I evaluate the distributional role of transfer income.
5.2.1 Demographic effects
The age profile of the British population has been regarded as an important determinant of 
growing income inequality in the years between 1965 and 1980 (Mookeijee and Shorrocks, 
1982). The growing number of elderly contributed to the upward trend in inequality to the 
point where subtracting the 'age effect1 from aggregate inequality meant a reversal of the 
trend. Recent work, however, suggests that the age effect is much less significant in the trend 
of the 1980s (Stark,1989: 181-182).
The age-decomposition analysis undertaken in this work differs from previous 
research both in the data sources and in the choice of the inequality index. Although the LIS 
datasets have not yet been used in longitudinal analyses of British trends, the most important
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contribution of my decomposition is that it relies on the generalized entropy index. As 
explained in Appendix D, this index is easily decomposable, while the Gini index employed 
by both Mookheijee and Shorrocks (1982) and Stark (1989) is not. Table 5.3. sets out the
Table 5.3. Contribution o f  changes within and between age groups in total inequality. United 
Kingdom 1969-1986. (Adjustedpost/taxpost/transfer income. Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy 
Index 0=.5).
year total inequality% within-group
inequality%
age effect% 
(between-group 
inequality)
1969 37.0 12.5 24.5
1974 38.1 13.0 25.1
1979 35.7 11.1 24.6
1986 41.1 17.7 23.3
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
results of the age decomposition between 1969 and 1986. The pattern highlights again a sharp 
contrast between the 1970s and the 1980s. Clearly the age effect was roughly stable during 
the 1970s, while there was a downward trend from 1979 to 1986 when the inequality index 
dropped from .246 to .233. Since total inequality in the same period grew from .357 to .411, 
the age factor seems negligible. A detailed examination of Table 5.3. shows that it is within- 
group inequality that explains the later trend. The age decomposition analysis is particularly 
useful in that it shows a dramatic change. For the first time in many years the pattern is 
reversed; there is an upward trend in within-group inequality and a downward trend in 
between-group inequality.
Table 5.4. shows how measures of inequality would have fared if no changes had 
occurred in the population shares. When the 1969 population shares are combined with 
adjusted disposable income figures for 1974, 1979 and 1986, the resulting total inequality is
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Table 5.4. Age decomposition o f inequality, actual and hypothetical values. United Kingdom, 
1969-1986. (Adjusted post/tax-post/transfer income. Generalized Entropy Index with 6 =  .5).
Year Actual values Hypothetical values with fixed population shares
1969 1974 1979
Total inequality
1969 37.0 37.0
1974 38.1 37.0 38.1
1979 35.7 38.1 35.9 35.7
1986 41.1 35.6 38.8 39.5
Between-group inequality
1969 24.5 24.5
1974 25.1 25.0 25.1
1979 24.9 25.6 24.1 24.6
1986 23.3 21.9 22.9 24.7
Within-group inequality
1969 12.5 12.5 14.0
1974 13.0 12.0 13.0
1979 11.1 12.4 11.7 11.1
1986 17.7 13.7 15.9 14.8
Source: computed by the author from LIS
less in 1974 and 1986 and more in 1979 than the value that corresponds to the population 
distribution in these years. Similarly, when combining the 1974 and 1979 population shares 
with the income figures of 1986, the hypothetical values of total inequality are lower than the 
actual values. The hypothetical values set out in Table 5.4 substantiate the claim that 
'between-group inequality' is the main determinant of the changes. Inequality of
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income is higher between different age groups than within the same age group. Therefore if 
population shares had remained constant, there would have been a smaller increase in
Figure 5.1 Distribution of the population by household type 
United Kingdom 1 9 6 9 -1 9 8 6
2 adults
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1 adult and children
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3adultsand children
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Source: computed by the author from LIS
inequality during the period 1969-86. These findings corroborate existing research which 
suggests that demographic changes have contributed to the pattern of income distribution in
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Britain, but not significantly (Jenkins, 1993).
We have seen that different household types may affect the distribution of income 
by reducing or increasing their concentration. In Britain, as in many other industrialized 
countries, there has been a secular decline in average household size. Figure 5.1 shows that 
between 1969 and 1986 the number of large families steadily declined while the number of 
single households and lone parents gradually increased. There is a sharp reduction in families 
with three children and a concomitant rise in parents with one offspring.
Reasons for the decline in average household size include greater mobility, a trend 
towards younger people living independently of their parents and higher divorce rates 
(Jenkins 1991; Kieman, 1989; Stark, 1989). The impact of these changes is likely to reduce 
equality all the more because they prevent income-pooling and increase the number of low 
income single-adult households, especially those of single parents (Ermisch, 1989). 
Following the same method adopted for age groups, income inequality trends are estimated 
for six household types. Table 5.5 shows that the growing proportion of smaller households 
had marginal effects on total inequality. Between 1969 and 1986 between-
Table 5.5. Contribution o f  changes within and between households to the trend in total 
inequality. United Kingdom 1969-1986. (Adjusted post/tax-post/'transfer income. Inequality 
Index: Generalized Entropy Index d=.5).
year total inequality within- household 
inequality
between household 
inequality
1969 37.0 11.5 25.5
1974 38.1 14.0 24.1
1979 35.7 11.3 24.4
1986 41.1 16.0 25.1
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
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household inequality was fairly stable. By contrast, within-household inequality had a strong 
distributional impact. These results indicate that modifications in the structure of the 
population in Britain over a period of about fifteen years had low distributional 
consequences.
5.2.2 Market effects
The impact of wage differentials on income inequality has received great attention from 
analysts of the distribution of income in Britain (Atkinson, 1991; Gardiner, 1993; Jenkins, 
1993). Several studies have detected a clear link between developments in income inequality 
and wage dispersion (Jenkins, 1986; Schmitt, 1992; Stark, 1989). Consequently, they 
concentrate specifically on the pattern of wage dispersion during the last twenty years in 
Britain. The claim that market income is the principal cause o f rising inequality is partially 
corroborated by the LIS data. Figure 5.2 represents the proportion o f the population in four 
income classes, defined in relation to the median, for the period 1969-1986. The picture that 
emerges is striking. The proportion o f the population with less than 50 percent o f median 
income more than doubled between 1969 and 1986. Furthermore, while the proportion of 
poor workers grew by 3.7 percent between 1969 and 1979, its growth accelerated under the 
Thatcher government, increasing by 8.6 percent from 1979 to 1986. At the same time, the 
richest income category with more than twice median income almost tripled, again with the 
highest increase o f 11.4 percent from 1979 to 1986.
The upper-middle income class experienced minor variations as compared to the 
other income classes, with the proportion of the population in this class dropping from 16.7 
percent to 15.2 percent. A noteworthy feature of Figure 5.2 is that over the 1980s the
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Figure 5 .2  Roportion of the population in different market incom e classes 
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Source: computed by the author from LIS 
distribution of market income was more spread away from the middle: The falling percentage
of workers with middle range incomes was associated with growth in the lower and upper
tails of the distribution, corroborating the hypothesis on the 'shrinking middle' discussed in
the previous chapter.
In a process akin to the trends in the Australian labour market, income polarization
mainly reflected structural and technological changes (Jenkins, 1993). There was an
expansion of the secondary labour market, with an increase in temporary and part-time
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workers employed in low skilled jobs. The analysis of market income differentials adds 
weight to research findings which suggest that market forces greatly affected inequality 
trends in the United Kingdom (Atkinson, 1991).
5.2.3 The distributional impact of cash transfers
As we have seen in the chapter on Australia, the role o f market forces can be better 
understood by analysing the separate effects o f market and transfer income inequality on 
total inequality. We analyse again equation 1.1. by first substituting the values in Table 5.6. 
for 1979 and 1986 and differentiating first with respect to Cm and then with respect to Ct.
Table 5.6. Income decomposition. Values fo r  the coefficient o f  variation o f  market income 
(C J , transfer income (CJ and the correlation coefficient (p). United Kingdom 1979 and 
1986. (Gross Income).
variable 1979 1986
c m 1.05 .88
Ct 1.00 1.02
A. 0.78 0.73
Pearson's 
coefficient (p)
-0.2900* -0.3042*
*signif.LE .1 (two-tailed)
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
The results o f this computation, which are reported in Table 5.7, show that the impact of 
market income inequality on total income inequality was reduced
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Table 5 .7. Results ofpartial derivatives o f  equation 1.1. United Kingdom 1979 and 1986.
partial derivative 1979 1986
dC/dCm .75 .66
dC/dCt .34 .015
in the period under examination. The reason is probably related to the higher number of 
unemployed people not earning market income in the mid-1980s. This analysis points to a 
remarkable reduction in the impact of transfer income inequality. Seven years under the Tory 
government seem to have altered the effect of redistributive policies to the point that if  
transfer income inequality increased by 100 percent it produced only 1.5 percent of total 
income inequality as opposed to 34 percent in 1979.
5.3 ECONOMIC CYCLES AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
Thatcher couched her attack on social security spending primarily in terms o f its effect on 
inflation. Her priority was to bring down inflation even at the price o f record levels of 
unemployment (Thatcher, 1993: 42). The 1979 budget reflected this strategy by embracing 
the monetarist doctrine, based on the firm control of the money supply in the medium term. 
To shift the focus o f economic policy from the short to the medium term the government 
announced a Medium Term Financial Strategy in March 1980, where monetary targets and 
the PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) were set out four years ahead (Mosley, 
1986: 193). The target range for sterling M3 was maintained between 7 percent and 11 
percent for 1980/81 and after subsequent reductions, it eventually ranged from 4 percent to 
8 percent for 1983/84. Despite greater flexibility in the setting of monetary targets, over the 
1980s monetary controls were a constant priority in the government's economic policy.
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5.3.1 Macroeconomic cycles
The main method chosen by the government to reduce the growth o f sterling M3 was to cut 
the PSBR from 4.77 percent of real GDP in 1979/80 to 1.5 percent in 1983/84 (Smith, 1987: 
92). 'Just as the PSBR had been the main source of money creation in the 1970s, it was to 
become the main instrument of monetary control in the 1980s' (Johnson, 1991: 36). These 
considerations do not imply that the government implemented a coherent and consistent 
economic design (Jackson, 1992: 11). Financial liberation proved incompatible with 
monetary controls 'and not sufficiently predictable to allow broad money targets to be 
formulated or achieved (Smith, 1987: 70). The Conservatives moved away from planned 
spending cuts after their failure to achieve them in the early 1980s.
The emphasis on restraining the public sector presumably hampered the ease with 
which redistributive policies could have adjusted to the economic cycle. Figure 5.3 shows 
the trends in the inflation rate, unemployment rate and real GDP from 1979 to 1987. The first 
point to note about the figure is that despite the increased duration of unemployment in the 
early and mid- eighties, no variations were made in the level and duration of unemployment 
benefits. Atkinson et al. believe that:
if governments can plead "not guilty", at least until recently, to the charge of 
making sudden changes in policy, this leaves them open to indictment on grounds 
of failing to adjust to changing circumstances. It is indeed striking that the White 
Paper of December 1985 (DHSS,1985) contains no more than five lines on benefits
for the unemployed. (Atkinson, et al., 1986: 18-19)
The second point is that if  redistributive policies had really followed macroeconomic trends, 
then as real GDP grew the government should have expanded social security benefits.
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Figure 5 .3  Trends in unemployment rate, real GDP and consumer price index
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Evidence suggests that the opposite actually occurred. Real GDP started rising in 1983 and 
steadily grew from 1984 to 1987, but social security benefits were curtailed in these years.
The government stiffened entitlement rules with the ratification of the Social Security 
Act of 1986, which marked the sharpest departure from postwar consensus by incorporating 
many recommendations of the 1984 Fowler Report. The pattern of change between 
redistributive policies and economic cycles in the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1987 
indicates that redistributive policies did not automatically adjust to macroeconomic variables.
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The policy actions and reactions of the Conservative government seemed to interfere with 
the economic trend.
5.3.2 Electoral politics: median voter and political business cycles
One reason why the Conservative government manipulated entitlement rules may be linked 
to vote-maximizing strategies. It is widely believed that during the postwar period British 
party leaders agreed that convergence towards 'the middle ground' ensured electoral success 
(Kavanagh and Morris 1994). Consequently, redistributive strategies were devised to 
privilege the middle groups.
Figure 5.4 shows the decile percentage share of post/tax-post/transfer income between 
1969 and 1986. The figure shows that from 1969 to 1979 a larger share o f income accrued 
to the middle income deciles. There was a steady rise in the income share of the third, fourth, 
fifth, sixth and seventh decile. This result corroborates the median voter hypothesis because 
the middle four deciles were net gainers from redistribution. Although the second decile also 
gained from 1974 to 1979, the values for the bottom decile were approximately stable. This 
stability partly explains the values for the Atkinson Indices discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter, which indicated a less favourable outcome for the poor people during the 1970s.
The salient aspect of Figure 5.4 is the reversal of the inequality trends in 1979, 
marked by wider income gaps between rich and poor. In order to visualized this inversion 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the percentage loss and gain accruing to population deciles between 
1979 and 1986. The striking feature o f the figure is that the overwhelming majority o f the 
population lost a share o f their income to the advantage of the upper income group. The
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Figure 5.4 Income share of population deciles United Kingdom 1969-1986.
Adjusted post/tax-post/transfer income.
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bottom decile experienced the largest loss, with its income share dropping by 1.1 percentage
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points between 1979 and 1986. By contrast, the upper decile gained as much as 2.3 percent 
thus more than compensating its income loss in the previous decade o f -2.1 percent.
Figure 5 .5  Ftercentage point gain and losses in the income diare of population deciles 
United Kingdom 1 969-1 9 7 9  and 1 979-1 9 8 6 .
Adjusted post/tax-post/tranter incoma
- 2.1
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Source: computed by the author from LIS
The wider dispersion of the distribution of post/tax-post/transfer income in the 1980s 
is inconsistent with established rational choice explanations based on the median voter 
hypothesis. The data in Figure 5.4, however, substantiate research findings which suggest 
that the median voter model offered a good account of the income distribution until 1979 
(Crewe and Searing, 1988). Before the advent of the Conservative government the
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distribution of disposable income reflected the predictions of models rooted in the Downsian 
tradition, while the inversion of inequality trends over the 1980s calls these models into 
question. Both Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 testify that under the Conservatives middle income 
classes lost a share of their income distribution. More specifically, Figure 5.5 points out that 
the middle four deciles lost a total of .9 percentage points o f their disposable income share 
from 1979 to 1986.
Unfortunately, the analysis of the LIS microdata sets yields only a partial picture of 
the real income distribution because of the lack of information on indirect taxation and in- 
kind transfers. It is reasonable to believe that middle income classes gained from taxation 
policy, especially from the shift to indirect taxation, and from access to universal social 
services; assessing the validity of these claims, however, lies beyond the scope o f this work.
While the LIS data are incongruent with median voter assumptions, evidence for the 
political business cycle in the United Kingdom between 1979 and 1986 is ambiguous. In 
1979 the Conservatives pledged to curb government outlays, but between 1979 and 1981 
spending increased by two percent, partly as the effect of soaring unemployment. Further 
deviation from the model was the government's reduction of the scope and level of benefits 
after 1981, regardless of the timing of elections. Highly controversial policies were enacted 
in 1982 just one year before the general election of 1983. From June 1982, for instance, the 
eamings-related supplement for Unemployment and Sickness benefit was abolished. From 
July 1982 Unemployment Benefit and Supplementary Benefit paid to unemployed people 
(with the exceptions of additions for children) became taxable.
The impact of these changes was immediate. Official estimates reported that the 
combined effect o f taxation and the 5 percent cut in unemployment benefit o f 1980 meant 
losses ranging from £140 in 1982-83 for a single person to £481.80 for a married couple; 
unemployed people with very low income lost £1.75 a week in real terms for a couple and
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£1.10 for a single person {Times, 9 July, 1982: 2). These policies marked a watershed because 
'there was no postwar precedent for legislation that cut the real value of the main national 
insurance benefits for those below pension age and that abolished benefits' (Lister 1991: 92).
The Social Security Act of 1986 deviated from the predictions o f the PBC since it 
lowered benefit levels and stiffened entitlement rights one year before the general election 
of 1987. This Bill abolished lower rate benefits which enabled those individuals not meeting 
the full contribution conditions to receive a half and a quarter rates o f national insurance. The 
result was that many people failed to qualify for national insurance benefit on account o f 
insufficient contributions. In May 1986, over 800,000 of the 3 million people unemployed 
had insufficient contributions to receive any unemployment benefit (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1988: 10). Thatcher's attempt to abolish the state eamings-related pension 
scheme foundered in the face o f the opposition of pressure groups. But in 1986 the 
government succeeded in substantially reducing the value o f the benefit by changing the 
method of calculation as described in section one.
The Social Security Act of 1980 is more consistent with the PBC since it cut the real 
value of child benefit by 9 percent, despite pre-electoral promises to increase it (Lister, 1991). 
This Bill also severed the link between wage movements and benefits discussed above. 
Another instance corroborating the predictions of the PBC is that one year after the 1983 
elections, the government abolished the child dependency addition to unemployment benefit. 
Hence in a few cases the behaviour of Conservative leaders does appear compatible with the 
PBC, but the overall trend in transfer benefits does not substantiate the model. While taxation 
policy may have followed a pattern congruent with the political business cycles, this model 
leaves too many empirical anomalies unaddressed.
161
5.3.3 Electoral geography, vote-mobilization and Director’s Law
Perhaps conventional vote-maximization models fail to explain the link between electoral 
competition and income redistribution because they neglect the peculiarity o f the British 
electoral geography.2 It is well-documented that the majority of Conservative voters live in 
the South, whereas Labour supporters are chiefly concentrated in the North. Over the 1980s 
the geographical distribution of votes coincided with differences in the principal bases of 
poverty. Available data suggest that in the South the elderly were the most likely to be poor; 
poverty in the North, by contrast, was more likely to be associated to redundancy and 
joblessness (Gregson and Robinson, 1993).
The difference in the principal bases of poverty between geographical areas may have 
been a significant factor behind the asymmetry in social security policies, which privileged 
the elderly, at least until the mid-1980s, and punished unemployed people. Krieger (1986: 
86) argues that arithmetical particularism relied on making sectional appeals, either to 
different social groups or to different geographical areas. Perhaps this is why social security 
policies penalized some 'risk exposed' groups, such as the unemployed, and privileged other 
sub-groups, such as pensioners, at least in the short-run. Cash transfers aimed at adjusting 
social relativities by changing the economic position of target groups. Redistributive costs 
and benefits may have been apportioned between different welfare recipients in order to 
mould the electoral majority.
In the light o f these considerations, transfers to pensioners followed an interesting 
pattern. In Nigel Lawson's words:
The most controversial decision announced in the 1979 Budget was the repeal of
2 Unfortunately the LIS datasets do not include the geographical variable for the United 
Kingdom, so I draw on published information on the geographical distribution of poverty and 
inequality in Britain.
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the Labour Government's legislatively enshrined formula for uprating pensions in 
line with prices or earning, whichever rose faster... As earnings normally rise faster 
than prices, Labour's commitment was an expensive one.. We decided to switch to 
straightforward indexation in line with prices. On the other hand the 1979 budget 
increased pensions by 19 1/2 percent. This increase was designed to compensate and 
to soften the blow of the change in the form of indexation. (Lawson, 1992: 36-37)
Pensions were curtailed in the medium-long term, but they were increased in the short term. 
Supporters o f the Conservative government claimed that pensioners were better off because 
pensions grew in real terms by 7 percent between 1978/9 and 1983-84 (Sked and Cook, 
1993: 346). These findings conceal the fact that the growth in real spending was almost 
entirely accounted for by demography. Between 1978/9 and 1983/4 there were 12 percent 
more pensioners which meant that spending per pensioner hardly changed in real terms 
(Hills, 1987: 91).
Yet Figure 5.6 shows that under the Conservative government pensioners increased 
their share of post/tax-post/transfer income. The proportion of pensioners with income below 
50 percent of the median dropped substantially from 4.3 percent to .9 percent between 1979 
and 1986. This is a remarkable reduction especially in the light o f rising poverty rates in the 
population, which increased from 5.7 percent in 1979 to 7.1 percent in 1986 (see Table 5.8). 
Pensioners seemingly fared better under the Conservative government than under the 
previous Labour government. Between 1979 and 1986 the proportion o f elderly above the 
highest poverty line (60 percent of median income) grew by 14.5 percent, while it only rose 
by 9.3 percent between 1974 and 1979.
The Conservative policy towards pensioners differed significantly from their attitude 
towards other state-dependent groups. As noted earlier, one o f the first casualties of the 
Thatcher government was the abolition of the eamings-related supplement (ERS) for the 
unemployed, sick and widows introduced by the Labour Government in 1966. In addition
Figure 5.6 Percentage of pensioners below or above different 
poverty lines United Kingdom 1974-1986.
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under the terms of the Social Security Act of 1980, 4 percent was cut from short term 
contributory national insurance benefits, including injury, unemployment, sickness and 
invalidity benefits. This reduction in the level of unemployment benefits suggests that a 
much larger proportion of unemployed people were poor and therefore dependent on 
supplementary benefit.
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164
Since research findings report that at least five years must elapse before policy 
changes have an impact (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 5), we can compare the 1979 and 1986 
LIS datasets to evaluate the socioeconomic consequences of changes in the social security 
system between 1979 and 1981/82. Table 5.8 sets out the cumulative percentage of 
unemployed people with incomes below three different poverty lines. Between 1974 and 
1979 the proportion of unemployed with income below 60 percent o f the median declined 
by 8.5 percent, while between 1979 and 1986 it grew by 6 percent.
Table 5.8 Cumulative percentage o f  the unemployed and total population below three 
different poverty lines (adjusted household post/tax-post/transfer income).
percent o f
median
income
unemployed population total population
1974 1979 1986 1974 1979 1986
less than 
40%
20.5 13.2 14.4 1.8 2.7 4.2
less than 
50%
30.7 21.6 23.0 6.9 5.7 7.1
less than 
60%
38.5 30.0 36.0 15.5 13.8 13.0
Source: Computed by the author from LIS
This is a significant increase in poverty rates among unemployed people in a very 
short period. Table 5.8 also shows that while the proportion of unemployed people with 
disposable income below the 60 percent poverty line increased between 1979 and 1986, the 
proportion o f the total population under the same poverty line slightly dropped from 13.8 
percent to 13 percent, an overall fall of .8 percent. Thus the Conservatives' attack on 
'scroungers' may have had considerable implications for the standards of living o f the 
unemployed people.
More generally, the consequences of tighter means testing can be gauged by looking
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at Figure 5.7 which shows the proportion of couples with children below three different 
poverty lines. Between 1974 and 1986 the cumulative percentage of poor families with 
income below 60 percent of the median almost doubled, growing from 11.1 percent to 22 
percent. But while under Labour poverty rates rose by 2.2 percent, from 11.1 percent to 13.3 
percent, under the Conservatives the proportion of poor people sharply increased from 13.3 
percent to 22 percent. The larger wedge in the pie graph of 1986 which represents extreme 
poverty (below 40 percent of median income) raises doubts about the success o f targeting 
benefits to the poor people.
Other redistributive measures limited the availability of benefits to women in general, 
and married females participating in the labour market in particular (Hill, 1990: 5). Since 
1979 successive Conservative governments have relied on a rhetoric of the 'family' and a 
reassertion o f Victorian values to justify cuts in welfare spending (McDowell, 1989: 179). 
These measures increased the financial hardship of women because unemployment is not 
equally distributed among groups in society, and women are a particularly vulnerable group. 
Harsh measures, including cutbacks in the real level of child benefit and the taxation o f 
supplementary benefits, affected the standards of living of lone-mothers. In 1986 Fowler was 
forced to reverse his decision to pay the new family credit to husbands rather than wives, 
'the transfer of cash from wife to husband upset the formidable Tory women. When they have 
allies like that, the poor hardly need the poverty lobby' {The Economist, 28 June, 1986: 27). 
This assertion is reinforced by Ogus et al who found that 'the government [had] only been 
prepared to make compromise when pressure [had] been exerted from within its own 
supporters' (1988: 11).
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Figure 5.7 Percentage of couples with children below or above 
different poverty lines United Kingdom 1974- 1986.
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Legend refers to income as a percentage of median 
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Arithmetical particularism was also pursued to capitalize on the geographical 
distribution of poverty. Income polarization between North and South was reflected in 
different patterns of dependence on supplementary benefits. In the South-East the number
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of beneficiaries grew from 9.4 percent in 1979/1980 to 9.7 percent in 1983/1984, an increase 
of .3 percentage points, while in the North it increased from 15.7 percent to 20 percent, a rise 
of 4.3 percentage points (Walker and Walker, 1987: 47-48). Hence higher unemployment, 
low paid jobs and poverty were of different magnitude and significance in the two regions 
(Johnston and Pattie, 1989: 62).
Detailed examinations of the Family Expenditure Survey data o f 1985 have shown 
that the North had a higher proportion o f individuals living in poor households (Borooah et 
al, 1991: 98). The economically fortunate were instead living in the South and formed a 
sizeable proportion of what Galbraith dubbed the 'contented electorate'(Galbraith, 1993: 15). 
Although the North-South divide pre-dates the 1980s (Fieldhouse, 1995), Walker contends 
that the Conservative government 'has helped to widen and deepen these divisions, 
sometimes to a catastrophic extent' (1987: 13).
Thus rather than passively responding to voters' demands, the Conservative 
government actively engaged in the mobilization of voters. 'Arithmetical particularism' 
coupled with the adjustment o f social relativities enabled the Conservatives to encourage 
alliances between sections of the middle class and economically privileged groups. Hence 
'Director's Law' of income redistribution and mobilization theory offer more adequate 
explanations of the curious imbalance in social security spending than mainstream, demand- 
driven models.
The new electoral coalition was forged by policy changes which explicitly denied 
benefits to specific groups while granting them to other more privileged groups. Analysts 
have observed that by stigmatizing benefits claimants through the shift to means testing the 
Tories 'have tried in a muted (..) way to extract political advantage from a widespread 
populist suspicion of the state dependent population' (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: 24). 
The link between social security benefits and social identities highlighted in Chapter Two
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suggestfthat Conservatives engaged in vote-mobilization to forge the electoral coalition that 
kept them in power.
The last point to note about the electoral arena is that the 1980s were marked by the 
lack of a credible Opposition. Divisions within the Labour Party over proposals of internal 
constitutional change absorbed the energies of the Labourites. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s Labour's political strategy shifted further to the left (Whiteley, 1983: 2-6). Labour's 
shift to the left opened a political vacuum in the centre o f the ideological space, soon filled 
by the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Throughout 1981 and 1982 the SDP 
in alliance with the Liberal Party was an apparently dominant force in shaping public opinion 
(Dunleavy and Husband, 1985: 67). The rise of the Alliance challenged the Tory moderates 
because many of them were exposed to the Alliance's advance in their constituencies 
(Riddell, 1983: 46-47). Electoral competition might therefore have tempered internal 
opposition against the antiprogressive stance of the 'dries'.
5.4 INTRAPARTY DYNAMICS AND INCOME SECURITY POLICIES
The government's attack on the 'culture of dependency' in general, and unemployed people 
in particular, derived from its conviction that transfer benefits generated disincentives to 
work. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, claimed that the social security 
system encouraged 'idleness and irresponsibility' (quoted in Gilmour, 1992: 125). Thatcher 
reinforced this view in her memoirs by pointing out that:
Both for public spending reasons and in order to deal with the "Why Work?" 
problem (namely, the disincentive to work created by the small disparity between 
in-work and out-of-work incomes), we had already agreed to tax short-term social 
benefits as soon as possible. In the interim we decided to reduce these benefits - 
unemployment, sickness, injury, maternity and invalidity benefits - by 5 percent. 
(Thatcher, 1993: 55)
The belief that transfer benefits generate disincentives to work was not supported by
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empirical evidence. In 1979 only 60 percent of those eligible were claiming the one-parent 
benefit, and in 1977 only 50 percent of those eligible were claiming FIS, while 24 percent 
o f Supplementary Benefits remained unclaimed {Social Security Statistics, Great Britain, 
1981:253).
The take-up rate was therefore well below 100 percent, casting doubts on claims of 
'fraud and abuse' by benefits' recipients and on the alleged disincentives effects o f transfer 
benefits. Yet 'abuse and fraud' continued to be the spectre used to justify draconian cuts in 
spending (Lister, 1991: 94). The Financial Times hailed the Fowler report as the cure for 
clamping down on the 'Costa del Dole' (21 August, 1985: 3). Paradoxically, these remarks 
were stated while official estimates reported that the Supplementary Benefit unclaimed was 
running at 25 percent, which meant that 410 million a year went unclaimed (Guardian, 5 
November, 1986).
5.4.1 Explicit games and anti-egalitarian ideology
The emphasis on economic, market-oriented explanations has meant that one significant 
question has gone largely unexplored: What effect has the struggle for relative dominance 
within the Conservative party had on transfer policies? It is well-documented that the years 
from 1979 to 1982 were marked by the internal struggle for real control o f the party, a time 
in which contradictions and dilemmas were particularly acute (Jessop et al, 1988: 19). Most 
accounts o f the Thatcher government, however, have paid little or no attention to the 
redistributive impact of strategic interactions within the party. It is reasonable to assume that 
internal strife influenced the apportionment of costs and benefits between social groups.
A preliminary step in understanding the Thatcherite assault on universal benefits 
involves tracing the evolution and consolidation of strategic games within the party. In 
Schelling's terms, bargaining between the Conservative elites shifted from 'tacit' to 'explicit'
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games (1980: 21). Tacit games are those where players watch and interpret each other's 
behaviour; partners cannot or will not negotiate explicitly; by contrast, in explicit games the 
conflict o f interest is publicized and overt. Tacit and explicit games are not thoroughly 
distinct concepts, since various gradations o f the two games may exist.
Most analysts of the Conservative Party have recognized the pervasiveness o f tacit 
games (Norton and Aughey, 1981: 51; McKenzie, 1963; Rose, 1964; Webb, 1994: 110). As 
one observer noted 'Conservatives...engage in ideological conflicts using sophisticated 
codewords and themes which resonate with the cognoscenti but cannot easily be picked up 
by outsiders' (Dunleavy, 1993: 124-125). Much has been written about the Conservative 
emphasis on internal cohesion. Tacit games may enhance loyalty and unity because close 
cooperation and coordination are dominant elements in these games (Schelling, 1980: 54-67).
From the mid-1960s, however, there has been a significant increase in the incidence 
of intraparty conflict (Shepherd, 1991: 103). There had been more dissenting MP votes under 
Edward Heath from 1970 to 1974 than in the previous twenty-five years, between 1945 and 
1970 (Norton, 1978: 115). The difference with pre-1970s dissent was not just a matter of 
quantity, but also o f quality. Conservative MPs traditionally expressed their dissent by 
forming ad hoc alliances from issue to issue. This pattern of internal coalitions changed in 
the 1970s, with a substantial number of MPs dissenting on the same issues (Norton, 1978: 
244). Hence the shift from tacit to explicit games fostered the formation o f more stable 
internal coalitions.
The consolidation of explicit games between Conservative elites has engendered 
several attempts at classifying ideological groups in the Conservative Party (Baker, et al, 
1994; Crewe and Searing, 1988; Dunleavy, 1993; Norton and Aughey, 1981). The difficulties 
encountered in reaching a clear-cut classification partly rest on the fact that Conservative 
elites have generally formed short term, loose tendencies rather than long-lasting, organized
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factions (Rose, 1964). Various hypotheses have been advanced to explain the quantitative 
and qualitative change in internal revolt.
Some authors contend that the party was facing a generational shift and young 
Conservative MPs had a less deferential attitude towards party policy (Budge et al, 1988: 55). 
Generational turnovers, however, are usually deemed an insufficient condition for alterations 
in the balance of power in party organizations (Panebianco, 1988: 33-45). The reason is that 
they do not always trigger variations in bargaining strength between party elites. Other 
authors maintain that internal warfare was fuelled by the authoritarian and confrontational 
personalities of Heath and Thatcher (Norton, 1978: 217-255). But explanations in terms of 
personalities sidestep the crucial question regarding the dynamics of power within the party.
5.4.2 Introducing sequential elections
A more convincing view holds that internal strife derived from MP participation in electing 
the party leader since 1965 (Shepherd, 1991: 103). Prior to 1965 the Conservative leader 
'emerged' out of informal discussions in the ranks of the party notables. The rules for the 
leadership selection introduced in 1965 did not alter significantly the relationship between 
the leader and the party. Once elected there was no provision for the formal removal of the 
party leader. It was not until 1975 that the most important changes took place (Punnett, 1993: 
262).
Two major modifications in the selection rules were introduced. First, the 15 percent 
votes requirement on the first ballot was replaced by a requirement o f 15 percent of all 
eligible voters, in addition to an absolute majority. Second, provision was made for regular 
election at the beginning of each new parliament and in each subsequent session. From 1975 
the Conservative leader had first to ensure re-election as leader and therefore satisfy the 
wishes o f the faithful MPs.
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One consequence was that the formal security of tenure o f the party leader was 
brought to an end. It may be argued that Conservative leaders never enjoyed security of 
tenure, and that the new rules merely formalized the realities o f existing relationships 
(Aughey and Norton, 1981: 246-247). Several Conservative leaders had been informally 
ousted by the members of parliament. Alec Douglas-Home, Harold MacMillan, Anthony 
Eden, Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain all resigned as a consequence o f loss o f 
confidence among their close allies (Bogdanor, 1994: 86-96).
Detailed descriptions of the leadership selection, however, suggest that the new rules 
marked a departure from previous experience. Bogdanor, for instance, concedes that 'neither 
Mrs. Thatcher, nor perhaps John Major, would have been selected under the old methods' 
(1994: 96). Jim Prior, a leading Conservative figure, observed that the new rules affected the 
relationship between Cabinet members:
the traditional ways in which the old 'inner circle' used to organize the Party 
informally and discreetly, bom of the values o f duty and loyalty - could no longer 
work. Whenever Willie Whitelaw and Francis Pym used to get together, they still 
seemed to think that the party could be run as they had run it ten or fifteen years 
earlier. Although they undoubtedly could wield some power and used all their skill 
to keep Margaret's Shadow Cabinet reasonably cohesive, it could never be the same 
again. (Prior, 1986: 103)
The increased dependence of the leader on the support o f the parliamentary party appeared 
as the 'most significant modification in the relationship between the Conservative leader and 
the party' (Norton, 1978:24). The formalization of the re-selection rules strengthened the role 
o f backbench opinion and that of the parliamentary party (Burch and Holliday, 1995: 766- 
768; Norton, 1990: 45-46).
Traditionally, the leader of the Conservative Party has been very powerful. All 
authority and policy emanate from the leader. The Central Office, the party's organizational 
headquarters, is a creature of the party leader (Webb, 1994: 110). Two consecutive election
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defeats in 1974 produced widespread recrimination against this concentration of power in the 
hands o f the then leader, Edward Heath (Berhens, 1980: 32). It is well documented that 
Thatcher was elected because she was the only serious candidate willing to challenge Heath 
and not because there was a widespread commitment to her views (King, 1983: 97; Riddell, 
1983: 21; Shepherd, 1991: 176-177).
Empirical research indicates that in 1975 the estimated share of Thatcherite MPs as 
a proportion of the Conservative parliamentary party was between 10 and 25 percent (Crewe 
and Searing, 1988: 371). Hence the election of Thatcher as leader was the unexpected 
outcome of strategic voting. The strong Tory tradition of loyalty to the party leader implied 
that those who wanted a leader other than Heath only had a chance o f getting who they 
wanted by 'voting initially for someone they did not, namely a candidate from the right of the 
party who had no inhibitions about challenging Heath' (Gamble, 1995a: 90; see also Jenkins, 
1987: 96-97).
The new rules, however, meant that the Conservative leader was now facing the 
problem of 'sequential elections'. The potential threat of a candidate standing against the 
incumbent could prove damaging for the party's image, and this gave some leverage to 
dissidents within the parliamentary party (Norton, 1978: 25). This claim has recently been 
substantiated by the contest between Major and Redwood of July 1995, which highlighted 
the devastating effects on party unity of the visibility o f the leadership battle. Most 
significantly, Major's victory was tarnished by the fact that '218 votes meant that 109 Tory 
MPs did not cast their votes for Major' {The Economist, 8 July, 1995).
Research on the leadership selection in several political parties of Western Europe 
found that the 'process of selection may constrain the style and behaviour o f those selected, 
either because of the resources required, or because of the need to ensure reselection where 
that is necessary' (Marsh, 1993: 229). These considerations suggest that 'sequential elections'
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may have impinged on Thatcher's policy-making authority and perhaps limited her influence 
on redistributive outputs.
5.4.3 Sequential elections and redistributive policies
Despite the difficulty o f classifying coalitions within the Conservative party, there is 
widespread agreement that by the end of the 1970s two broad coalitions could be easily 
discerned under the names of'dries' and 'wets'. The dries were identified with nineteenth- 
century liberalism, with the main watchwords being initiative, duty, independence. This 
coalition was overtly inegalitarian since its members believed that wide differences in income 
were both natural and desirable. The main task of the dries' new strategy was 'to challenge 
one of the central prejudices of modem British politics, the belief that it is a proper function 
o f the State to influence the distribution of wealth for its own sake' (Joseph and Sumption, 
1977: 1). The wets were less sympathetic to such views. They claimed that the Tory tradition, 
going back to Disraeli, stressed the primacy of community over individuality (Gilmour, 
1992: 142-177). They believed that some degree of state intervention for the relief o f poverty 
was necessary, and that less privileged groups should be protected.
Until the end of the Conservative first term, the dries were in a minority within the 
parliamentary party and in the Cabinet. This minority status may have been one of the 
reasons behind their ideological drive, so unusual among Conservative leaders. Whiteley et 
al (1994: 127) claim that 'Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative rarity in her readiness to 
identify Conservatism in unambiguous ideological terms'. Generally speaking, minority 
coalitions may be more ideological than majority ones because purposive incentives develop 
to substitute for other incentives controlled by the larger group, including 'representing the 
party identity and tradition' (Panebianco, 1988: 3-15).
Another reason behind the ideological 'crusade' of the dries was that it helped cement
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their internal divisions. A large number of important figures, such as Rhodes Boyson, Lord 
Beloff, Paul Johnson, Alfred Sherman, Alan Walters, had changed their political allegiances 
at least once before, and thus might be expected to do so again (Denham and Garnett, 1994: 
270-271). These people had been recruited from varying sources, some had been Liberals, 
others Labour supporters. 'Since their beliefs were shaped more by their antipathies than by 
a common positive vision, the need for a constant unifying enemy was particularly urgent for 
them '(Denham and Garnett, 1994: 271).
The existence o f internal enemies was instrumental to the viability o f the dry 
coalition. The relevance of the ideology, exemplified in Thatcher's dictum 'Is he one o f us?', 
explains why the divisions engendered in the late 1970s 'remained to plague the party 
afterwards' (Cosgrave, 1978: 36). Thatcher's account of her conflicts with Jim Prior, Minister 
o f Employment and leading wet, clearly illustrates the instrumental role o f the ideological 
drive:
For all his virtues, Jim Prior was an example o f a political type that had dominated 
and, in my view, damaged the post-war Tory Party. I call such figures 'the false 
squire'. ... In order to justify the series o f defeats that his philosophy entails, the 
false squire has to persuade rank-and-file Conservatives and indeed him self that 
advance is impossible. His whole political life would, after all, be a gigantic mistake 
if  a policy o f positive Tory reform turned out to be both practical and popular.
Hence the passionate and obstinate resistance mounted by the 'wets' to the fiscal, 
economic and trade union reforms o f the early 1980s. These reforms had either to 
fail or to be stopped. For if they succeeded a whole generation o f Tory leaders had 
despaired unnecessarily. (Thatcher, 1993: 104-105)
The wets' reaction was epitomized in Prior's belief that the inegalitarian stance was 'a very 
simplistic approach...In a world increasingly interdependent and with a people used to a 
welfare state, it looked an unpromising scenario' (Prior, 1986: 119).
Although the ideological battle over redistributive policies was cast in economic
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terms, several observers have noted that the main goal of the dries was to re-shape the 
identity o f the Conservative Party. For Deakin 'ultimately the economic arguments were 
means to a still more ambitious end - Keith Joseph's insistence that the party must move 
away once and for all from its previous position' (Deakin, 1987: 86). Gamble aptly remarks 
that '[t]he appeal to monetarism was much more than a set o f techniques for controlling the 
money supply' (1995a: 100). Bulpitt argues that '[t]he dictates of party management, political 
argument, electoral success, and above all, the necessity to find a future governing 
competence, ensured that a link would be made with the statecraft of monetarism' (1986: 33). 
To appeal to monetarism was not entirely guided by economic reasons (Hahn, 1988: 107).
Evidence substantiating these claims is provided by Thatcher's belief that a staunch 
defence o f monetarism was a pre-condition to shaping the attitudes o f the electorate:
I was utterly convinced o f one thing: there was no chance o f achieving that 
fundamental change of attitudes which was required to wrench Britain out o f 
decline if people believed that we were prepared to alter course under pressure. 
(Thatcher, 1993: 122, emphasis added)
Against this background it is not surprising that 'Thatcherism', whatever its meaning, became 
part o f the party's self-identity (Jessop et al, 1988: 6). Shaping the party identity and voters' 
attitudes was part of the same strategic line.
The minority status of Thatcherites meant that on coming to office Thatcher had little 
choice but to appoint as Cabinet ministers Heath's most able and effective supporters, 
including William Whitelaw, Jim Prior, Ian Gilmour, Peter Carrington and Lord Hailsham 
(Quintin Hogg). Thatcher also brought in people like Peter Walker, the symbol o f Heathite 
interventionism, and Christopher Soames, a typical traditional Tory. As The Economist 
commented in the wake o f the Cabinet formation 'the significant thing is not that there is a 
strong moderate faction in Cabinet, but that, with only a handful o f exceptions, the Cabinet
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is itself a moderate faction' {The Economist, 22 September, 1979: 15). The Prime Minister 
ensured that four key posts were given to her closest supporters. Geoffrey Howe was 
appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Biffen, Chief Secretary o f the Treasury, Keith 
Joseph, Secretary o f State for Industry and John Nott Secretary o f State for Trade.
Divisions inside the Cabinet grew steadily worse. Prior's reaction to the 1979 Budget 
eloquently expressed this dissension: 'It was really an enormous shock to me that the budget 
which Geoffrey [Howe] produced the month after the election of 1979 was so extreme' (Prior, 
1986: 119). Soon after the Conservatives took office, the Treasury pushed for cuts in welfare 
outlays proposing the reduction of the annual uprating of benefits in order to save £600 
million; but the proposal was abandoned in the face o f strong opposition from the Social 
Service Secretary, Patrick Jenkin (Young, 1991: 212).
As the economy slumped and unemployment soared the attack on social security 
benefits provoked an outright revolt within both the Cabinet and the Conservative 
parliamentary party. In 1981 the unemployment rate stood at 13 percent and most Cabinet 
ministers were expecting less stringent monetary rules. In the words o f Francis Pym, a 
leading wet Cabinet member:
[t]o insist that unemployment is an urgent social problem in need o f immediate and 
imaginative attention may or may not require a new economic policy, but it 
undoubtedly requires a sympathetic social policy...it is undesirable for any 
Government to make a hard and fast choice, or to appear to do so, between 
economic and social policy. (Pym, 1984: 111/112).
Thatcher's reply to mounting opposition from her Cabinet was epitomized in her famous 
statement 'I have only one thing to say. You turn if you want to. The lady's not for turning' 
(Thatcher, 1993: 122).
The Blackpool Conference held in 1981 displayed the two faces of a divided cabinet.
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Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, criticized the right-wing emphasis 
on independence and self-help because 'self help [had] a limited meaning in an inner city 
community where 40 percent of the young kids may be without work' {Times, 16 October, 
1981: 2). Internal disputes over the relationship between the Conservative party and sections 
of the British population reflected different views on the identity of the party organization. 
As mentioned above, the dries wished to reshape the party identity as the party of free-market 
principles, initiative and duty; while the wets believed that some degree of state intervention 
for the relief of poverty was necessary.
Arguably, however, the most significant aspect of the Blackpool Conference was the 
surfacing of the dilemma of sequential elections:
The unease o f Tory members o f parliament [contrasted] strongly with the loyalty 
and enthusiasm of constituency delegates for Mrs. Thatcher, and more particularly 
for Thatcherism. The ..more applause she won at Blackpool the less appeal she had 
to the broader electorate watching television. {The Economist, 17 October, 1981: 29)
Had the Conservative leader responded to the demands of moderate Cabinet ministers and 
to those of the wider electorate, she would have annoyed the party's rank-and-file. Thatcher 
skilfully deployed different sources of power to overcome the tensions between wets and 
rank-and-file on the one side, and between wets and dries on the other. She immediately 
appealed to party activists in order to mobilize their support. In her words:
The dissenters in the cabinet had been stunned by the 1981 budget proposals. It was 
clear that the Party in the country must be mobilized in support o f what we were 
doing. The forthcoming Central Council o f the Conservative Party provided an 
opportunity for me to do this... I got a good reception. For the moment at least, the 
Party faithful were prepared to take the heat and back the government. (Thatcher,
1993: 138-139)
The key importance ascribed to activists is perhaps one of the reasons why party membership
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increased under Thatcher, after years of relentless decline. Her appeal to the rank-and-file 
raised activists' perception of their importance for the party organization. Survey findings 
suggest that since the early 1980s Conservative activists have been feeling more influential 
in the decision-making process of the party organization (Whiteley et al, 1994 ).3
Thatcher's popularity with the rank-and-file probably reflected her responsiveness to 
their views. 'Above all', wrote the Times, 'Mrs.Thatcher has given voice to many grassroots 
Tory views about unions, law and order, scroungers and capital punishment' (11 March, 
1986: 3). By distributing purposive incentives through attacks on scroungers and on the 
welfare state, the Conservative leader was able to develop and strengthen the loyalty of party 
activists.
The strains between wets and dries were partly eased by relaxing public expenditure. 
Growth in government outlays in the early 1980s was the effect of automatic stabilizers, but 
it was also reflected in the strength of internal opposition: 'The relenting on cuts took some 
o f the edge off the cabinet anger.. It is regarded as signalling the start o f the 'wet 
appeasement'. (The Economist, 24 October, 1981: 29). For Shepherd, Thatcher always 
tempered her radicalism with an overriding desire that the Conservatives should hold office 
with her as their leader (1991: 178).
Internal turmoil over Thatcherite social policy was regularly reported by the press. 
The Times, for instance, described how 'the Government suffered one of its biggest backlash 
revolts of the present parliament., when 13 Conservative MPs voted to restore the 5 per cent 
that was cut from unemployment benefits in 1980' (18 March, 1982: 1). The Financial Times 
depicted this revolt as 'the most determined piece of internal dissent Mrs. Thatcher has
3 These results seem to reject McKenzie's (1963) claim that Conservative activists are not 
relevant actors in the decision-making process. Yet, they also qualify Kelly's (1989) contention 
that activists significantly influence policy-making. Activists do play a role, but not a very 
significant one.
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suffered' (14 July, 1982). Hence by appealing to the party rank-and-file and by appeasing the 
wets, Thatcher was able to forge an internal alliance and to retain the leadership despite the 
fact that the dries were a minority coalition.
5.4.4 Breaking the Internal Alliance on Social Security Policies.
Internal wrangling reached a climax in the summer of 1981 during the discussions preparing 
the budget. The Treasury urged spending cuts for 1982-83, below the totals derived from the 
March white paper. Thatcher recounts in her memoirs how this proposal sparked 'one o f the 
bitterest arguments on the economy, or any subject, that I can ever recall taking place at 
Cabinet during my premiership' (Thatcher, 1993: 148). Internal struggles damaged the party 
image, to the point that:
decisions came to be seen as victories by one side or the other., and it was quite 
impossible to convey a sense of unity and purpose in this climate. ..Some ministers 
were trying to discredit the [the government's] strategy itself. (Thatcher, 1993: 130)
Fierce reactions to the 1981 Budget acted as a springboard for a Cabinet reshuffle. According 
to Francis Pym, 'Margaret Thatcher saw this crisis as a personal challenge to her resolve and 
became doubly determined not to give an inch on the economic strategy' (Pym, 184 : 8). 
Between 1981-1982 she dropped three well-known wets: Ian Gilmour, Lord Privy Seal, 
Christopher Soames, Leader o f the Lords and Mark Carlisle at Education, and brought in 
three men on whom she could rely, Norman Tebbit, who was appointed Minister of 
Employment, Nigel Lawson, Minister of Energy and Norman Fowler, who became Minister
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of Health and Social Security.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the dynamics which induced the cabinet reshuffle and ended the 
search for a compromise in social security policies. The top part o f the figure shows the 
compromise on social security spending and taxation as the equilibrium solution o f the 
bargaining strategies pursued by the wets and the dries between 1979 and 1981. Point A! was 
appealing to the dries because by 'appeasing' the wets it deferred the threat of a leadership re­
selection and retained party unity. The lower half of Figure 5.8 depicts a typical situation in 
bargaining theory where weakness may be strength (Schelling, 1980: 48-49). As 
unemployment mounted, the wets shifted their position to W, which challenged the 
redistributive policies of the dries.
At this critical point two institutional features insulated Margaret Thatcher from 
losing control of policy-making. The constitutional role of Prime Ministers in appointing and 
reshuffling their Cabinets was 'undoubtedly one of the most important ways in which a prime 
minister [could] exercise power over the whole conduct of government' (Thatcher, 1993: 25). 
King claims that Thatcher used her hiring-and-firing power far more than any other 
twentieth-century Prime Minister (1988: 59). In Panebianco's terms, another salient aspect 
was the 'strong institutionalization' of the Conservative party which concentrated power in 
the hands of the dominant coalition and prevented the development of stable organized 
factions and (Panebianco, 1988: 130-141). The wets had no real alternative but to grudgingly 
accept the policy-making authority of the party leader.
The Cabinet reshuffle and the electoral landslide o f 1983 crushed the wets as a 
coherent force within the party. Thatcherite ideas apparently became so dominant that social 
policy ceased to be a divisive issue among MPs during the second Conservative term (Garry,
1994). The Fowler report marked a retreat from any serious commitment o f insuring 
individuals against risk (Lister, 1991). Its major proposals were cuts in child benefit and the
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phasing out o f SERPS which meant a far less secure and independent old age. It is 
noteworthy that research findings show a rapid increase in inequality after 1985 (Atkinson,
1995).
To assess the redistributive impact of those measures implemented under the second 
Thatcher term, I cannot rely on the LIS dataset of 1986 because o f time-lags in the various 
stages o f the policy process. But recent simulations suggest that changes to the transfer 
system during the entire period 1979-1987 significantly affected income inequality (Johnson
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Figure 5.9. Re-transfer, post-transfer and post-tax income.
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and Webb, 1988). Some evidence supporting these findings is presented in Figure 5.9 which 
shows the trends in the Gini values for pre-transfer, post-transfer and post-tax incomes 
between 1969 and 1986. It is evident that the distributional impact of the transfer system is 
far stronger than that of the tax system, adding weight to the findings discussed in Chapter 
Two. The distributional pattern traced in Figure 5.9 shows that inequality declined steadily 
in post/transfer and post/tax income until 1979; while it increased in pre/transfer (original) 
income since 1974, thus corroborating my results on the important role o f market income 
differentials in the acceleration of income inequality.
It is worth pointing out, however, that under the Labour government of 1974 -1979 
the Gini values for post-transfer (and post-tax) income continued to decline, suggesting that 
the social security system had equalizing effects. This decline in post-transfer Gini was 
consistent with the pattern traced since the 1960s. By contrast, Figure 5.9 clearly indicates 
that the advent of the Conservative government in 1979 marked a departure from previous 
experience, with considerable increases in the Gini values for all three income concepts.
Conclusions
The fact that over the 1980s income inequality in the United Kingdom grew faster than 
elsewhere suggested that national factors played a crucial role. Decomposing the structure 
o f inequality highlighted the low distributional impact of demographic variables, such as the 
growing number of elderly and the smaller size of households. By contrast, income 
polarization in the market sphere had strong disequalizing effects, supporting research 
findings based on the central role of market (original, pre-transfer) income.
This wider dispersion of market differentials, however, was not offset by government 
intervention. The Conservatives sustained pre-transfer income inequality by attacking the 
'culture o f dependency'. Yet Conservative rhetoric concealed an asymmetry in the distribution
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of costs and benefits among beneficiaries. Generous pension benefits privileged the elderly 
living in the affluent South while cutbacks in the level and scope of unemployment benefit 
exposed the people out o f work to the risk o f extreme poverty. These facts seemed 
incongruent with conventional demand-driven explanations.
The driving forces behind the allocation of costs and benefits seemingly stemmed 
from supply-side factors. By capitalizing on the geographical distribution o f poverty in 
Britain, the Thatcher government aimed at moulding coalitions o f voters between people in 
work and pensioners. According to 'Director's Law' of income redistribution social groups 
enter or exit electoral coalitions if redistributive policies alter their incentives to vote (Stigler, 
1970). Thus the Conservatives engaged in a sophisticated application of 'arithmetical 
particularism', whereby some state-dependent groups, including women, lone parents and low 
income groups, were penalized while others were privileged. In this way Conservatives 
mobilized sections of the British adult population into the coalition o f Conservative voters.
Explanations of Thatcher's redistributive policies, however, seem to have focused too 
exclusively on electoral considerations. My account suggests that the struggle between wets 
and dries was also important. It was evident that the allocation of cash transfers over the 
1980s reflected strategic repositioning within the governing party. More specifically, the 
dilemma of sequential elections impinged on the options available to the contending partners. 
By raising Thatcher's threat perception, it facilitated the compromise on social security 
benefits between 1979 and 1981. Furthermore, it was not until the wets abandoned the 
internal battle that the Conservative government undertook the most radical departure from 
post-war social security policies.
Vote-mobilization and intraparty politics eventually converged in strengthening the 
Conservative anti-egalitarian stance, thus contributing to the accelerating pace o f income 
inequality in the United Kingdom. The results presented in this chapter indicate that the
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growing gap between rich and poor in Britain is not accidental, a mere product o f 'natural' 
differences. While this consolidates the findings of most scholars, my account differs in that 
it points out that some of the driving forces behind income redistribution spring from within- 
elite conflicts.
The argument developed throughout this chapter clearly illustrates that variations in 
redistributive policies are partly triggered by the formation and demise of party factions, and 
by the consequent variation in elite-voter alignments. It thus shows the advantages o f ceasing 
to regard governing parties as unitary actors and treating as strategic what is instead 
conventionally viewed as parametric, that is, the struggle for relative dominance between 
party elites.
188
CHAPTER SIX-DECLINING INEQUALITY UNDER TRUDEAU. THE IMPACT OF 
FACTIONAL POLITICS AND OPPOSITION EFFECTS ON INCOME 
REDISTRIBUTION
[M]ake sure that once the wealth is produced, 
it is distributed with fairness.
Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1993: 189)
6.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter examines income inequality trends in Canada during the Liberal government o f 
Trudeau. The 1960s and 1970s were marked by rapid developments in social security 
policies, sparked off by the widespread recognition that despite economic growth there were 
still millions of Canadians living in poverty. In 1965 Pearson, the Liberal Prime Minister, had 
established a Special Planning Secretariat to coordinate anti-poverty programmes and a 
federal-provincial conference to discuss the problem (Westell, 1972: 168). Between 1965 and 
1975 new programmes were set up, the scope of existing social insurance schemes was 
extended and transfer benefits were increased (Wolfson, 1986). Banting (1987a: 17) defines 
this period as the 'golden age of income security' with the implementation of the Canada 
Assistance plan, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, the Canada Pension Plan and the 
Quebec Pension Plan. In 1973 the government expanded Federal family allowances and 
introduced the Quebec Family allowances.
The Finance Minister Edgar Benson had established a strong redistributive thrust to 
fiscal policy in his 1970 budget speech: 'steady and sustainable improvement in the standard
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of living of all Canadians requires... [among other things] that we obtain a progressively more 
equitable distribution of the goods and services we produce.' (House o f  Commons 
D ebates:\138 , 1970). Gillespie noted that the tax-reform budget o f 1971 was indeed 'built 
upon a fair and equitable tax system' and was 'modestly redistributive' favouring policies that 
would improve the economic conditions of the poor relative to the highest income families 
(Gillespie, 1978: 10).
Major reforms in income security were initiated in June 1970, with the publication 
o f the government's White Paper Unemployment Insurance in the '70s (Dodge, 1975: 
Gillespie, 1978: 5-9). The White Paper proposed a sweeping expansion o f the unemployment 
insurance system, transforming it into one of the most generous programmes in the world 
(Struthers, 1989: 237). The old unemployment insurance scheme introduced in 1940 covered 
only workers who earned up to $7,800 a year, excluding all middle income groups. It also 
related benefits to contributions, which meant that new entrants to the labour force and those 
who regularly suffered unemployment were entitled to the least benefits. The original act 
exempted from coverage 58 percent o f the labour force, the most prominent among them 
being agricultural workers, fishermen, hospital employees, civil servants and teachers. The 
White Paper Unemployment Insurance in the '70s also improved old age pensions, boosting 
a politically potent group of almost two million voters (Banting, 1987: 27).
The new unemployment insurance scheme broadened coverage to all employees, 
adding 1,200,000 people. Benefits were raised to two-thirds o f regular earnings. The length 
of time for which benefits could be paid was not related to contributions, but to the level of 
unemployment: when unemployment was high and the chances of getting work low, the pay­
out period was lengthened. Premiums paid by employees and employers financed the scheme 
when unemployment was low, but as soon as it topped 4 percent the government began to 
contribute, roughly $100 million for every 1 percent climb in unemployment. For the first
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time benefits were paid for maternity and sickness. Research findings on the redistributive 
effects of the unemployment insurance scheme introduced in 1971 showed that low income 
groups received 50 percent of all benefit paid while contributing about 14 percent, implying 
a substantial transfer of income to this group from the middle and upper contributors (Bailey 
and Naemark, 1977).
The 'golden age' o f fighting income inequality, however, evaporated rapidly in the 
latter half o f the 1970s. The budgetary intentions of the Liberal government with respect to 
distribution of income policy changed considerably. On 30 September 1974 Trudeau 
announced to the House of Commons his intention to stiffen eligibility requirements for 
unemployment benefits. Family allowances were first de-indexed in 1976 and then curtailed 
in 1978 in favour of an income-tested selective tax-credit programme for children. In 1978 
the government reduced the level of unemployment benefits, but attempts to trim pension 
programmes were withdrawn in response to a nationwide protest (Banting, 1987: 187). This 
outcome was in stark contrast with the experience of the United States and Great Britain 
where pension benefits were cut during the 1980s.
A key to understanding social security policies in Canada is the role played by social 
cleavages, most notably the geographical, cultural and national-local cleavage (Cairns, 1968; 
Struthers, 1989: 230-237). In the late 1960s income inequality between regions was a 
sensitive issue. As Cairns writes:
to the extent that our politics has been ameliorative it has been more 
concerned with the distribution of burdens and benefits between sections than 
between classes. The poverty of the Maritimes has occupied an honourable 
place in the foreground of public discussion. The diffuse poverty o f the 
generally underprivileged has scarcely been noticed. (Cairns, 1968: 74)
The extent o f regional disparity in 1971 can be gauged by looking at the stacked-bar chart
191
Figure 6 .1 .  Average value of income component as a percentage of average gross income .Canada 1 971 .
BRITISH COLUMBIA
praries
ALBERTA
SASKATCHEWAN
« ■ ■ ■  1
M A NITO B A ^ BHSIil mm1 1
ON TA R IO
QUEBEC
maritimes
NEW  BRUNSWICK m m m m —2-------------- jh
N O V A  SCOTIA 
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 
N EW FOUNDLAND
m m sm m m m M  f -s
0  5 0  1 0 0  1 5 0  2 0 0  2 5 0
|  wages and salaries |  self-empl. [ f |  property income H  market income H  tranter income 
Souroe: oomputed bv the author from LIS
illustrated in Figure 6.1. It shows the 'income package' of the ten provinces by reporting the 
average values of the income component as a percentage of average gross income. The point 
to note is that the percentage of average transfer income over average gross income was much 
higher in the Maritimes than in the Prairies or in Ontario and Quebec. In Prince Edward 
Island, for instance, transfer income was three times the share of British Columbia. Transfers 
were probably compensating for lower shares of wages and salaries accruing to this province. 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick received a larger share of transfers than any 
of the other western provinces. Figure 6.1. clearly highlights the implications of redistributive 
choices for the standard of living in the Maritimes.
Territorial conflicts were reflected in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1978, 
which provided for regional diversity. Cutbacks in unemployment benefits were moderated 
by the clause of 'variable entrance requirement' which entitled high unemployment regions,
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such as the Maritimes, to more benefits. Traditionally the federal government has been 
responsible for income support programmes, such as old-age pensions and family allowances, 
while provinces are mostly in charge o f the provision of services (Banting, 1987b). The 
Canadian Constitution, however, did not address the problem of the constitutional division 
o f power in social security1. For this reason, and in contrast to every other policy area, the 
formal division of power over income security has been repeatedly amended:
Over the course of a half century these adaptations have radically changed the 
jurisdiction and power relations in the income security field. From an area o f virtually 
absolute provincial dominance in the 1860s, income security has emerged as an area 
o f decisive federal dominance in the 1980'. (Banting, 1987a : 47)
The federal government has often had an incentive to maintain a vigorous role in income 
security because this has been 'one o f its major weapons in the continuing struggle for the 
loyalties of Canadians' (Banting, 1987a: 66). Looking at the resources of both central and 
provincial governments in six federal systems, Lijphart argues that Canadian federalism is 
one of the most decentralized (1984 : 170-179; see Elkins and Simeon, 1980: 31-76; Smiley, 
1976). Another index o f provincial importance in the 1960s was higher voter turnout at 
provincial elections than at national elections (Scarrow, 1965).
Cultural conflicts associated with the core-periphery cleavage stemmed from the 
vigorous resistance raised by the province of Quebec, inhabited by a majority of French 
Canadians, against attempts to be incorporated into an English-speaking Canada. Although 
Canada had been a British colony for over a century, the Quebecois retained their language, 
as well as their religion, laws, customs and education system. So the standardization of a 
language, which is one of the most important steps for completing the nation-building
1
The situation was not modified after the patriation o f the Canadian Constitution brought about 
by the adoption o f the Canada Act in the British House of Commons in 1982 (Pal, 1985).
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process, was never achieved (Lipset-Rokkan, 1967: 14; see also Komberg and Clarke, 1992: 
1-33 ).
The core-periphery cleavage deeply affected the development of Canadian political 
parties (McRae, 1974: 250). Unlike Australian and British political parties which divided 
along class lines, party competition in Canada evolved around opposite sides o f the core- 
periphery cleavage : the Progressive - Conservative party aggregated the interests o f the 
English and Irish Protestants and was considered the party of government centralization in 
Ottawa. The Liberal party was identified as the party of French speaking Catholics and 
provincial autonomy. Survey findings in the mid-1960s showed that 62 percent o f French- 
speaking respondents voted for Liberals, 15 percent voted Conservative and 11 percent 
favoured the New Democratic Party (NDP). By contrast, English speaking voters were more 
evenly distributed with 42 percent voting for Liberals and 38 percent preferring 
Conservatives (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975: 190). Hence the Liberals had the strongest 
party identification because the French-speaking community was more cohesive in its vote 
(LeDuc, 1981).
One manifestation of provincial autonomy is that provincial organizations are the 
most significant unit in Canadian political parties (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975: 66). The 
Liberal Party, for instance, developed as a federation o f ten provincial and two territorial 
associations. The party headquarters - the National Liberal Federation - coordinated rather 
than integrated the organizational subunits. These subunits acted as independent centres of 
power, increasing the potential for internal divisive forces.
The independence of provincial associations rested on their ability to distribute 
selective and collective incentives. They enjoyed relative financial autonomy because funds 
flowed independently to the federal and the provincial units (Smiley, 1976: 90-91). The 
distribution o f selective incentives was achieved through appointments and patronage.
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Schlesinger (1991:215) defines Canadian parties as 'open neophyte parties' because of late 
entry into advanced office without prior office experience.
Both Conservative and Liberal parties have been conspicuous in western democracies 
to promote to positions of national legislative leadership individuals with little or no prior 
parliamentary experience. Trudeau, for instance, was elected leader after merely two years 
o f parliamentary experience. A distinctive feature of Canadian parties is that the career 
patterns within the federal and provincial organizations are to a large extent separated, there 
is no cumulation of mandate. In 1970 only 6.4 percent o f264 seats in the House o f Commons 
were filled by former members of provincial legislatures (Smiley, 1976: 89).
Organizational discontinuity between federal and provincial wings has been so 
significant that cross party alliances at the provincial level have called into question the 
'collective identity' o f the party transcending federal-provincial lines (Whitaker, 1977: xxii). 
Tensions between national leaders attempting to centralize power and resistance opposed by 
provincial associations have marked the history of the Liberal party (Wearing, 1981: 75).
The salience of the core-periphery cleavage in Canadian politics represents an 
exception in the cleavage theory of party development, which predicts that core-periphery 
cleavages would give way to the class cleavage, with a trend towards similar patterns of party 
support across regions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 15-25). National-local conflicts have had 
greater weight than functionally based interests, such as the owner-worker conflict 
(Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975: 75). The often quoted comparative study by Alford on 
class-voting in Anglo-American democracies showed Canada at the bottom o f the scale in 
the early 1960s (Alford, 1964: 102).
Weak links between social class and party support have hindered the transformation 
o f Canadian parties from cadre parties into mass parties. Most analysts stress the 
organizational underdevelopment of Canadian parties (Angell, 1987: 364-366; Clarkson,
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of redistributive policies in its party programmes (1977: 156-159).
Social security policies resurfaced in the political agenda of the Liberal party after 
the formation of the NDP. By merging the voting strength of the CCF and of the trade unions 
the NDP constituted an electoral challenge from the Left (Thombum, 1979: 10). Change in 
the political atmosphere became gradually discernible. Survey findings showed that NDP 
supporters were more concerned with social security policies than other voters; perhaps this 
explains why the completion of the welfare state became one o f the dominant campaign 
themes during the 1960s (Budge et al. 1987: 78; Gagne and Regenstreif, 1965). In those years 
redistributive policies, such as the Guaranteed Annual Income, were incessantly discussed 
by both Conservative and Liberal leaders. In Leman's view, proposals for the guaranteed 
income were 'elite directed', since there was little evidence of widespread public support 
(1980: 58). The implication was that redistributive policies could be deployed as an 
instrument for the mobilization of voters.
Entrance of the NDP in the political arena altered the options available to the Liberal 
leaders. The growing electoral strength of the NDP brought to the fore the erosion of partisan 
attachments. It also suggested that the declining 'structural predisposition' o f the political 
system towards the Liberal Party (Meisel, 1974). Survey findings in the mid-1960s reported 
that over 30 percent of respondents were unable or unwilling to identify with a particular 
party (Jenson 1975: 549); hence there was a sizable number of undecided voters for whom 
partisanship was less certain (LeDuc, 1981; Clarke et al 1984: 47). Electoral volatility further 
increased in 1970 when the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18, extending the franchise 
to approximately one million new voters.
These changes in the political scenario of the 1960s suggest that redistributive 
programmes under Trudeau were affected by a plurality of factors. Electoral volatility and, 
more generally, a turbulent electoral arena impinged on the options available to party leaders.
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The Trudeau era therefore provides a good case study for mobilization theory, while at the 
same time lending itself to the analysis of intraparty politics, since Trudeau retained power 
for sixteen years, from 1968 to 1984.
6.2 TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
An overview of income inequality in the period from 1971 to 1981 is reported in Table 6.1. 
The inequality indices indicate that over the 1970s there was a reduction in income 
differences with the sharpest decline occurring at the beginning of the decade. Taking into 
account that income distributions change slowly, the drop in income inequality between 1971 
and 1975 is remarkable, suggesting that redistributive policies had profound effects on 
inequality.
Another point to note is the faster reduction in most of the indices sensitive to lower 
income groups. Between 1971 and 1975 the Atkinson Index with e=.5 dropped by 24 percent 
and the Theil index fell by 16 percent. In the second half of the 1970s the results are less 
clear-cut, since most indices declined while the Atkinson index with e=1.5 increased. This
Table 6.1. Trends in Income Inequality Canada 1971-1981.
(Adjusted householdpost/tax-post/transfer income)
Year ATKINSON CV GINI THEIL
€=.5 6=1.5
1971 12.5 79.6 72.5 39.1 26.1
1975 09.4 69.5 63.7 36.0 21.8
1981 08.3 83.3 62.5 34.3 19.5
Percentage change
1971/1975 -24 -12 -12 -8 -16
1975/1981 +12 +19 -1 -5 -10
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
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Table 6.2. Population decile share o f  post/transfer-post/tax income and adjustedpost/tax- 
post/transfer income. Canada 1971-1981
Decile
post/tax-post/transfer income adjusted post/tax- post/transfer income
1971 1975 1981 1971 1975 1981
bottom .8 1.3 1.8 1.3 2.0 2.5
second 2.6 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.4 4.7
third 4.3 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.7 5.9
fourth 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.4 7.0 7.0
fifth 8.1 8.3 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.2
sixth 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.4 9.7 9.5
seventh 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.0
eighth 14.0 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.0 12.9
nine 16.9 16.3 16.2 16.4 15.7 15.5
top 25.1 24.0 23.3 25.2 23.1 22.8
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
or 2 percent, a difference of .2 percent is significant.
Table 6.2 also shows that adjusting income for family size and composition may 
substantially reduce the income share of the top decile. From 1971 to 1975 the rich people 
lost 2.1 percent of their adjusted income share, while they lost only .9 o f their unadjusted 
income. These findings suggest that the income concept might account for the different 
results obtained in Gillespie's work and in mine. As I have done in the previous two 
chapters, I now decompose the inequality trend to assess the distributional effects of the age 
structure and the household size and composition. Since I have already discussed at length 
the technical and conceptual background to this analysis, in the following sections I only 
examine the evidence without reiterating on the technical aspects.
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6.2.1 Demographic effects
Table 6.3 suggests that within-group inequality had a stronger impact on the decline in 
aggregate inequality than between-group inequality. The distributional effects of the 'baby
Table 6.3 Contribution o f  changes within and between age-groups to the trend in total 
inequality in adjustedpost/tax-post/transfer income. Canada 19r 1-1981.
(Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy Index d=.5)
year total inequality within group 
inequality
age effect 
(between group 
inequality)
1971 39.0 12.3 26.9
1975 36.7 09.9 26.8
1981 34.4 09.3 25.1
Source: Computed by the author from LIS
boom' of the 1960s seem marginal. The simulation exercise reported in Table 6.4. supports 
this finding. It shows that when the 1971 population shares are combined with the income 
data of 1975 and 1981 the resulting hypothetical aggregate inequality is less in 1975 and 1981 
than in 1971. When combining the population shares of 1975 with the income data of 1981 
the hypothetical value is 36.8 percent which is approximately the same as the actual value. 
36.7 percent. The general significance of Table 6.4 is that the 'within-group' component was 
the major factor influencing the inequality trend.
Over the 1970s household size and composition in Canada underwent major changes. 
The processes which brought about the decline of the traditional family composed of a couple 
with children were similar to those in other industrialized countries, namely greater mobility 
and higher rates of marital breakdown, which led to large increases in the number of one-
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Table 6.4. Age decomposition o f inequality in adjusted post tax-post transfer income in 
Canada 1971-1981 (Inequality Index: Generalized Entropy Index with 6 = 5j.
Year Actual values Hypothetical values with fixed population shares
1971 1975 1981
Total inequality
1971 39.0 39.0 37.5 34.2
1975 36.7 36.3 36.7 34.5
1981 34.4 34.2 36.8 34.4
Between-group inequality
1971 26.9 26.9 23.5 27.8
1975 26.8 25.8 26.8 29.8
1981 25.1 25.4 25.9 25.1
Within-group inequality
1971 12.3 12.3 14.0 6.4
1975 9.9 10.5 9.9 4.7
1981 9.3 8.8 10.9 9.3
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
percent to 23.1 percent, but then rose in the second half of the 1970s to 25.2 percent. The 
significant aspect o f Figure 6.2 is the increase in single households with children from 3.0 
percent in 1971 to 4.1 percent in 1981. and the concomitant decline in couples with children 
from 35.3 percent in 1971 to 30.0 percent in 1981, an absolute decline o f 5.3 percent. As 
mentioned in the chapters on Australia and Great Britain, the distributional impact of smaller 
households is usually negative, because it prevents income-pooling. We should therefore 
expect a stronger effect of 'between-household inequality' on total income inequality. The 
decomposition results reported in Table 6.5, however, do not substantiate this hypothesis. 
Over the 1970s 'between-household' inequality declined only marginally, while
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of the population by household type, Canada 1971-1981
1 adult
2 adults
3 adults
1 adult and children
2adultsand children
3adultsand children
10 20
percentage
30 40
1971 |  1975 |  1981 
Source: computed bv the author from LIS
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Table 6.5. Contribution o f  changes within and between households to the trend in total 
inequality in adjusted post/tax-post/transfer income. Canada 1971-1981 (Inequality Index: 
Generalized Entropy Index d=.5).
year total inequality within-household
inequality
between- household 
inequality
1971 39.0 12.5 26.5
1975 36.7 11.0 25.7
1981 34.4 10.3 25.4
Source: computed by the author from LIS.
the sharpest drop occurred in the within-group component from 12.5 percent in 1971 to 10.3 
percent in 1981. Developments in family structure had therefore a low distributional impact 
in Canada during the 1970s.
6.2.2 M arket effects
The negligible role of demographic variables suggests that other forces were at work in the 
trends towards growing equality. Market differentials might have played a more relevant 
role. The descriptive information provided in Figure 6.3 is one reflecting an increase of the 
middle income class with decreases in the upper and lower tails of the distribution. This is 
opposite to the trend depicted for Australia and Britain, since Figure 6.3 shows a tendency 
towards depolarization. We can note a smaller percentage of people with both low market 
incomes and high market incomes. Between 1971 and 1981 the proportion of the population 
with market income below 50 percent of the median declined from 19 percent to 17.6 
percent, while the proportion of the population in the top income class declined from 22.6 
percent in 1971 to 20.4 percent in 1981. An important feature of Figure 6.3, which contrasts
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Figure 6.3 FVoportion of the population in different market income classes 
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sharply with the experience of the 1980s in Australia and Britain, is that the distribution of 
market income is more concentrated towards the middle. The falling percentage of workers 
with low and high incomes was associated with growth in the middle of the distribution. This 
finding points to the significant role of the changing structure of market differentials in 
reducing income inequality in Canada during the 1970s.
6.2.3. The distributional impact of cash transfers.
Having established that market effects had a strong distributional impact, the last step in 
decomposing the structure of income inequality is to disentangle the effects of market income
1971 H I  1975 1981
< 5 0 %  50% and < 1 5 0 %  150% and< 200%  > 200%
market income classes (percentages of median)
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and transfer income on total inequality. Substituting for the values of cm ct p and k in Table 
6.5 and differentiating first with respect to Cm and then with respect to Ct we get thevalues 
reported in Table 6.6. These values show that in 1981 dC/dCm is equal to .83 and dC/dCt is 
equal to .25. The first point to note about Table 6.6 is that given the size of the 1981 sample 
(n=15,136) the Pearson coefficient is statistically very significant. What is most important, 
despite the high share of market income in total income in 1981 (A.=.86),
Table 6.5. Income decomposition. Values fo r  the coefficient o f  variation o f  market income 
(Cm) and transfer income (Ct) and the correlation coefficient (p). Canada 1971-1981.
variable 1971 1975 1981
cm 0.9 0.9 0 .8
C, 1.4 1.2 1.2
k 0.83 0.85 0.86
Pearson's coefficient -0.3247* -0.3145* -0.2929*
(P)
*signif. LE .01 
(2-tailed)
Source: calculated by the author from LIS
Table 6.6. Partial derivatives of equation 1.1. Canada 1971-1981.
variable 1971 1975 1981
dC/dCm 0.78 0.83 0.82
dC/dCt 0.18 0.38 0.25
the partial derivative shows that transfer income inequality produced a fourth of a unit 
increase in total inequality.
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A less sophisticated analysis is presented in Figure 6.4 which illustrates the role 
played by cash transfers in the redistribution of income between 1971 and 1981. The figure 
shows a sharp drop in aggregate inequality between 1971 and 1975 when the income concept
Figure 6 .4 . Re-transfer, post-tran^er and post-tax income. 
Canada 1971-1981
55
preUransfar income post-tracer income post-tac income
50
45
40
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35
30
19811971 1975
Source; computed by the author from LIS
changes from pre/transfer to post/transfer income. Note that in 1975 direct taxation slightly 
reduced the equalizing impact of transfer benefits. Between 1975 and 1981 cash transfers 
were still important in reducing aggregate inequality but their effect was less significant. 
Because transfer benefits account for a considerable part of the structure o f income inequality 
attention should focus on the determinants o f transfer policies.
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6.3 VARIATIONS IN REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES: MACROECONOMIC CYCLES AND 
ELECTORAL POLITICS
The idea that redistributive policies are driven by economic forces is a recurrent theme in 
explanations of income security programmes in Canada (Cuneo, 1979: 157). Cycles in 
macroeconomic variables are often considered the main determinant of redistributive policies 
under Trudeau:
the high economic growth rates o f the 1960s had given way by 1973 to a 
period o f stagflation characterized by high unemployment and inflation and 
by slow economic growth. For governments, this meant sluggish real 
growth in revenue and a marked rise in spending on income support and 
protection, such as unemployment insurance and social assistance. It 
became obvious that rigorous budgetary constraints would invariably force 
governments to restrict the expansion of existing programs. (Fortin, 1985: 
153, my emphasis)
Since economic growth was the backdrop of major expansions in social security programmes 
in the early 1970s, the ensuing economic recession in the late 1970s allegedly implied less 
generous benefits and cutbacks in welfare programmes (Pal, 1985; Pelletier, 1988: 300; 
Wolfson, 1986).
6.3.1 Macroeconomic variables
If the aforementioned interpretation is correct, then trends in the main macroeconomic 
indicators during the 1970s should have coincided with changes in cash transfers. We would 
expect, for instance, positive associations between economic upturns and expansionary
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Figure 6 .5  Trendsin unemployment rate, real GDP and consumer price index. 
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redistributive policies. Correlatively, economic recessions would be accompanied by stiffer 
entitlement rules. Figure 6.5 illustrates the trends in unemployment rate, inflation rate and 
the percentage growth in real GDP during the 1970s. It is evident that in the early 1970s the 
world economic boom had a favourable impact upon Canadian growth with real GDP 
growing from 2.6 percent in 1970 to 7.5 in 1973.
The coincidence between the economic upturn and generous social security benefits 
lends support to the view that economic variables exert strong effects on transfer policies. Yet 
the retrenchment of redistributive policies between 1975 and 1979 took place despite GDP 
growth. Although the output gains were modest as compared to the early 1970s, there was
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clear evidence of economic recovery, with real GDP growth rising from 1.1 percent in 1975 
to 5.8 percent in 1976. The surprising aspect of Figure 6.5 is that when Trudeau announced 
his intention to stiffen eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits in 1974, the 
unemployment rate touched its lowest point in the 1970s after declining for two years from
6.2 percent in 1972 to 5.3 percent in 1974.
It may be argued that stiffer eligibility criteria were necessary to reduce public 
expenditure and curb inflation. After all, we have seen in Chapter Five that this argument was 
incessantly reiterated in the UK under Thatcher. Curiously, however, the doubling o f the 
inflation rate in 1973 did not prevent the tripling of the nominal level o f family allowances. 
This expansion in transfer benefits is the more surprising in the light of massive international 
borrowing in the late-1960s early 1970s, which transformed Canada into the leading 
international debtor among industrialized countries (Wilkinson, 1980: 116). In addition, 
arguing that the inflation rate was the real target of the government is inconsistent with 
Liberal monetary policy. Trudeau had opted for the depreciation of the Canadian dollar from 
1976 in order to restore competitiveness with the United States (Wilkinson, 1980: 134). The 
Canadian experience of the 1970s shows associations between macroeconomic variables and 
redistributive policies with unexpected signs. These facts suggest that macroeconomic 
variables cannot be considered as the only driving force behind changes in redistributive 
policies under Trudeau.
6.3.2 Electoral politics: median voter hypothesis and political business cycles
There are good reasons to believe that modifications in the electoral arena offered incentives 
for variations in redistributive policies. We have seen that the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were marked by electoral volatility and by the emergence of the NDP as a significant political 
force. One manifestation of this structural fluidity was that four electoral contests were held
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instead of two, as formally required by the five-year term of the Canadian House of 
Commons. Elections were held in 1968. 1972. 1974 and 1979.
Explanations of the redistributive policies implemented by the Liberal government 
sometimes rest on self-interested, vote-maximizing behaviour. Gillespie, for instance, 
contends that middle income classes gained from income redistribution during the 1970s 
because Trudeau aimed at broadening his electoral appeal (1978: 80). The data in Figure 6.6 
provide a picture of the distribution of post/tax-post/transfer income between 1971 and 1981. 
It shows that the income share of the lower-middle groups, namely the fourth and fifth decile 
slightly increased, while the income share of the sixth and seventh decile slightly dropped. 
The interesting aspect of the figure is that over the 1970s the first, second and third deciles 
,gained from the redistributive process. More specifically, the income share o f the bottom 
decile grew from 1.3 percent in 1971 to 2.5 percent in 1981 and the income share of the 
second decile grew from 3.8 to 5.7. The rich people underwent the largest loss, as shown by 
the drop in the income share of the top decile from 25.2 percent in 1971 to 22.8 percent in 
1981.
It is important to note that while the proportion of income accruing to the middle 
deciles increased in the first half of the 1970s, it declined between 1975 and 1981. This 
finding suggests redistributive effects from the richest to the poorest income strata, rather 
than to themedian group as predicted by scholars rooted in the Downsian tradition. Figure 6.7 
consolidates these findings. It shows that the proportion o f pre/transfer, post/transfer and 
post/tax income accruing to the bottom 40 percent of the population changed remarkably over 
the 1970s. From 1971 to 1975 their share of both post/transfer and post/tax income doubled, 
while the corresponding shares for the middle 40 percent slightly decreased. The difference
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Figure 6.6. Income dtare of population deciles Canada 1971-1981.
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between 1971 and 1975 was also significant for the top 20 percent of the population, with a 
visible drop in their post/transfer and post/tax income share. Between 1975 to 1981 the 
bottom 40 percent of the population still benefitted from a larger share of post/transfer 
income, their income share rose less than in the early 1970s. Hence evidence from the LIS 
datasets only partially supports Gillespie's claim that the middle income classes gained from 
redistributive policies over the 1970s. The median voter hypothesis seems to provide only 
partial explanations for income redistribution in Canada.
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Variations in social security programmes were sometimes compatible with the predictions 
of the political business cycle. Expansionary measures, including increases in the old-age 
pension, the guaranteed-income supplement for the elderly, veterans' pensions and the 
Unemployment Insurance Scheme, were introduced in the 1971 budget just one year before 
the federal elections of 1972. We know, however, that the model also predicts post-electoral 
cutbacks in transfer spending after the pre-electoral boost. Yet the Trudeau government 
introduced a generous scheme of family allowances in 1973 one year after the election. 
Similarly, the PBC fails to explain why cutbacks in unemployment benefits and family 
allowances were suddenly implemented in 1978, just one year before the 1979 general 
election.
What is most puzzling about these policy modifications is that poverty rates were 
higher in the Atlantic regions and Quebec, that is, the regions where the core Liberal 
electorate was concentrated. Table 6.7. cross-tabulates the poverty rates by family type and 
province; it is evident that the percentage of poor families was much higher in the Atlantic 
regions and Quebec than in the West. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had 
poverty rates for couples with children ranging from a minimum of 11 percent to a maximum 
of 14.2 percent which was well above the national 8.5 percent. Quebec experienced the 
highest poverty rates with over a fifth of its total population below the poverty line. A 
decision to enrich programmes related to financial needs, such as family allowances, clearly 
benefitted a greater proportion of Atlantic Canadians and Quebecers than westerners. In his
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Table 6. 7. Proportion o f  the population below the OECD poverty line. Family type by 
province 1975. (Adjustedpost/tax-post/transfer income).
province couples couples with 
children
total 
population in 
the province
Theil index %
Saskachewan 7.7 6.1 6.5 23.6
Alberta 6.6 10.0 9.7 20.7
Newfoundland 7.0 14.2 9 19.0
Quebec 18.3 16.8 20.3 17.5
New Brunswick 7.3 11.1 8.6 17.1
BC 8.3 5.8 8.0 17.0
Nova Scotia 10.4 10.6 9.9 16.8
Manitoba 5.2 4.8 5.5 16.6
Ontario 18.6 14.3 18.0 16.1
P.E.I. 1.5 2.1 4.6 15.5
CANADA 7.8 8.5 5.2 21.8
Source: computed by the author from LIS. Provinces are ordered according to the Theil index.
longitudinal study of transfer benefits, Banting found that Atlantic Canadians received below 
average benefits until the mid-1950s as did Quebecers until the 1970s (1987a: 119); this 
pattern shifted significantly in the 1970s, with a surge in per capita benefits going to the 
Atlantic region and Quebec, coinciding with the 1971 revision o f the unemployment 
insurance. Table 6.7 also sets out the values of the Theil Index in percentages. Note that
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while poverty rates in 1975 were higher in the Atlantic regions, total inequality was higher 
in the western regions, most notably in Saskatchewan. Since this province seems to have 
enjoyed relatively low poverty rates, inequality might have been the result o f wider income 
differentials between sub-groups of the population.
As in the Australian and British case, the data for Canada provide insufficient 
evidence for conventional vote-maximization explanations o f income redistribution. This is 
not to say that vote-maximizing considerations were irrelevant during the Trudeau era. On 
the contrary, for Thorbum electoral politics in Canada is always o f paramount importance 
in the formulation of public policies. He contends that reforms are first mooted by third 
parties and only when they appear to be appealing to the electorate are they implemented, 
albeit in a diluted fashion, by the governing party (1979: 47).
One reason is that when public demand for innovation is clear the risk of jeopardizing 
the unity of the party by adopting it is minimized (Thorbum 1979: 67). These observations 
suggest that while demand-driven vote-maximizing strategies may have been important 
factors behind variations in social security benefits, the role o f factional politics cannot be 
understated.
6.3.3 Electoral threats, internal realignment and social security programmes
Social security programmes over the 1960s and 1970s developed both as a consequence of 
electoral politics and of internal realignment within the Liberal Party. Explaining the 
structure o f incentives for redistribution over the 1970s in Canada involves considering how 
the Liberal pro-welfare and anti-welfare coalitions emerged. In fact, the historical pre­
conditions for these social security programmes were set after the Liberal party was 
dismissed from office in 1957 (Guest, 1984: 142).
The traumatic experience of being ousted from government in 1957 after over twenty
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years o f uninterrupted tenure coincided with a generational turnover in the party elites, which 
led to internal unrest. In the Liberal party internal conflicts are not institutionalized, there are 
no organized factions; rather, coalitions form and dissolve on specific issues. In the early 
1960s the old guard established under the leadership of St.Laurent (1948-1958) was being 
replaced by a new generation o f Liberals who believed that the electoral defeat had been 
caused by indiscriminate use of patronage prerogatives and exclusive reliance on the advice 
and expertise o f the civil service. They criticized the caucus for losing touch with social 
developments and argued that a redefinition of Liberal policies was necessary 
(Wearing, 1981: 47-64).
A few active left-wing reformers, such as Walter Gordon, Keith Davey, Maurice 
Lamontagne and Tom Kent pressed for 'intraparty democracy' and a shift in Liberal policies 
towards the consolidation of the welfare state (McCall-Newman, 1982: 38-39). The old guard 
mainly composed of, and representing, businessmen strongly opposed social reform and 
believed these ideas were socialistic (Smith, 1973: 76). The redefinition o f Liberal policies 
was accompanied by a re-examination of the party's constitution and organization (Wearing, 
1981: 21). Several changes were made to enhance the authority o f the national convention 
over the parliamentary party. The chief modification to the party constitution was introduced 
in 1966 when the party convention was entrusted with the task o f establishing 'the basic 
policies' o f the party (Wearing 1981: 74). Previously, decision-making authority had always 
been informally given to the leader. Past Liberal leaders could formulate and enact policies 
with no prior consent from the extraparliamentary party.
The 'new Liberals' aimed at tighter links between the extraparliamentary party and 
the rank-and-file. They also wished to broaden the Liberal electoral appeal by campaigning 
for new social security programmes. For Smith these programmes served the twin purpose 
o f connecting party supporters with new policies and of thrusting a useful weapon into the
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hands o f the reform wing to do battle with the conservative elements which still exercised 
considerable power in the caucus (1973: 216). Walter Gordon, the final authority in 
organizational matters until the mid-1960s, expressed this strategy in the following way:
My idea o f the Liberal Party is that we should represent and fight for the great mass 
o f small and inarticulate people. We should be thinking about what is best for them.
It's not our job to worry about the bankers. Their profits are going up enough 
already, (quoted in Smith, 1973: 272)
Keith Davey, the national director of the party, believed that it was also essential 'that the 
parliamentary wing of the party not be allowed to gain control of the party organization. This 
was the opinion, he said, of the 'new and younger wing of the Party'..who were 'genuinely 
concerned that the party organization maintain its vigorous approach' (quoted in Wearing, 
1981:47).
The new Liberals soon acquired responsibility positions in the party structure. In 1961 
Walter Gordon became chairman of the National Campaign committee, with direct 
responsibility for the recruitment of candidates and the management and financing o f the 
party's campaign (Smith 1973: 83). The electoral results of 1963 and 1965 engendered 
minority governments, offering right-wingers the chance to make counterattacks to Gordon's 
strategies. The internal balance of power tilted in favour o f the right during the Cabinet 
reshuffle of 1965. One of the most important changes was the replacement o f Gordon, as 
Finance Minister, by Mitchell Sharp, a representative o f the financial and business 
community (Wearing, 1981: 68-72). Indeed 'bankers and businessmen suggested the.. 
replacement of Walter Gordon in Finance as the price of financial support for the party' 
(Smith, 1973: 257). Early in the campaign, Gordon was described as 'the most dangerous 
socialist in Canada today' (Smith, 1973: 259).
After Walter Gordon lost hold on the party in 1965 the old guard consisting o f right­
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wingers like Mitchell Sharp, Bud Drury and Robert Winters attempted to reassert themselves 
(McCall-Newnan, 1982: 271). Presumably because the business community was a financial 
backer of the Liberal Party, 'Gordon was not even seriously defended by the 'progressives' 
(Taylor, 1974: 162). Towards the end of the 1960s, therefore, electoral considerations 
affected the strategic manoeuvring within the Liberal party and the anti-welfare alliance 
steadily increased its strength.
6.4 THE PARTY UNDERWORLD AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES
It was not until Pearson confided he was unwilling to run for the election in 1968 that
intraparty conflicts re-surfaced. During the leadership campaign the question regarding the
consolidation of the welfare system came back to the fore. As Trudeau put it:
I based my campaign on the central theme of the Just Society. Achieving such a 
society would require promoting equality of opportunity and giving the most help 
to those who were the most disadvantaged. Social security and equalization 
payments, as well as a ministry of regional economic expansion, would give 
practical effect to these abstract principles. (Trudeau, 1993: 87)
The 'new Liberals' threw their support behind Trudeau, while Turner, Hellyer and Winters 
were backed by the anti-welfare sections of the business community (McCall-Newman, 
1982: 78-97).
The extent of the internal dispute may be grasped by comparing the results o f the
Table 6.8. Liberal conventions o f 1948, 1958, 1968.
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AUGUST 7,1948
Candidates in order 
of rank of first ballot
first
ballot
second
ballot
third
ballot
fourth
ballot
Louis St. Laurent 61.4
James G. Gardiner 23.4
C.G. Power .4
Total number of 
voting
1380
JANUARY 16, 1958
Lester B. Pearson 87.5
Paul Martin 24.8
L. Henderson .08
Total number voting 1227
APRIL 6, 1968
Pierre E. Trudeau 31.8 40.8 44.6 51
Paul Hellyer 13.9 19.7 14.3
Robert Winters 12.4 23.8 26.3 40.4
John Turner 11.7 22.6 20.0 11.8
Paul Martin 11.7*
J.J. Greene 7.1 4.4 1.2**
A.J.MacEachen 6.9 .5**
Eric Kierans 4.3*
L.Henderson 0**
total number 2366 2364 2357 2352
* Withdrew as a result of this ballot.
* * Eliminated as a result of this ballot.
Source: calculated by the author from J. Courtney (1973: 58).
leadership convention of 1968 with those of 1948 and 1958. In the Liberal party the 
leadership is conferred by provincial delegates; the leader can thus claim to represent the 
whole party. Table 6.8 shows that while in 1948 and 1958 there were three contenders for the 
leadership, in 1968 there were nine candidates, three times as many as in the previous 
contests. Table 6.8 also highlights two other aspects. First, at the leadership conventions o f
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1948 and 1958 the decision was quickly reached at the first ballot, while Trudeau won after 
four ballots. Second, in 1948 St.Laurent gained a comfortable majority of 61.4 percent of the 
total votes and in 1958 Pearson obtained an even greater majority o f 87.5 percent; by 
contrast, Trudeau barely achieved an absolute majority of 51 percent. It may be argued that 
since the total number of voting delegates was almost twice as large in 1968 than in the 
previous contests, this may explain both the increase in contenders and in the potential for 
dissension. A closer look at Table 6.8, however, shows that internal strife was not only a 
question of numbers: at the fourth ballot there were only three candidates left, as many as in 
1948 and 1958, but the final vote was almost evenly divided between Trudeau and Winters 
who were, respectively, the representatives of the pro-welfare and anti-welfare coalitions.
6.4.1 The leadership of Pierre Elliott Trudeau
The old guard grudgingly accepted Trudeau's leadership. In the words of the new leader:
Some long-time Liberals felt that Marchand, Pelletier, and I had stolen 'their' party 
from them, because we had been so merciless critics o f its policies right up to the 
moment we had joined it. All of which made me realize that the first thing I had to 
do was to restore party unity. (Trudeau, 1993: 94)
After taking office in 1968 Trudeau engaged in the strategy of conflict management that re­
united the party and kept him in power for sixteen years. He re-staffed and re-organized the 
Prime Minister's Office, which Lalonde described as 'a power group supporting the Prime 
Minister and controlled by him' (1971: 520). Trudeau also headed off internal opposition by 
including in the Cabinet members of the anti-Gordon anti-welfare alliance, such as Sharp and 
Drury. Finally, he strengthened his hold on the party organization by offering key positions 
in the Liberal Federation to the 'New Liberals', such as the new party president Richard
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Stanbury. Those who had taken leadership positions within the party during the Pearson 
period now found themselves on the sidelines. For the most part this meant people who had 
supported Trudeau's rivals, Turner and Hellyer, during the leadership contest (Wearing 1981: 
196-197).
Trudeau's efforts at centralizing power in his hands contrasted with attempts at 
devolving power to the extraparliamentary party. His reforms were in line with the 
traditional emphasis placed within the Canadian government on leadership, and particularly 
on leadership by the prime minister (Franks, 1989: 23). In comparing the relationship 
between prime ministers and MPs in Canada and Britain, Franks notes th a t ' in Canada a 
strong, solidly entrenched prime minister faces an insecure and transient House of 
commons; in Britain an insecure and transient prime minister faces a strong and solidly 
entrenched House of Commons.' (1989: 24. The symptoms of the greater imbalance between 
executive and legislative power in Canada are long-term prime ministers and short-term 
members of parliaments. For Stewart, the strength of party leaders in Canada is a legacy of 
their pervasive use of patronage in the mid-ninteenth century which bound members to the 
party and made them dependent on their leader (1986: 95).
Prime Minister Trudeau's tenure has entailed a strengthening of these centralizing 
tendencies within the Canadian leadership style. It is typical o f charismatic leaders such as 
Trudeau to resist efforts by counter-elites to strengthen the party organization, because it 
would inevitably set the stage for the party's 'emancipation' from his control (Panebianco, 
1988: 66-67).2 The best illustration of Trudeau's success at controlling the party organization
2 Trudeau's behaviour is reminiscent of MacKenzie King, the Liberal leader from 1919 to 
1948, who was opposed to the development of a strong party organization. In Whitackefs vivid 
description:
[considering the divergent crowds assembled under the umbrella of the Liberal party,
[MacKenzie King] had a justifiable fear for any permanent structure which might give voice to 
divisive policy initiatives, not to speak of challenges to his own leadership.(Whitacker, 1977: 9)
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is offered by the process which led to the abandonment of the Guaranteed Annual 
Income.
6.4.2. Non-decisions: the case of the Guaranteed Annual Income
Although the Guaranteed Annual Income was approved at the 1970 policy convention with 
657 votes in favour, 187 against and 117 abstentions, the proposal never reached the Cabinet 
agenda. As mentioned above, the amendments to the party's constitution in 1966 declared 
that '[t]he basic policies of the Party shall be established by the Party assembled in policy 
conferences' (Courtney 1973: 98). Trudeau claimed in his recent co-authored book that the 
economic recession dictated the abandonment of the Guaranteed Annual Income (Axworthy 
and Trudeau, 1990: 39).
Other analysts have advanced a different interpretation. Wearing (1981) and Whitaker 
(1977), for instance, contend that the Guaranteed Income failed for reasons linked to the 
distribution o f power within the party organization. A more careful enquiry into intraparty 
power games sheds light on this typical case of policy 'non-decision.' After the party 
convention o f 1970 Allen Linden, the co-chairman of the policy committee, pressed for the 
Guaranteed Annual Income to be included in the party's manifesto in the next election of 
1972. The Liberal caucus, however, strongly opposed this proposal. When the idea was 
presented to the cabinet 'Linden and Stanbury were surprised by the barrage of criticism that 
it encountered. The cabinet refused to have anything to do with it., because there had been 
no parliamentarians on the policy committee, they hadfelt excluded from  the whole process 
(Wearing, 1981: 171, emphasis added).
In Whitaker's view the process which led to the failure o f the Guaranteed Annual 
Income was intimately connected to the internal distribution o f power :
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The Liberal party's policy process failed... on the issue o f power. Even before the 
resolutions favouring a guaranteed annual income were debated and passed, the 
prime minister made clear in his "accountability" session with the delegates that he 
was not prepared to implement such a major change in his government's approach 
to welfare. (Whitaker, 1977 : 158)
Trudeau admits in his memoirs that strategies of conflict management within the party at 
times dictated the endorsement of moderate policies:
Throughout my first mandate, the 'leftist reputation I had earned in Quebec during 
my days in opposition to the Duplessis regime imposed a certain reserve on me... 
Still somewhat shakily established at the head of the organization, I had to be 
constantly aware o f the possible risks involved in ranging the more traditional 
Liberal members against me, and of provoking a rift between the two wings.. I had 
to be on my guard all the time to maintain a careful equilibrium between 
progressive measures and more moderate ones. (Trudeau, 1993: 165)
The abandonment o f the guaranteed income was presumably a price worth paying for other 
major expansions in social security. We have seen in section one that in 1971 the scope of 
existing social insurance schemes was extended and transfer benefits were increased. What 
helped Trudeau to push through these programmes was the availability of new strategic 
options in the electoral arena.
6.4.3 Adjusting social relativities through income redistribution
The adversarial nature of the Canadian party system during the postwar period had offered 
few opportunities for interparty bargaining. But the situation changed with the entrance o f 
the NDP into the electoral arena. Competition from the left o f the political spectrum 
threatened to capture actual and potential Liberal voters. By contrast, competition from the 
right was weak. Conservative leaders were struggling to maintain its unity. Internal strife 
connected to the leadership succession exhausted their energies and attention (Perlin, 1980: 
63-73; Penniman, 1975: 105).
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The Liberal Party, moreover, was suffering from a steady erosion of the provincial 
electoral base in the Western provinces (Manitoba, British Colombia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan), where support for the NDP was growing. Liberals, therefore, had to stray into 
the NDP's electoral territory. In 1971 Jim Davey, a member of the pro-welfare coalition and 
the programme secretary in the Liberal Prime Minister Office (PMO), succinctly remarked: 
'[the NDP] is the danger. At the same time, a good proportion o f their present support 
believes that there is only 50% chance that they actually vote for them on election day. This 
is our chance '(quoted in Wearing, 1981: 193).
For Trudeau the main cause for the erosion of the provincial electoral base in the 
West was the predominance of right-wing Liberals at the provincial level:
[M]y party..at the provincial level, had for years tended to fall to the right. As a 
result, in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the British Columbia, the Liberal Party had 
all but disappeared for the political stage, to be replaced by the NDP. As federal 
Liberals, we were worried that we might share the fate o f our British counterparts, 
who had let themselves be pushed so far to the right by the Labour Party that there 
were only a handful of Liberal members left in Westminster, non o f whom exerted 
much influence on the course of events. We were determined not to let that happen 
to the Liberal Party o f Canada. (Trudeau, 1993: 165)
The division of power between federal and provincial states on social security had regularly 
triggered conflicts in the Liberal party between the provincial units and the centre (Bryden, 
1974: 60-75). Perhaps for this reason Trudeau's attempt to weaken right-wing provincial 
Liberals meant that while in the previous decade federal transfers to provincially delivered 
services in health, education, and social assistance 'formed the major part of Ottawa's 
expenditure growth, in the 1970s the Trudeau government used income security programs 
which it alone controlled.' (Struthers, 1989: 237)
Trudeau's control of social security programmes allowed Liberals to forge a skilful 
offensive strategy. In Dunleavy's terms, the government engaged in 'partisan social 
engineering' and in 'adjusting social relativities' (1991: 120-121). Partisan social engineering
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was achieved by expanding the size of the population insured by the social security system. 
NDP supporters tended to have lower incomes, and thus were more exposed to the risks of 
economic insecurity (Komberg and Clark, 1992: 75). Figure 6.8 sets out the values for the 
Theil index for the working and the non-working population in Canada over the 1970s. It is 
remarkable that between 1971 and 1975 the Theil for the non-working population fell from 
29.7 percent to 17.3 percent, a percentage drop of 41.7 points; inequality within the working 
population also dropped but only 23 percent, from 18.2 percent in 1971 to 13.9 percent in 
1975. This decline indicates that the expansion of social security programmes may have had 
significant distributional consequences. It is also noteworthy that when unemployment soared 
in the late 1970s, the Theil values increased by only 18 percent.
A crucial feature of the White Paper Unemployment Insurance in the 70s was the 
projection of imminent labour market changes. It argued that rapid technological changes
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associated with post-industrialism would threaten previously secure employment. The 
government deployed this argument to overcome the resistance o f those groups resenting 
state interference. As a Liberal MP remarked:
we have heard..that some of the new groups, such as the Canadian Teachers 
Federation did not appear to favour universality as far as their teachers were 
concerned...However, it was the committee's opinion, and my personal opinion also, 
that the contingency of interruption o f earnings is not now restricted to certain 
groups in Canada, as it may have been in earlier years, and that therefore no 
employee should be excluded from coverage if it were possible to include him. 
(House o f Commons Debates, 1971: 5081)
Trade union opposition towards expansionary social security legislation is a recurrent theme 
in historical accounts of the welfare state (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981: 17-37). Union 
representatives feared that state legislation would replace their protective role towards their 
members, undermining their role as representatives o f workers' interests.
The second electoral goal was to 'adjust social relativities' by targeting particular 
social categories. The unemployment scheme of 1971 extended coverage to self-employed 
fishermen, the only category of self-employed so covered; in the fishing communities of 
Atlantic Canada, a region traditionally sympathetic to the Liberals, unemployment benefits 
constituted an important supplementary source of income. Social relativities were adjusted 
also by introducing maternity benefits, which strengthened the traditional loyalty of women 
towards the Liberal party (Komberg and Clark, 1992: 75). Deliberate attempts to direct the 
message to women were reinforced by specific pledges for female workers. In the words of 
David Weatherhead, a Liberal MP:
There are about three million working women in the labor force today and they are 
and have been for a long time a very vital part o f our work force in Canada. Many 
have worked continually for a long time, have paid into the unemployment 
insurance fund for a long time, and then decided to have a child. [MJatemity leave 
will give the female employee significant new rights to which, in my opinion, they 
are well entitled. (House of Commons Debates, 1971: 5083)
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Figure 6 .9 . Percentage of female household heads below or above 
different poverty lines. Canada 1971-1981.  (Adjusted 
post/tax-post/transfer income).
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Modifications in the electoral and social environment changed the options available to the 
pro-welfare coalition and facilitated the implementation of social security programmes 
(Wearing 1981: 200-202). Figure 6.9 illustrates that over the 1970s the proportion of female 
household heads below the three poverty lines declined significantly. In particular, the 
proportion of women in extreme poverty dropped from 21.9 percent in 1971
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to 14.4 percent in 1981. It is worth noting that female poverty rates dropped under all three 
cut-off points. By 1981 there were 6 percent more women enjoying a relative non-poor 
standard of living, partly as a result of government intervention.
6.5 INTRA AND INTERPARTY COMPETITION: THE IMPACT ON 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES
Despite the implementation of social security programmes, the Liberals were unable to form 
a majority government in 1972. Table 6.11 sets out the percentage o f votes and of seats in 
the House o f Commons from 1968 to 1979. It shows that from 1968 to 1972 the proportion 
o f seats obtained by the Liberal Party declined from 58.7 percent to 41.3 percent, a
Table 6.11. Percentage o f  votes and seats in Canadian federal elections 1968-1979.
political
party*
1968 1972 1974 1979
votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats
CP 31 .4 27.3 35.0 40.5 35.4 36 .6 35 .9 48 .2
LP 45.5 58.7 38.5 41.3 43.2 53.4 40.1 40 .4
NDP 17.0 8.3 17.7 11.7 15.4 6.1 17.9 11.3
SC .80 0 7.6 5.7 5.1 4 .2 4 .6 0.0
CP=Conservative Party 
LP=Liberal Party 
NDP= New Democratics Party 
SC=Social Credit
percentage drop o f almost 30 percent; however, its proportion o f votes fell by only 15 
percent, from 45.5 percent to 38.5 percent. The dis-representative effects o f the plurality 
system explain the difference between seats and votes. Conservatives performed much better, 
increasing their share o f seats from 27.3 percent to 40.5 percent, a surge o f about 48 
percentage points. The two minority parties also gained legislative strength. The NDP
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obtained 3.4 percent more seats in 1972 and the Social Credit gained 5.7 percent of the seats. 
6.5.1. Opposition effects on redistributive policies
The distribution o f seats in the House of Commons after the election of 1972 had two major 
consequences. First, the formation of a minority government led to a Cabinet reshuffle, with 
the most important change being the replacement of Benson with Turner at the Ministry of 
Finance. The appointment of John Turner, the most prominent o f English-Canadian MPs, 
sanctioned the strength o f the anti-welfare alliance within the party. As Gillespie noted, 
appointing Turner to Finance meant accepting a shift from Benson's 'modestly redistributive' 
budget, which had included policy instruments especially favourable towards poor families, 
to Turner's commitment to maintaining the status quo (Gillespie, 1978: 20-21).
Figure 6.10 clearly shows that the proportion of poor families declined from 9.4 
percent in 1971 to 7.7 percent in 1975, an absolute drop of 1.7 percent; however, from 1975 
to 1981 this proportion only declined by .1 percent. It is likely that family poverty increased 
as a result of rising unemployment rates; however, it appears that the Liberal government was 
unable to offset the distributional consequences of the recession for very poor families.
The second consequence of the near-electoral defeat was the formation of a minority 
government with the external support of the NDP. In Sartori's terms (1976: 122), the 
distribution of seats enhanced the blackmail potential of the NDP. Since it now enjoyed veto 
power in the legislative arena its support was vital for the stability o f the Liberal government. 
Paradoxically, however, Trudeau considered the lack of a legislative majority as an asset
Figure 6.10. Ftercentage of couples with children below or above different 
poverty lines Canada 1971-1981. (Adjusted 
post/tax-post/transfer income)
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against internal opposition. His description of the strategic situation is worth quoting at 
length:
81.1
[Bjeing a minority government allowed us to engage in a new form o f politics that 
attracted me greatly [and] allowed me to put forward more advanced 'left wing' 
projects. I knew that the NDP, under David Lewis, would back me up - in fact, the
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NDP supported me when some of the more conservative members o f my own party 
did not. I was thus able to institute policies that I had been dreaming about for a 
long time, and the social-democratic faction of the Opposition was forced to support 
them, or else deny their own social program... In this way the minority government 
allowed us to get social legislation through Parliament that helped less-advantaged 
Canadians, such as the increasing and indexing of old age pensions [and] higher 
unemployment insurance benefits. (Trudeau, 1993: 165/ 167, emphasis added)
This quotation suggests that changes in the legislative arena impinged on the outcome of 
bargaining games within the Liberal party, and that the need for the NDP's support became 
an advantage for the Liberal pro-welfare alliance (Clarkson, 1974: 83).
Figure 6.11 illustrates the redistributive consequences of the interaction between the 
Liberal Party and the NDP by using the graphical device elaborated by Laver and Shepsle 
(1990). It shows a policy space with two dimensions - taxes and social security spending. 
It depicts the strategic environment during 1972-1974, when the formation and maintenance 
o f the Liberal government hinged on the external support of the NDP. The NDP factions are 
represented by the ideal points NDP!and NDP2; the Liberals are represented by the social 
reform faction, led by Trudeau (Tr) and the faction defending the status quo led by Turner 
(Tu). The indifference curves in Figure 6.11 are centred on the faction led by the party leader 
(NDP, and Tr).
Suppose NDP,-Tr is the status quo (point x). There is one credible proposal in its win 
set, NDP,-Tu (point z), but this is regarded by NDP, as inferior to NDP,-Tr, so it will not 
receive the assent o f NDP,. This choice has consequences for the internal politics o f the 
Liberal party, because it weakens the position of the so-called 'Tumites'. The priorities o f the 
NDP leaders amplify Trudeau's margin of manoeuvrability, offering him more leeway in the 
implementation of generous redistributive policies. Figure 6.11 illustrates a typical case of 
a game in multiple arenas, where the payoffs in the parliamentary arena are deployed as 
resources in the internal arena (Tsebelis 1990: 10-20). It depicts a strategic
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situation in which external weakness can become strength. The Liberal social reformers could 
implement redistributive policies, such as family allowances, without jeopardizing the unity 
of the party by further alienating the business community. 
Hence expansionary income security programmes in the early 1970s can partly be
interpreted as the outcome of strategic interaction within a changing political environment. 
The slow erosion o f traditional subcultural loyalties and the challenge of a new electoral 
rival, the NDP, elicited centrifugal drives pushing Liberal leaders to expand redistributive 
policies. This is technically a dominant strategy because irrespective of the strategy followed 
by the NDP, the Liberals would have maximised their electoral payoffs by appealing to the 
NDP's supporters through the visibility of redistributive policies. Correlatively, had 
redistributive policies not been implemented, the NDP would have maximised its electoral 
payoffs by withdrawing its support from the minority government. Modifications in income 
security policies were also affected by the changing conditions of interpartv competition.
Moreover, the near-defeat which gave Liberals only two seats more than the 
Conservatives sharpened opposition within the party organization. Electoral losses lend 
ammunition to counter-elites by highlighting the weakness of the dominant coalition. One 
consequence was that expansionary transfer policies were partially offset by tax concessions. 
Other budgetary instruments such as the personal income tax cut, the corporate-profits tax 
cut from 49 percent to 40 percent, and indexing of the personal income tax generated larger 
benefits to middle-upper income families and the business community. The substantial 
personal income tax cut which cost the government $1,300 million in foregone revenues did 
not benefit the poorest families, because their income was too low for them to take advantage 
of either the increased personal exemptions or the minimum tax credit (Gillespie 1978: 21). 
John Turner was committed to maintaining the status quo and did not suggest redistributive 
policies that would improve the real economic position of the poor relative to the highest 
income families (Gillespie, 1978: 3-4).
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6.5.2 The u-turn: pre-empting internal rivarly
The relationship between the so-called 'Trudeauites' and 'Tumites' rapidly deteriorated after 
the elections. Turner thought that Trudeau 'never stopped to consider [that] the economy had 
to be able to bear the government's social security programs' (McCall-Newman, 1982: 309). 
When Trudeau denied his support to Turner's proposals for cutting spending and 
implementing an incomes policy, the Finance Minister left the Cabinet and resigned on 10 
September 1975 (McCall-Newman, 1982: 169; Chretien, 1985: 78). Turner's resignation 
damaged the unity of the Liberal party because 'for years. Turner had epitomized in his 
person the alliance for power that had held the party together' (McCall-Newman, 1982: 241). 
In the winter preceding the 1979 election the Liberal adherents were asked to analyse the 
causes o f the Liberals' difficulties; McCall-Newman reports that 'almost to a man they would 
begin by citing the decision in 1975 of John Turner, the former Minister o f Finance, to 
abandon politics for the practice of corporate law' (1982: 241).
It is important to note that a few months after Turner's resignation the Cabinet 
approved both the incomes policy and the cutbacks in spending advocated by the former 
Finance Minister:
The irony was clear..Trudeau and MacDonald [the new Finance Minister] had both 
been more firmly anti-interventionist than the rest o f the cabinet, and it had been 
their opposition that prevented other, more timid ministers from supporting Turner 
in his tough-measures stance months before. (McCall-Newman, 1982: 231)
Trudeau wrote in his memoirs that 'MacDonald came to the Cabinet and said: 'There is no 
choice" (Trudeau, 1993: 196). Yet, this begs the question why Trudeau was prepared to 
accept the incomes policy from MacDonald and not from Turner. There is some evidence 
suggesting that the Liberal leader felt threatened by Turner. The former Finance Minister was 
the only candidate to the leadership contest of 1968 to have kept a personal power base in the
party and an independent public reputation (McCall-Newman 1982: 128). All the others were 
either devoted to Trudeau's cause or out of politics altogether. What is more, the Liberal party 
had 'institutionalized' the core-peripherv cleavage by alternating English and French speaking 
leaders, and offering the deputy leadership to the other ethnic group. The view that Turner 
represented a threat to Trudeau is buttressed by Trudeau's recollection of those events in his 
memoirs:
You can tell me I handled it badly., but if [Turner's] heart wasn't in it for one reason 
or another, either because of his family and his economic circumstances or because 
I was his leader, then perhaps it was right that he leave politics. (Trudeau, 1993: 194).
After Turner's resignation from the cabinet the anti-welfare coalition became 'a kind of 
opposition from within the party' (Johnston, 1986: 35; Wearing, 1981: 236).
The Liberal party was facing its biggest crisis for more than ten years as bitter 
infighting over redistributive policies threatened to fracture the internal alliance. Trudeau 
retreated into the Prime Minister Office (PMO) and came to regard his staff there as the only 
group whose loyalty was unquestioned (Wearing, 1981: 236). The impact of internal conflicts 
on redistributive policies was dramatic. Most cabinet members were taken by surprise when 
Trudeau and his closest advisers suddenly announced cutbacks both in family allowances and 
unemployment benefits. In the vivid recollection of those events by Jean Chretien, then 
recently appointed Minister of Finance :
Since Trudeau's announcement came as a surprise to me, the press jumped on the idea 
that the Prime Minister had pulled the rug out from under his Minister of Finance.
The people who had criticized Trudeau for not being concerned with the economy 
now abused him from interfering with Chretien's territory, and I was made to look 
like a fool. I've never quite decided whether it was a breakdown in communications 
or a power play by the PMO. (Chretien, 1985: 177, emphasis added)
Chretien's suggestion that the retrenchment of welfare spending may have been the outcome
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of a power game lends support to the view that intraparty politics affected redistributive 
policies. Adopting Turner's policies was like 'stealing the rivals' clothes'. Cutbacks in transfer 
benefits aimed at showing that Trudeau's internal rivals had no policy alternatives to offer. 
Hence the u-tum in transfer benefits from an expansionary design in the early 1970s to a 
restrictive policy in the late 1970s, can be interpreted as an optimal strategy in the intraparty 
arena. In Tsebelis's terms (1990: 68-70) it can be viewed as an instance o f correlated 
strategies, in which the actions of player I at time T depend on the actions o f player II at time 
T-l.
Focusing on the internal arena sheds light on the fact that Trudeau was playing a 
game in multiple arenas, consisting of two simultaneous strategies pursued in the electoral 
and in the internal arena. In the early 1970s redistributive policies were activated and social 
cleavages gained new political expression partly because they offered a weapon to the reform 
group. Trudeau was thus able to both maximize votes and defend his intraparty position. By 
contrast, in the latter half o f the 1970s the internal challenge to his leadership pushed the 
Liberal leader to endorsing restrictive redistributive policies.
Conclusions
Existing accounts of income redistribution in Canada under Trudeau emphasize the role 
played by either macroeconomic variables or vote-maximizing behaviour. Expansionary 
social security programmes over the 1970s have been generally conceived of as the outcome 
of economic growth or the attempt by party leaders to broaden their electoral appeal. These 
conventional views have typically neglected the impact o f demographic factors and o f 
market effects on the declining income inequality trend over the 1970s.
Results from the LIS datasets indicate that neither the age structure nor shrinking 
household size had significant distributional effects. Market differentials seemed more
237
relevant, suggesting that the primary distribution of income had equalizing effects. Yet 
decomposing aggregate inequality pointed to the key role played by social security policies. 
Explanations based on demand-driven models of transfer policies, such as the median voter 
and the political business cycle, offered important insights on the driving forces behind 
redistributive policies, but left unaddressed too many anomalies.
Factional politics between pro-welfare and anti-welfare coalitions within the Liberal 
party highlighted some of the reasons which affected Trudeau's redistributive policies in the 
1970s. By skilfully exploiting the NDP's blackmail potential, Trudeau was able to overcome 
the internal opposition against generous social security programmes in the early 1970s. 
Under the Liberal minority government of 1972-1974 expansionary programmes are 
interpreted as a dominant strategy in inter-party competition. Internal conflicts re-surfaced 
in the late 1970s when the u-tum from generous to stiffer cash benefits seemingly aimed at 
pre-empting the leadership threat. Income redistribution after 1975 could, at least in part, be 
understood as Trudeau's reaction to his fear of being outmanoeuvred by the Tumites.
The distinctiveness of the Canadian experience with respect to Australia and Britian 
lies in the role played by electoral competition. Entrance of the NDP in the electoral arena 
provided an incentive for Liberal leaders to mobilize voters. In turn, the challenge from the 
left o f the political spectrum impinged on the outcome of bargaining games between the 
Liberal pro-welfare and anti-welfare coalitions. The chapter illustrates how some puzzling 
aspects o f income redistribution during the Trudeau era can be explained by focusing on the 
interplay between intra and inter-party competition. It thus provides compelling evidence 
of the redistributive consequences of internal strife and electoral competition.
CH A PTER SEVEN-CONCLUSIONS
7.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The foregoing analyses of inequality trends and policy actions and reactions of the three 
countries describe and explain how each governing party tried to affect income redistribution 
by means o f cash transfers. Of course, these accounts are historically incomplete; like other 
works in comparative politics my aim is not detailed descriptions but 'narrative explanations' 
(Sharpf, 1991: 161). In this chapter I review the material presented from an explicitly 
comparative perspective in order to highlight similarities and differences between the 
countries. On the basis of the historical experience of the three Westminster systems, it is 
possible to outline a set of propositions about the incentives for income redistribution in a 
liberal democracy. Delimiting the investigation to countries with similar institutional 
conditions facilitates comparisons according to the 'most similar system design'.
The study spanned two decades marked by two economic recessions induced by the 
oil crises o f 1973-74 and 1979-80. Both crises were characterized by the threat o f mass 
unemployment. Hence while the periodization for the three countries was different, their 
economic conditions were fairly similar. I analysed demographic and market effects to isolate 
the distributional role of structural factors. I then examined how parties of different 
ideological persuasions reacted to similar problems that arose from fundamental changes in 
international socioeconomic conditions. But I was less concerned with similarities among the 
cases than with their differences, and less with governments' efforts to restore a functioning 
economy than with their strategic options in redistributing burdens and benefits. I therefore 
focused on the factors that allowed the governing parties of Australia, Britain and Canada 
either to alleviate or to exacerbate income inequality. These three parties pursued very 
different strategies in the allocation of redistributive costs and benefits.
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The ALP successfully implemented an incomes policy of wage stability to fight 
unemployment, but at the same time penalized the state-dependent population by abolishing 
universal benefits. The redistributive policies of the British Conservative government 
advantaged specific categories of the dependent population at the expense of other categories. 
The Canadian Liberals, on the other hand, initially expanded universal social security 
programmes but failed to sustain generous unemployment benefits later in the term.
Precisely because of the differences in the strategies they adopted, party leaders 
suggested that there were different incentives for income redistribution, and that neither 
declining nor rising inequality were unavoidable fates. If some governing party was 
nevertheless unable to avoid growing inequality, then the reasons must lie less in 
international trends than in the varying strategic options o f their leaders. The sections that 
follow concentrate on the driving forces behind these strategies. First, however, let us 
summarize briefly what the incentives are for redistribution in a liberal democracy.
7.1.2 The redistributive logic in liberal democracies
Most scholars of income inequality have assumed that electoral politics and economic 
development have an in-built mechanism in favour of equality, and therefore in 
industrialized democracies income differences are reduced over time. Political sociologists 
see redistributive policies as the outcome of contrasting distributive goals that are consistent 
with the locations of the party's core constituencies in the hierarchy o f income classes (Hibbs 
and Dennis, 1988). The expectation is that Left-wing parties reduce income inequality by 
redistributing income from rich to poor and that right-wing parties, in a process o f contagion 
from the left, become less anti-egalitarian in order to appeal to low income groups. Rational 
choice theorists believe that vote-maximization drives governing parties towards expansive 
redistributive policies, either to improve the economic position o f median income voters
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(Denters, 1993), or to achieve short-term electoral benefits (Griffin and Leicht, 1986).
Against this background, the rise in inequality over the 1980s suggests that inequality 
trends had in some sense evolved counter-intuitively. Yet the wider the gap between rich and 
poor becomes, the less plausible it is to suppose that liberal democracies converge towards 
equality and the more important it becomes to examine the sources of income inequality. 
Perhaps the best example o f counter-intuitive inequality trends is Australia where inequality 
rose in prosperous times under a Labor government. The Hawke government placed 
redistribution o f wealth second to wealth production and implemented redistributive policies 
more congruent with right-wing ideologies. The Accord protected unionized workers, but 
the Labor government severely penalized the dependent population by tightening eligibility 
and entitlement rules. The result was rather disappointing for egalitarians: under Labor 
inequality steadily grew.
The Australian experience is a far cry from Bobbio's recent contention that the 
criterion differentiating left and right is the emphasis given by the former to equality (1994: 
99-114). It points out that Left-wing parties may implement policies devoid of any emphasis 
on equality; it suggests that free-market principles can be espoused by Labor parties as well 
as Conservative parties; it indicates that priorities in the hierarchy o f party aims may change 
irrespective o f ideology.
In Canada, in fact, the Liberal government actively engaged in both generous and 
stiffer social security benefits, thus contributing to both falling and rising inequality trends. 
Economic prosperity and expansionary redistributive policies in the early 1970s brought 
about a substantial reduction in income inequality. Poor people appeared to be better off in 
the mid-1970s, as measured by the share of equivalized disposable income accruing to the 
bottom deciles. But in the late 1970s, the Liberal government implemented contractionary 
redistributive programmes which exacerbated the plight o f the poor during the economic
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recession.
That democracy has no in-built mechanism towards equality was clearly highlighted 
in Britain where inequality grew faster than elsewhere. British redistributive policies, 
moreover, were marked by a curious asymmetry, whereby some groups o f the dependent 
population were protected while others were exposed to the risk of poverty. Neither political 
sociology nor demand-driven, vote maximizing explanations appeared consistent with these 
facts.
Because established approaches seem incongruent with empirical evidence, it is 
important to stand back from the 'narrative explanations' o f the case studies and again raise 
the question of what the incentives are for income redistribution in a liberal democracy. The 
literature on the redistributive impact of parties has with good reason emphasized the role o f 
demand-driven policies. Oriented towards the paradigm of representative democracy, 
exogenous preferences and inter-party competition, this literature stresses the responsiveness 
o f elected representatives to voters' demands. According to this thinking, party leaders 
represent the interests of the electorate by responding to their redistributive wishes.
Normatively speaking this argument is correct, but its practical significance may be 
somewhat exaggerated. Not all party leaders may want to meet voters' redistributive 
expectations. Reasons for manipulating entitlement rules may be intimately connected to 
supply-side factors. Politicians may devise redistributive strategies aimed at constructing new 
social identities in order to forge electoral alliances among protected voters. Redistributive 
policies are well-suited to trigger issues of social identity because they define categories of 
privileged and less privileged people. By tracing boundaries between risk-exposed voters and 
insured voters, party elites can encourage shifting coalitions of supporters. Hence rather than 
merely responding to voters' demands, party leaders may actively engage in public opinion
242
formation (Iversen, 1994).
What is more, contrary to the 'class politics' view which is based on the assumption 
that redistribution occurs vertically from upper to lower income classes, party leaders may 
also engage in horizontal redistribution between social categories included in the same 
income class. Horizontal redistribution may involve reducing benefits to one category of 
beneficiaries while increasing them to other welfare recipients. Perhaps because welfare 
beneficiaries have been regarded as a homogeneous social class, insufficient attention has 
been paid to the incentives for horizontal redistribution in a liberal democracy.
A second limitation of established approaches seems more important to me. Not all 
political parties act as cohesive groups. Discussion seems to have focused too exclusively on 
the electoral logic of income redistribution, while paying little attention to strategic 
repositioning within the governing party. As Lawson writes, by studying 'who wins, and in 
what combinations, and who governs, and where, we have tended to shortchange the work 
of examining the organizations that produce these fateful results' (Lawson, 1990: 107). The 
search for explanations for redistributive policies in the three countries can thus be focused 
on the organizational life of governing parties.
Analytically, strategic interaction within party elites evolve in two main arenas. In 
the strictly internal arena, conflicting pressures within the party may produce redistributive 
policies with counter-intuitive redistributive results. Incentives for redistribution may be 
spawned from the struggle for relative dominance within the party organization, especially 
when a dominant faction is displaced by another one. For example, a newly established right- 
wing faction of a Labor or Socialist party may wish to re-shape the party's image in order to 
legitimize its dominant position; it may adopt transfer policies which exacerbate inequality 
to recast the party as the party of economic growth. Alternatively, credible threats by right- 
wing factions to the dominant position o f a centre-left faction can persuade the latter to
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endorsing right-wing redistributive programmes. 'Stealing the clothes of the neighbour' is a 
familiar process in inter-party competition, but its significance for intraparty strategies has 
not yet been sufficiently acknowledged.
These considerations mean that party leaders may affect inequality counter-intuitively 
when their ability to respond to the redistributive demands of their constituency is impaired 
by their need to maintain internal dominance. Whilst some redistributive strategies may be 
beyond the manipulative reach of party leaders, the government can be unresponsive to 
voters' views for reasons connected to the strategy of conflict within the party organization. 
The formation, consolidation and demise of party factions ushers in modifications to 
redistributive programmes.
In the external arena, by contrast, incentives for income redistribution stem from the 
options available to the bargaining partners. The emergence of new social cleavages, such 
as the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the formation of new political parties, the 
end of the Cold War in 1989 and, more generally, rising electoral volatility may impinge on 
the internal balance of power. A turbulent external arena unleashes new social forces, 
offering opportunities to factions struggling for relative internal dominance. Governing 
parties may pursue redistributive policies to adjust social relativities, by altering the 
economic position o f targeted groups; or may wish to reshape the party identity to attract 
either previously unsympathetic or indifferent voters.
The mixture of objectives embedded in redistributive policies is more clearly detected 
if we relax the assumption of preference-homogeneity within the party. It is possible to view 
variations in the allocation of social security benefits as arising from shifting boundaries 
between party factions and social groups. Consequently, factions are better understood as 
distributive elites, and sub-groups of the electorate as social clienteles. Manipulations of 
eligibility and entitlement rules are regarded as attempts at moulding faction-voter
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alignments. Since it is reasonable to assume that distributive elites are tied to more than one 
social clientele, the redistributive process can be viewed as a zero-sum game for the latter 
but a variable sum game for the former.
Given these reasons for expansionary or contractionary redistributive policies in 
general, in the following sections I return to the case studies and review which incentives 
applied to the redistributive strategies pursued by the Australian Labor Party, the British 
Conservative party and the Liberal Party o f Canada. I first consider the extent to which 
inequality trends were influenced by non-governmental forces, by examining demographic 
and market effects. Then I turn to the role of transfer income and the incentives for governing 
parties to implement expansionary or contractionary transfer programmes. Thereafter I 
consider the broader implications of this analysis for understanding the party-policy link in 
the field of social security policies. I then conclude by exploring family poverty rates in 
selected OECD countries and by suggesting possible avenues for future research.
7.2 EXOGENOUS DETERMINANTS: DEMOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND VOTERS
Evaluating the distributional impact of governing parties requires the identification o f non­
governmental effects on income inequality. To this end, I employed sophisticated analytical 
techniques which decomposed the structure of income inequality and brought to the fore the 
role of demographic and market forces. Whether the grouping variable was age or household 
type, the results invariably indicated that demographic effects had a low distributional 
impact. In Australia the ageing of the population and the slowdown in birth rates had a 
negligible impact on aggregate inequality over the 1980s. I found a similar pattern in Britain 
where the ageing o f the population appeared less significant in the 1980s, in contrast to 
earlier results. In Canada the expectation that the 'baby boom' o f the 1960s had distributional 
effects in the 1970s was largely refuted by the much greater impact o f the within-group
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component.
A largely unexpected result was the low distributional impact o f household 
composition. The decline in the traditional family composed o f a couple with children and 
the concomitant increase of one-parent families should have in principle had disequalizing 
effects. The distributional impact of smaller households is usually negative because they 
prevent income pooling. My findings, however, suggested that within-household inequality 
accounted for most o f the changes in income differences.
Since the amount of inequality explained by population characteristics was rather 
small, my results called into question demographic explanations. This was a very interesting 
conclusion because it implicity strengthened the relevance of other sources o f income 
inequality. If the age structure or the household size and composition had marginal 
distributive effects, then I could concentrate on wage differentials and cash transfers.
Wage dispersion presented significant differences in the three countries primarily, 
but not exclusively, because the time-frame was different. International comparisons show 
that trends in inequality o f earnings in the 1980s differed from those o f the 1970s (OECD 
Employment Outlook, 1993: 157). Over the 1970s the earning distribution was relatively 
stable while in the 1980s it exhibited a wider spread. To highlight the location of changes in 
the distribution o f market income I used a descriptive categorization of four market income 
classes of unequal size.
In Canada over the 1970s the distribution of market income was more concentrated 
towards the middle, with both upper and lower tails decreasing constantly. As a consequence, 
the proportion o f the population in the middle income class grew, suggesting market effects 
behind the drop in inequality. This tendency towards depolarization in Canada sharply 
contrasted with income polarization in both Australia and the United Kingdom. In these 
countries the distribution of market income was more spread away from the middle, showing
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a wider gap between rich and poor. Because inequality trends were rising in both Australia 
and the United Kingdom, their association with income polarization in the market sphere 
adds weight to research findings detecting a clear link between inequality and wage 
dispersion (Atkinson, 1995; Gottschalk, 1993; Jenkins, 1993).
The emphasis on market differentials in formal distributional analyses has often 
meant that little or no attention has been paid to the impact of cash transfers. This study took 
the investigation one step forward and raised the question of the distributional impact of cash 
transfers. The results yielded consistent answers: cash benefits affected total inequality both 
directly and indirectly, if they became more dependent on market income.
In Australia, transfer income exerted a stronger distributional impact in the mid-1980s 
presumably because of persistent high unemployment rates. In Britain, the effect o f transfer 
income on total inequality was less pronounced in the mid-1980s than in the late 1970s, 
despite soaring unemployment. This result is somewhat puzzling but may be related to 
cutbacks in social security benefits. In Canada about 25 percent o f a unit increase in total 
inequality was produced by transfer income inequality. Since the analysis showed that 
transfer policies had a significant distributional impact, the systematic neglect o f these 
policies in the economic literature on income inequality blurs our views of the driving forces 
behind the size distribution of income in a liberal democracy.1
In addition, the experience of the three countries suggested that variations in cash 
transfers were not merely a passive response to stochastic economic cycles; rather, party 
leaders actively engaged in policy changes in the field of transfer benefits. In Australia and 
in Britain, in fact, cash benefits were stiffened when unemployment was both rising and 
falling, while in Canada associations between macroeconomic variables and cash transfers
N otable exceptions are Atkinson (1990) and Di Telia and MacCulloch (1995).
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yielded unexpected signs, including generous family allowances when the inflation rate was 
rising. These facts raise doubts about the compliance of policy-makers to macroeconomic 
cycles, even allowing for inevitable time lags between various stages of the policy process.
To the extent that changes in income inequality were the result of discretionary policy 
choices I applied conventional public choice explanations to the incentives for income 
redistribution. The median voter hypothesis was partly supported in Canada where median 
income groups slightly improved their share of disposable income between 1971 and 1981. 
But a detailed examination of population deciles suggested that the bottom deciles had gained 
more in the final distribution of post/tax-post/transfer income, thus questioning the 
redistributive emphasis on median groups.
Even less supportive evidence was found in both the United Kingdom and Australia, 
where median income voters appeared net losers in the allocation o f direct costs and 
benefits. In these countries the rich people disproportionately benefitted from the distribution 
of post/tax-post/transfer income to the disadvantage of middle and lower income groups. As 
far as income redistribution by means of cash transfers was concerned, the LIS data for the 
three Westminster systems provided insufficient evidence to support the median voter model.
I also examined roughly nineteen alterations in transfer policies introduced either 
before or after eight elections. The picture that emerged was rather more complex than the 
one depicted by the political business cycle. Approximately 50 percent of the changes were 
congruent with the predictions of this model, suggesting that the timing o f elections was but 
one o f several factors influencing transfer policies. In some cases, modifications in transfer 
policies were in sharp contrast with the PBC.
Most striking was Hawke's announcement o f the 'harshest budget for decades'just one 
year before the 1987 elections. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative government reduced 
the scope and level of benefits regardless of the timing o f elections and introduced
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controversial social security policies, such as the taxation of unemployment benefits in 1982, 
just one year before the 1983 elections. In Canada, cutbacks in unemployment benefits and 
family allowances were suddenly implemented in 1978, again just one year before the 1979 
general election. Overall, the three countries provided compelling evidence that there are 
important variations in social security programmes that demand-driven explanations cannot 
adequately address.
In particular, rational choice interpretations of redistributive policies failed to explain 
asymmetries in the allocation of welfare benefits. Why was the Conservative onslaught 
against the unemployed followed by expansionary pension benefits in Britain? And why was 
means testing in Australia counterbalanced with the 'Family Plan' which increased spending 
for very poor families? Or, why did Trudeau initially advocate and then oppose generous 
benefits? These questions suggest that redistributive processes may be more articulated and 
multi-layered than is usually suggested by conventional rational choice models.
A similar critique can be levelled to the 'class politics' view. This approach was 
particularly ill-suited to interpret transfer policies in Canada where the core-periphery 
cleavage was still the dominant political conflict. Welfare spending in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s appeared to redress long-lasting imbalances between rich and poor provinces, 
rather than between rich and poor income groups. Generous family allowances clearly 
benefitted a greater proportion of the population in the Atlantic regions and in Quebec where 
poverty rates were higher.
Interestingly, the salience of the class cleavage in Canada emerged as a result of 
interparty competition between 1970 and 1974, when traditional geo-political alignments 
began to fluctuate. Liberal leaders mobilized voters over class issues, advocating the need 
for universal social security to insure low income groups from the risk o f poverty. Vote- 
mobilization aimed at capturing sections of the NDP's electorate by downplaying the core­
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periphery cleavage vis-a-vis the class cleavage.
In Britain, as well, the 'class politics' view was incongruent with the peculiar 
redistribution of income. Transfer policies seemed to encourage electoral coalitions between 
sections of one income class, most notably pensioners, and people in work. The generosity 
o f pension benefits during the first two Conservative terms probably increased the traditional 
concentration o f Conservative voters in the South, where pensioners constituted a sizable 
minority o f the population. Evidence from LIS suggested that at least until 1986 pensioners 
fared better under the Conservative government than under the previous Labour government. 
Horizontal redistribution between unemployed and elderly seemed more consonant with the 
electoral aims of the Conservative 'dries'.
Perhaps the clearest refutation o f the 'class politics view' were Hawke's policy 
initiatives undertaken against low income families. The Labor government passed social 
security legislation which doubtlessly damaged the economic position of some traditional 
Labor supporters. These policies included the abolition of unemployment benefits for those 
aged 16-17, the means testing of family allowances and the asset test for the elderly. Labor's 
attack on targeted groups of the state-dependent population cannot be adequately explained 
in 'class politics' terms.
Evidence from the three countries contributes to general knowledge o f redistributive 
strategies, but it also brings to the fore important questions disguised by demand-driven 
approaches. It indicates that party elites can manipulate transfer policies and societal 
cleavages in order to 'mobilize commitments to particular projects for the future' (Przeworski 
and Sprague, 1986: 9). Vote-mobilization may forge new collective identities among 
disjointed groups. Arguably, the most fundamental criticism o f demand-driven approaches 
of income redistribution is their unidirectional conceptualization o f elite-voter alignments. 
By insisting on exogenous determinants of redistributive policies, they neglect the fact that
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elites may alter the distribution of costs and benefits to mould group identities and to shift 
the boundaries of elite-voter alignments.
7.3 ENDOGENOUS DETERMINANTS: DISTRIBUTIVE ELITES, INTERNAL
CONSTRAINTS AND OPPOSITION EFFECTS
My account has pointed to the role of supply-side factors in the definition of transfer policies. 
By penalizing or favouring selected income groups, redistributive outputs were directed at 
forging new coalitions of voters. Voting behaviour may be unstable because elites are 
searching for new alliances. Social groups may enter or exit electoral coalitions if  
redistributive policies alter their incentives to vote. My account has indicated that the pattern 
of voting sometimes mirrors the direction of transfer policies rather than the other way round, 
as suggested by demand-driven models. In Australia, the asset test on pensioners alienated 
the elderly from the ALP; in Canada expansionary transfer policies appealed to the NDP 
electorate; and in Britain the generosity of pension benefits presumably strengthened the 
support o f pensioners in favour of the Conservative government. Demand-driven models 
overlook the fact that politics often implies the making and breaking of coalitions between 
party elites and voters, and that the plasticity of public opinion lends itself to being moulded 
by the redistribution o f costs and benefits. Thus the importance o f supply-driven explanations 
cannot be understated. They point out that the forces behind income redistribution are 
sparked by the dynamics of policy formation and policy decision.
Although the salience of social cleavages rests on their relevance in the competitive 
struggle for power, the ease with which the electorate can be swayed by party leaders may 
be overstated. To understand the constraints on party leaders I examined the internal 
processes o f the party organization, in particular the way in which distinct social security
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programmes were selected; I also explored how Opposition effects impinged on the internal 
balance o f power. In the following sections I compare the processes within party 
organizations from three angles: the changing boundaries between factions and social 
clienteles, the way power is distributed within the party and, finally. Opposition effects on 
redistributive policies.
7.3.1 Distributive elites and social clienteles
A common feature of demand driven models is that party leaders are assumed to act 
collectively to further their interests, or the interests of their core supporters. This argument 
did not withstand close scrutiny. In the three countries, party leaders pursued conflictual and 
contradictory goals, with some leaders joining pro-welfare alliances and others forming anti­
welfare coalitions. In most cases, social security policies evolved as a compromise between 
actors with heterogeneous preferences, suggesting that the assumption o f preference 
homogeneity embedded in the unitary actor model was unwarranted.
By relaxing the unitary assumption, it was possible to disentangle the links between 
factions and social groups. In Australia, for example, the emphasis placed on means-tested 
benefits by the Labor Right aimed at shaping the party identity so as to secure the support o f 
the business community and market oriented voters. Because left-wingers had traditionally 
represented the interests of welfare recipients, the attack on social security benefits also 
discredited the role of left-wingers as leaders in the eyes of their supporters. Therefore the 
displacement of the Left as dominant faction by the Right paved the way for the introduction 
of stiffer entitlement rules for pension benefits and unemployment compensation. Seen in this 
light, the urge to re-shape the party image was a manifestation o f the internal struggle for 
power and o f the consequent need to re-define elite-voter alignments.
Transfer policies in Britain also reflected shifting coalitions of distributive elites and
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social clienteles. The dries were able to re-apportion redistributive costs and benefits at the 
expense of low income families, who were identified either with the Opposition or with the 
Tory wets. The allocation of cash transfers over the 1980s reflected strategic repositioning 
within the governing party. In fact, it was not until the wets abandoned the internal battle that 
the Conservative government undertook the most radical departure from postwar social 
security policies.
Finally, in Canada, Trudeau's expansionary social security programmes encouraged 
links between members of the pro-welfare faction and voters threatened by unemployment, 
including women, fishermen and teachers. By mobilizing welfare recipients Trudeau 
reinforced his bargaining position with respect to Turner's anti-welfare faction. Strategic 
repositioning of the Trudeauites and Tumites over the 1970s explained why certain social 
categories were either penalized or privileged by the reallocation of costs and benefits. The 
analysis o f intraparty politics threw considerable light on both the expansion of family 
allowances and the contraction of unemployment benefits in the late 1970s.
These findings suggest that the redistributive goals o f governing parties were partly 
the outcome of factional efforts to enhance their own position in the internal arena by 
redefining their links with social clienteles. To some degree, of course, transfer policies were 
directed at representing the interests of party members and voters. Generally speaking, parties 
would cease to be such if they did not muster votes. But in the three countries considered in 
this study, cash transfers were unevenly allocated partly because o f changing boundaries 
between coalitions o f distributive elites and social clienteles.
When examining the organizational life of governing parties we see that relaxing the 
unitary assumption increases tremendously the explanatory power o f our analysis. The 
unitary assumption, in fact, prejudges the most interesting question- under what 
circumstances faction leaders develop and actively work towards redistributive goals.
Understanding those circumstances and the effect of those circumstances on the manner in 
which redistributive goals are designed and attained seems to me the central task for anyone 
interested in the impact of governing parties on income inequality.
7.3.2 Internal constraints and possibilities: the distribution of power
Since transfer policies were apparently the outcome of factional games in multiple arenas 
with priority given to internal payoffs, redistributive choices could be fully understood only 
by considering the manner in which power was distributed within the party. In Australia, 
much of Labor's redistributive policies was explicable in terms of the changes introduced by 
the new electoral system for the party delegates at the Annual Conference, and by the 
declining number of unionized members. The shift to proportional representation in 1981 
spawned a national system of faction, marked by the formation of the Centre-Left.
The new electoral system endowed the Centre-Left with veto power to counteract 
Keating's anti-progressive stance. Because the Centre-Left could act as veto player in the 
redistribution of costs and benefits, income inequality in Australia probably grew less fast. 
In addition, the declining number of unionized workers and the rising number o f individual 
members yielded a growing asymmetry in organizational strength between the ACTU and 
the FPLP. This asymmetry strengthened the bargaining position of the FPLP so much so that 
despite a significant drop in real wages the unions refrained from practising an aggressive 
wages policy.
The British Conservative party offered another example of the impact o f the 
distribution o f power on transfer policies. Modifications in the selection and re-selection 
rules for the party leader altered the nature of bargaining games between Conservative elites 
from 'implicit' to 'explicit' games, marked by weaker coordination and potential threats to the 
leadership. During the first term of the Conservative government, explicit games raised
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Thatcher's awareness of the threat to her position and gave some leeway to the wets, thus 
partly explaining Thatcher's concessions in social security spending from 1979 to 1982.
Arguably, however, Thatcher's major strength lay in the tradition of unity and 
cohesion in the Conservative party and in the concentration of decision-making authority in 
the hands o f the leader. The joint impact of internal centralization and the considerable 
margin of freedom conferred by Westminster systems on Prime Ministers, provided Thatcher 
with the requisite autonomy to depart from postwar consensus on social security legislation.
Finally, in the Liberal party of Canada the combination o f a weak bureaucratic 
structure and the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the leader, granted 
Trudeau the flexibility to adjust transfer policies to his advantage. Trudeau enjoyed both the 
freedom to expand transfer policies when external options changed in his favour between 
1972 and 1974, and the readiness to reduce the level of social security benefits in order to 
pre-empt the leadership threat from the Tumites.
Key importance is ascribed to the distribution o f power within governing parties 
because it affects how party leaders adapt and respond to emerging challenges. In devising 
redistributive policies, faction leaders have to consider which proposals jeopardize their 
internal position by preventing them from fostering enduring alliances.
7.3.3 Opposition effects
Cooperation or competition, or lack thereof, in the electoral and legislative arenas altered the 
options available to the bargaining partners, thus impinging on the redistributive output. For 
this reason the incentives for income redistribution in the three countries were intelligible 
only in the light of the internal repercussions of inter-party competition.
We have seen that Opposition effects in Australia afforded Labor Right-wingers with 
a wider set o f feasible policies. Labor's unpopular redistributive strategies carried low risks
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because the Opposition was in a shambles. This situation reduced the incentives for Right­
wingers to reach a compromise with minority factions, explaining why the Left could so 
easily be marginalized when selecting transfer programmes. The pivotal role of the Centre- 
Left, however, meant that an enduring alliance with the Right could only be achieved if 
Right-wingers tempered their antiprogressive policies. Hence the decentralization of power 
within the ALP limited the margin of freedom that weak inter-party competition had 
conferred on Labor Right-wingers.
The interplay between Opposition effects and factional manoeuvring was also evident 
in Britain. Neither the SDP nor the Labour party were able to provide a credible threat to the 
Conservative government. This situation deprived the wets o f fundamental ammunition in 
the struggle for relative dominance in the party organization - namely the electoral weakness 
or defeat o f the leading elite. In contrast to Australia, Opposition effects in Britain were 
reinforced by the centralization of power in the Conservative party. As mentioned above, the 
cohesion and unity of the Conservative leadership hindered internal rivalry. The weakness 
of both internal and external competition explained why the dries were able to radicalize their 
anti-progressive stance and to engage in vote-mobilization by capitalizing on the 
geographical distribution of poverty.
The distinctiveness of the Canadian experience with respect to Australia and Britian 
lies in the role played by electoral competition. The chapter was particularly innovative for 
the insights it threw on the interplay between electoral competition and intra-party 
bargaining. Entrance of the NDP in the electoral arena provided Trudeau with incentives 
to mobilize voters. In turn, the challenge from the left of the political spectrum impinged on 
the outcome of bargaining games between the Liberal pro-welfare and anti-welfare coalitions. 
The chapter illustrates the advantage o f relaxing the unitary assumption by suggesting that 
some puzzling aspects of income redistribution can be explained by focusing on the
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interaction between intra and inter-party competition. As already noted, Trudeau availed 
himself of the opportunities offered by the blackmail potential of the NDP. transforming a 
situation of vulnerability into an advantage for the Liberal pro-welfare alliance. In game- 
theoretic terms, expansionary policies were a dominant strategy in interparty competition: 
irrespective o f the NDP's redistributive choices, expansionary policies were Trudeau's 
optimal strategy because they enabled him to consolidate his position with respect to the 
Tumites; similarly, whatever the choices of the Liberal government, the pursuit o f generous 
benefits was the NDP's optimal strategy to gamer electoral support. Electoral competition 
was thus one of the driving forces o f income redistribution.
When examining the redistributive choices of governing parties along the dimensions 
of faction-voter alignments, the internal distribution of power, and Opposition effects we see 
that sudden u-tums in transfer policies, curious asymmetries in social security benefits, and 
counter-intuitive allocations of burdens to welfare recipients become more intelligible. The 
way in which faction leaders engaged in vote-mobilization, or the way in which they shaped 
the party identity, or the identity of privileged and less privileged groups, was partly a 
function of their freedom to manoeuvre. This freedom, in turn, was explicable in terms of the 
distribution o f power in the party organization and the internal repercussions o f Opposition 
effects.
7.4 RECONCILING IDENTITY AND STRATEGY
One advantage of viewing parties as a political system in miniature is that when party 
behaviour is stripped of all misleading monolithic assumptions, issues of identity and 
strategies of conflict management coexist. This result reconciles some of the core insights of 
political sociology and public choice approaches, providing a more encompassing framework 
of the redistributive impact of parties. In seeking to maximize their position within the party
organization, faction leaders manipulate entitlement and eligibility rules to both mould and 
respond to social identities.
The analytical gains offered by this framework may be grasped by comparing my 
perspective with conventional interpretations of the redistributive impact of parties. Contrary 
to the class politics view endorsed by Hibbs and Dennis (1988), my account suggests that the 
dominant coalition consolidates its position within the party organization not by devising 
redistributive programmes that reflect social identities, but by constructing social identities 
which support and legitimize their dominant position. Thus my account turns the class 
politics view on its head by highlighting the fact that social identities are not given once and 
for all, and by pointing to the independent role of party politics in the apportionment o f costs 
and benefits.
The second difference is that Hibbs and Dennis neglect the pervasiveness of rational, 
self-interested behaviour and are therefore unable to detect non-societal, elite-induced 
cleavages in the redistribution of costs and benefits. In this way the authors fall prey to what 
Wilson defines as the Marxian fallacy, the belief 'that every organization represents the 
underlying objective interests or social condition of its members' (1995: 14). The ALP's 
retrenchment o f redistributive goals emphasizes the severe limits o f interpretations which 
discard elite-initiated redistributive outputs.
I examined the role of within-elites cleavages both in the light of established rational 
choice explanations and by focusing on intraparty bargaining processes. The picture that 
emerged indicated that conventional views left many empirical anomalies unaddressed. We 
have seen that there was insufficient evidence to support either the median voter hypothesis 
or the political business cycle. Concentrating on the internal arena pointed out that intra-elite 
conflicts influenced the way in which redistributive goals would be sought. Contrary to 
established rational choice models, my account lends support to the view that party leaders
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are sometimes constrained in their redistributive options by the demands of party members 
and voters.
For instance, Thatcher’s appeal to the party rank-and-file and the successful campaign 
for membership recruitment signalled to the wets that Conservative activists wanted a radical 
change from previous redistributive policies. Although Thatcher was the leader of a minority 
elite, her popularity among Conservative members and their readiness to identify with 
Thatcherite policies, assuaged the wets' internal opposition. Hence questions o f identity 
intertwined with strategic interactions.
In Australia, the formation of the Centre-Left faction was seemingly directed at 
guarding Labor's identity as a party concerned with redistributive issues. By exploiting its 
pivotal role the Centre-Left aimed at allaying the economic burden on traditional Labor 
supporters by withholding, for instance, its support from Keating's consumption tax. 
Strategies o f conflict management and issues of identity again overlapped. Mixed interests 
surfaced in the relationship between trade unions and FPLP. Despite Hawke's efforts to 
appeal to market oriented voters, and despite the declining organizational strength o f trade 
unions, the long-standing identity of the ALP as the 'party of workers' was guarded by 
Labor's commitment to a policy of full employment. In Canada, by contrast, the role of party 
members was less relevant, primarily because party organizations were less developed there. 
Yet the coexistence of identity and instrumental rationality was evident at the level of inter­
party competition. The appeal of the Liberals to NDP's supporters involved re-shaping the 
party identity as the party of the vulnerable and the poor. In Pizzomo's terms (1983), 
collective or purposeful incentives were a key element in Trudeau's redistributive 
programmes. But instrumental rationality was also at work in Trudeau's attempt to 
outmanoeuvre Turner.
Another significant difference between conventional rational choice models and my
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perspective is the time dimension. I applied a two-stage analytical framework, which first 
considered the historical pre-conditions of factional manoeuvring and then examined the 
choice situation. Rational choice theorists typically analyse 'snapshots' o f the redistributive 
process. In most cases, my account indicated that the driving forces behind income 
redistribution could not be fully understood by glimpsing a single instant, and that historical 
reconstructions were necessary to understand how the bargaining partners found themselves 
in that particular situation.
Furthermore, while the identification o f factions and tendencies may be difficult in 
comparative analyses (Janda and Harmel, 1993), my study points out that historical 
reconstructions throw considerable insight on internal divisions. This finding is consistent 
with theoretical progress in economic institutionalism, which highlights the role o f historical 
developments in narrowing the choice-set of institutional actors and in linking the stages of 
the decision-making process through time (North, 1990: 112-115).
7.5 FORMATION, CONSOLIDATION AND THE DEMISE OF PARTY FACTIONS: 
REASSESSING THE PARTY-POLICY LINK
Three propositions can be derived from the historical reconstructions of factional politics and 
income redistribution in the three countries. First, new social security programmes are often 
sparked by the formation o f party factions. Emerging factions need supporters - party 
members and voters - to legitimize their struggle for internal power. Since redistributive 
policies raise issues of identity, it follows that new redistributive programmes may forge new 
social identities. This statement is substantiated by evidence from the three countries.
In Canada, the evolution o f the Left-wing faction led by Gordon in the early 1960s 
confronted the business and financial community, which had traditionally backed the Liberal 
anti-welfare coalition. The distinct aspect of the new faction was its progressive redistributive
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policy and the wish to protect the economic welfare of the vulnerable people. The emergence 
of the new faction involved a re-examination of the redistributive goals o f the Liberal party.
In a similar vein, but with opposite effects, in Britain the real break with post-war 
consensus was marked by the anti-egalitarian drive of the dries. We have seen that the 
formation o f the internal coalition led by Joseph and Thatcher in the mid-1970s was 
intimately connected to questions o f income inequality, and the redefinition o f social 
identities through the stigmatization of the categories in need. Finally, in Australia the 
development o f the Centre-Left faction was anchored to the defence o f income redistribution. 
Although this programme reflected traditional Labor concerns, it corroborates my hypothesis 
that redistributive policies are an integral part of factional development for their close 
association with issues of identity.
The second proposition is that the consolidation o f specific factions as dominant 
intraparty elites sparks the re-shaping o f the party identity. The fact that the party 
organization acquires a new image testifies to the end of an era and to the success of those 
'new faces' holding positions of responsibility in the internal hierarchy. In Australia, the 
Hawke-Keating partnership aimed at recasting Labor as the party of fiscal responsibility and 
wealth production against the Left's legacy of profligacy and redistribution. Right-wingers 
appeared more concerned with establishing a new party identity in order to estrange internal, 
rather than external, rivals. In Britain, most authors agree that Thatcher's appeal to 
monetarism was not entirely guided by economic reasons, and that reshaping the party image 
was just as important (Deakin, 1987: Gamble. 1988: 100). Throwing the burden of fiscal 
restraint on the shoulders of'scroungers’ was also instrumental to internal disputes and to the 
forging of symbols for re-constructing the party image. In Canada, Trudeau's consolidation 
at the top o f the Liberal party in the early 1970s was followed by generous cash transfers 
aimed at moulding the Liberal identity as the party of the less privileged people.
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The third proposition is that the demise of party factions brings about a radicalization 
o f  redistributive programmes if interparty competition is ineffective. Unconstrained by 
internal and external credible threats the dominant coalition enjoys ample margins of 
manoeuvre to undertake radical departures from previous redistributive commitments. 
Evidence from Australia and Britain suggests that the demise o f Left-wing factions and the 
rise o f Right-wing factions reinforced antiprogressive measures, irrespective o f the location 
o f  the governing party on the ideological continuum. Hawke penalized the core supporters 
o f  the defeated faction and at the same time mobilized voters to sustain the new dominant 
coalition. Thus contra Bobbio (1994) even Left-wing parties may opt for anti-progressive 
policies in the pursuit o f myopic self-interest. Because social identities are malleable, albeit 
within limits, factional conflicts can ignite social conflicts. For this reason focusing on the 
formation, consolidation and demise of party factions sheds considerable light on the 
development and selection of redistributive programmes, enhancing our understanding of the 
driving forces behind income redistribution.
Although I cannot pretend to have offered a theory in any strict sense. I think I have 
offered a theoretical perspective that calls attention to processes that seem to explain a variety 
o f redistributive policies. This perspective is quite different from the more conventional way 
o f examining the redistributive impact of parties - namely by identifying their stated goals 
or their electoral interests. The analysis of strategic interaction within parties is still in its 
infancy, and the development of a rigorous and realistic model o f intraparty politics has 
proved a daunting task' (Laver and Shepsle, 1995). My work, however, suggests that a lot can 
be gained by analysing party politics as a game in multiple arenas (Tsebelis. 1990: 10-12), 
with priority given to internal payoffs.
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7.6 DEMOCRACY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
If the redistributive impact of governing parties reflects the equilibrium solution o f internal 
strife, party leaders may level or exacerbate income differences irrespective of their ideology 
or the distributive demands of their core constituencies. Thus the redistributive impact of 
governing parties is indeterminate. This conclusion begs the question o f whether there is any 
relationship between liberal democracy and the distribution of income. One answer to this 
question may be found in Huntington's book, The Third Wave, which is a study of thirty-nine 
countries undergoing the process of democratization since the Portuguese revolution in 1974. 
Huntington finds that the shape of the income distribution was a crucial factor in the 
establishment o f democratic regimes (1991: 66). Where income was concentrated in the 
hands of the few, such as in the oil-producing Arabic countries, democratic regimes failed 
to survive.
This association between democratic regimes and income distribution reverses the 
direction o f causation between democracy and equality envisaged by scholars in the 1950s 
and 1960s. As I briefly outlined in Chapter Two, in those early works liberal democracy was 
considered a pre-condition for a more equal society; by contrast, Huntington maintains that 
democracy may flourish only where the distribution o f income is not too spread away from 
the middle. 'Democracy is difficult in a situation of concentrated inequalities' (Huntington, 
1991:66).
If  it is true that the spread o f income differences should be relatively small for the 
stability o f liberal democracy, then it is important to be aware of the trends in the 
concentration of wealth and in poverty rates in Western democracies. While information on 
wealth is typically very difficult to assemble, partly because o f the lack of data on capital 
gains, we can observe the trends in poverty rates by drawing upon the LIS datasets. Table 7.1
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Table 7.1 Families poverty rates in 8 OECD countries 1970s-1980s. Adjusted pre/transfer 
income and adjusted post/transfer income (50 percent poverty line).
Country
1970s 1980s
pre-transfer post-
transfer
%change
pre/post
pre-
transfer
post­
transfer
%change
pre/post
NW 8.3 7.3 12. 6.4 4.7 26.5
UK 12.6 9.4 25.4 22.6 19.6 13.3
FR 14.3 11.1 22.4 15.2 12.3 19
AS 15.3 14 8.5 16.8 13.4 20.2
IS 15.4 12.5 18.8 19.2 15.6 18.7
SW 16 11.7 26.4 12.9 8 37.9
US 16.9 16.4 2.9 19.6 19.4 1
CN 17.5 15.3 12.6 18.3 15.8 13.6
Source: computed by the author from LIS
sets out the poverty rates for couples with children in eight OECD countries. It shows that 
between the 1970s and the 1980s the proportion of poor families rose significantly in all eight 
countries, with the exception of Norway and Sweden. The table highlights two aspects of the 
trend towards rising poverty rates. First, between the 1970s and the 1980s pre-transfer 
poverty rates rose dramatically, again with the exception of the Scandinavian countries. This 
result is consistent with previous findings regarding the wider spread of wage differentials. 
As already noted, structural and technological changes have increased the proportion of 
market-income poor, by expanding the secondary labour market of part-time workers and low 
paid jobs.
Table 7.1 also illustrates that post-transfer family poverty rates sharply rose in some 
countries between the 1970s and the 1980s. This result indicates that the disengagement o f 
party leaders from protecting the vulnerable by espousing free-market principles, had serious
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Figure 7.1 Ftercentage change in family poverty rates from adjusted pre-tran^er to adjusted post-tran^er income in 
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Source: computed by the author from LIS
consequences for the standards of living of low income groups. In the light of research 
finding suggesting that poverty is a culture which is transmitted across generations, the 
retrenchment of redistributive policies is alarming for the well-being of future generations 
(O'Neill and Sweetman, 1995).To measure the direct impact of cash transfers on poverty rates 
I have constructed an index based on the percentage change in family poverty rates between 
pre/transfer and post/transfer income. This index is reported in columns three and six of 
Table 7.1. The values illustrate that between the 1970s and the 1980s the index dropped in 
some countries, suggesting that elected representatives had been less capable of
offsetting'Family poverty rates generated by market forces.
/
The stacked-bar graph of Figure 7.1 helps to visualize my measure of the direct 
impact of governing parties on family poverty rates. It is evident that in Sweden, Norway and 
Australia transfer benefits exerted a much stronger impact on poverty rates in the 1980s than 
in the 1970s. The reverse situation occurred in the United Kingdom and in the United States,
■  1970s 
W\ 1980s
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where poverty rates rose dramatically. The growing proportion of family poverty rates in 
some countries perhaps reflected the persistent disengagement o f governing parties from 
insuring citizens against market failures. This attitude exposed the vulnerable to the risk of 
poverty.
As analysts of income distribution in Britain have noted, it is 'a matter o f concern that 
little by little the [social security] system has undergone major changes o f principle without 
any widespread public recognition' (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1988: 125-126). In the light 
o f Huntington's contention that an impoverished population hinders the stability of 
democratic institutions, it may be disquieting that policy-makers fail to reduce family poverty 
rates. It is paradoxical that in the United States and in the United Kingdom where the 
targeting of cash transfers to the'needy' has been advocated with greatest vigour, family 
poverty rates have accelerated.
Against the backdrop of these findings, there seems to be at least two avenues for 
future research. Some political philosophers criticize the inadequacy of conventional policies 
to fight poverty and argue in favour of a basic income, an income unconditionally paid to all 
on an individual basis without means test or work requirement (Baker, 1992:101). Van Parijs 
claims that this is 'a profound reform that belongs in the same league as the abolition of 
slavery or the introduction of universal suffrage' (1992: 7). These works, however, do not 
question the legitimacy of liberal-democratic institutions, and may therefore need to be 
complemented by empirical studies focusing on the incentives for income redistribution in 
liberal democracies.
I have argued that advances in the theory of political parties may shed some light on 
the incentives for generous or stiffer transfer benefits. Viewing parties as political systems 
in miniature may offer considerable insights into the redistributive impact o f electoral and 
factional politics. Future studies on the redistributive impact of parties might benefit from
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rigorous and systematic analyses of intraparty politics, and especially from the development 
o f analytical models focusing on the link between distributive elites and social clienteles.
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Appendix A
THE LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY DATABASE
This appendix contains the technical documentation for the twenty-seven Luxembourg 
Income Study microdata sets used in my research. Most of the information presented is 
adapted and summarized from Hackauf and Randell, Introduction to the Report (1990) and 
subsequent updating by the LIS staff in Walferdange, Luxembourg. In total I have used 
twenty-seven datasets for eleven countries. The basic descriptive information on the 
countries and years for which data has been used is presented in Tables A. 1 - A.6.
Table A. 1 The Luxembourg Income Study Datasets
Australia 1981-82 1985-86 1989-1990
Canada 1971 1975 1981
France 1979 1981
Germany 1973 1978 1984
Israel 1979 1986
Italy 1986
Netherlands 1983
Norway 1979 1986
Sweden 1975 1981 1987
United
Kingdom
1969 1974 1979 1986
United States 1974 1979 1986
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Table A.2 Survey Reference Years
Country Year Year Year
Australia 1981-82 1985-86 1989-1990
(AS81) (AS85) (AS89)
Canada 1971 1975 1981
(CN71) (CN75) (CN81)
Federal 1973 1978 1984/85
Republic of (GE73) (GE78) (GE84)
Germany
France 1979
(FR79)
1984
(FR84)
Israel 1979
(IS79)
1986
(IS86)
Italy 1986
(IT86)
Netherlands 1983
(NL83)
Norway 1979
(NW79)
1986
(NW86)
Sweden 1975 1981 1987
(SW75) (SW81) (SW87)
United 1969 1974 1979 1986
Kingdom (UK69) (UK74) (UK79 (UK86)
United States 1974 1979 1986
(US79) (US79) (US86)
269
Table A.3 Survey Name
AS81 1981-82 Income and Housing Survey
AS85 1986 Income Distribution Survey
AS89 1990 Income Distribution Survey
CN71 Survey of Consumer Finances 1971
CN75 Survey of Consumer Finances 1975
CN81 Survey of Consumer Finances 1975
FR79 The French Survey of Income from Income Tax 
1984 (Revenus Fiscaux 1979)
FR84 The French Survey of Income from Income Tax 
1984 (Revenus Fiscaux 1984)
GE73 The 1973 German Transfer Survey 
(Transferumfrage 1973)
GE78 The 1978 German Transfer Survey 
(Transferumfrage 1978)
GE84 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study: Wave 
l/Wave 2
IS79 The Family Expenditure Survey
IS86 The Family Expenditure Survey
IT86 The Bank of Italy Income Survey
NL83 Additional Enquiry on the Use o f (Public) Services
NW79 Income and Property Distribution Survey 1979
NW86 Income and Property Distribution Survey 1986
SW75 Income Distribution Survey 1975
SW81 Income Distribution Survey 1981
SW87 Income Distribution Survey 1987
UK69 The Family Expenditure Survey 1969
UK74 The Family Expenditure Survey 1974
UK79 The Family Expenditure Survey 1979
UK86 The Family Expenditure Survey 1986
US74 March Current Population Survey 1975
US79 March Current Population Survey 1980
US86 March Current Population Survey 1987
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Table A.4 Sponsorship of the Survev*
AS81 National Budset
AS85 National Budaet
AS89 National Budeet
CN71 Statistics Canada
CN75 Statistics Canada
CN81 Statistics Canada
FR79 Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques
FR84 Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques
GE73 German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsge- 
meinschaft). (DFG)
GE78 German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsge- 
meinschaft). (DFG)
GE84 German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsge- 
meinschaft). (DFG)
IS79 Israeli Central Bureau o f Statistics (CBS)
IS86 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
IT86 Banca d'ltalia (Bank o f Italy)
NL83 Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (Social and Cultural 
Planning Office). (SCP)
NW79 SCB. ordinary state budget
NW86 SCB, ordinary state budget
SW75 National Budeet
SW81 National Budeet
SW87 National Budeet
UK69 Department o f Employment and Central Statistical 
Office
UK74 Department o f Employment and Central Statistical 
Office
UK79 Department o f Employment and Central Statistical 
Office
UK86 Department o f Emplovment
US74 The Budgets o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics and 
the Bureau o f the Census
US79 The Budgets o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics and 
the Bureau o f the Census
US86 The Budgets o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics and 
the Bureau o f the Census
* Sponsorship o f the survey refers to the organization which is financially responsible for the survey, or which 
oversees its general operation.
271
Table A.5 Administration o f Data Collection*
AS81 The Australian Bureau o f Statistics
AS85 The Australian Bureau o f Statistics
AS89 The Australian Bureau o f Statistics
CN71 Household Surveys Division, Statistics Canada
CN75 Household Surveys Division, Statistics Canada
CN81 Household Surveys Division, Statistics Canada
FR79 Division Revenues, INSEE-DG (Income Tax 
Administration)
FR84 Division Revenues, INSEE-DG (Income Tax 
Administration)
GE73 Special Collaborative Program 3 (Sfb 3)
GE78 Special Collaborative Program 3 (Sfb 3)
GE84 Special Collaborative Program 3 (Sfb 3) and Deutsches 
Institut fur Wirtshaftsforschung
IS79 Isreali Central Bureau o f Statistics
IS86 Isreali Central Bureau o f Statistics
IT86 AGB Italia SPA
NL83 Sociaal en Cultured Planbureau (Social and Cultural 
Planning Office), (SCP)
NW79 Central Bureau of Statistics
NW86 Central Bureau o f Statistics
SW75 Statistika Centralbyran, (SCB)
SW81 Statistika Centralbyran, (SCB)
SW87 Statistika Centralbyran, (SCB)
UK69 Social Survey Division o f the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys
UK74 Social Survey Division o f the Office o f Population 
Censuses and Surveys
UK79 Social Survey Division o f the Office o f Population 
Censuses and Surveys
UK86 Department o f Employment
US74 Bureau o f the Census, Demographic Survey
US79 Bureau o f the Census, Demographic Survey
US86 Bureau o f the Census, Demographic Survey
* Administration o f data collection refers to the organization which is responsible for the sample design, interviewing and 
other fieldwork.
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Table A.6 Primarv Objective o f the Survev’
AS81 Measurement o f personal and household income 
distributions and nousing costs.
AS85 Measurement o f personal and household income 
distributions and housing costs.
AS89 Measurement o f personal and household income 
distributions and housing costs.
CN71 To measure the composition, earnings levels, and 
distribution o f income in Canada
CN75 To measure the composition, earnings levels, and 
distribution o f income in Canada
CN81 To measure the composition, earnings levels, and 
distribution o f income in Canada
FR79 Measurement o f household income distribution
FR84 Measurement o f household income distribution
GE73 Microanalyses o f the distribution and redistribution of 
income and monetary transfers
GE78 Microanalyses o f the distribution and redistribution o f 
income and monetary transfers
GE84 Provide information on the dynamics o f individual 
welfare
IS79 Determine the 'weights' o f the consumer price index 
basket
IS86 Determine the 'w eights' o f the consumer price index 
basket
IT86 Provide information on the economic behavior of 
families
NL83 To measure income, household composition, and the 
use o f public services
NW79 Provide information about the structure and 
distribution of income and property
NW86 Provide information about the structure and 
distribution o f income and property
SW75 To measure income distribution
SW81 To measure income distribution
SW87 To measure income distribution
UK69 Provide information on spending patterns for the 
United Kingdom Retail Prices Index
UK74 Provide information on spending patterns for the 
United Kingdom Retail Prices Index
UK79 Provide information on spending patterns for the 
United Kingdom Retail Prices Index
UK86 Provide information on spending patterns for the 
United Kingdom Retail Prices Index
US74
US79
US86
To provide estimates o f employment, unemployment, 
ana other characteristics o f  the labor force.
* Primary objective o f the survey refers to the main purpose for which the data was collected.
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Population and sample size, sampling methods
Table A.7 Sampling Frame’
AS81 Block sampling within Census collector's 
districts
AS85 Block sampling within Census collector's 
districts
AS89 Block sampling within Census collector's 
districts
CN71 Address list of all private dwellings
CN75 Address list of all private dwellings
CN81 Address list of all private dwellings
FR79 Census list of housing units
FR84 Census list of housing units
GE73 Electoral registers
GE78 Electoral registers
GE84 Electoral registers
IS79 Census Population Survey
1S86 Census Population Survey
IT86 General Population Register
NL83 Post Office address list of private households
NW79 Central Population Register
NW86 Central Population Register
SW75 Taxation Register
SW81 Taxation Register
SW87 Taxation Register
UK69 Electoral registers
UK74 Electoral registers
UK79 Electoral registers
UK86 Post office address lists
US74 Address lists of Census
US79 Address lists of Census
US86 Address lists of Census
’ For those surveys which utilized a multi-stage sample design, only the final stage sampling frame 
is listed in this table.
274
Table A.8 Sample Design
AS81 A multi-stage sample of private and non-private 
dwellings, stratified by region.
AS85 A multi-stage sample of privaie and non-private 
dwellings, stratified bv region.
AS89 A multi-stage sample of private and non-private 
dwellings, stratified by region.
CN71 Stratified cluster probability sample
CN75 Stratified cluster probability sample
CN81 Stratified cluster probability sample
FR79 A random sample of ordinarv households, 
stratified by region, head of household 
occupation, and size of the household in the 1975 
census.
FR84 A random sample of ordinarv households, 
stratified by region, head of household 
occupation, and size of the household in the 1982 
census.
GE73 Stratified sample (ADM-concept)
GE78 Stratified sample (.ADM-concept)
GE84 Two stage stratified sample design
IS79 Two stage stratified sample design
IS86 Two stage stratified sample design
IT86 Three stage stratified sample design
NL83 Random sample
NW79 Two stage sample design
NW86 Two stage sample design
SW75 Four stage stratified sample design
SW81 Four stage stratified sample design
SW87 Four stage stratified sample design
UK69 Four stage stratified sample design
UK74 Four stage stratified sample design
UK79 Four stage stratified sample design
UK86 Four stage stratified sample design
US74 Multistage stratified probability sample
US79 Multistage stratified probability sample
US86 Multistage stratified probability sample
Table A.9 Primarv Collection Unit'
Households Families Individuals
AS81 X
AS85 X
AS 8 9 X
CN71 X
CN75 X
CN81 X
FR79 X
FR84 X
GE73 X
GE78 X
GE84 X
IS79 X
IS86 X
IT86 X
NL83 X
NW79 X
NW86 X
SW75 X
SW81 X
SW87 X
UK69 X
UK74 X
UK79 X
UK86 X
US79 X
US79 X
US86 X
* Primary collection unit refers to the unit which the survey was designed to measure.
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Table A. 10 Population Coverage*
AS81 Australian non-institutionalized population
AS85 Australian non-institutionalized population
AS89 Australian non-institutionalized population
CN71 Canadian non-institutionalized population
CN75 Canadian non-institutionalized population
CN81 Canadian non-institutionalized population
FR79 French non-institutionalized population.
FR84 French non-institutionalized population.
GE73 German civilian non-institutionalized population.
GE78 German civilian non-institutionalized population.
GE84 German civilian non-institutionalized population
IS79 All private households
IS86 All private households
IT86 Italian civilian non-institutionalized population.
NL83 Dutch civilian population-
NW79 Norwegian non-institutionalized population.
NW86 Norwegian non-institutionalized population.
SW75 Swedish non-institutionalized population
SW81 Swedish non-institutionalized population
SW87 Swedish non-institutionalized population
UK.69 All private households
UK74 All private households
UK79 All private households
UK86 All private households
US74 American non-institutionalized population
US79 American non-institutionalized population
US86 American non-institutionalized population
* In each survey certain segments of the population were excluded either at the level of the sample design, or 
during the fieldwork. This table only describes the general population which the survey was designed to cover.
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Table A. 11 Number of Survey Units Available
Number of Survey Units in Country 
Data
Number of Survey Units in LIS Data 
Base
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
AS81 16,225 5,760,896 15,985
AS85 8,867 6,181,151 8,014
AS89 15,879 15,879
CN71 15,136 15,136
CN75 26,569 26,569
CN81 87,837 20,267,000 11,960
FR79 11,044 _ 11,044 __
FR84 33,134 _ 33,134 _
GE73 2,900 23,000 2,700*
GE78 2,975 23,075 2,727* „
GE84 5,174 25,753 5,174
IS79 2,271 2,271
IS86 5,000 5,000
IT86 8,022 _ 8,022
NL83 4,833 5,797,000 4,833
NW79 9,366 4,210,000 9,366 —
NW86 9,366 4,210,000 9,366
SW75 9,625 9,625
SW81 9,625 9,625
SW87 9,421 8,200,000 9,421
UK69 7,005 7,005 __
UK74 6,035 6,035
UK79 6,777 6,777
UK86 7.045 7,045 „
US74 68,500 .. . 15,225
US79 68,500 15,225
US86 62,000 89,473 11,614
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Table A. 12 Response Rates
AS81 93.6%
AS85 94.1%
AS89 94.3%
CN71 93.0%
CN75 93.3%
CN81 90.3%
FR79 Not applicable (based on tax file documents)
FR84 Not applicable (based on tax file documents)
GE81 69.6%
GE84 SOEP Wave 1: 61.7%; SOEP Wave 2: 88.9%
IS79 77.7%
IS86 77.0%
IT86 61.4%
NL83 56.9%
NW79 75.0%
NW86 75.0%
SW75 86.9%
SW81 86.9%
SW87 86.1%
UK69 70%
UK74 68%
UK79 67%
UK86 69%
US74 95% to 96.5%
US79 95% to 96.5%
US86 95% to 96.5%
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Table A. 13 Geographic Areas Excluded from Sampie Design
AS81 None
AS85 None
AS89 None
CN71 Native American Reserves, and the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories
CN75 Native American Reserves, and the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories
CN81 Native American Reserves, and the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories
FR79 The non-metropolitan departements of Reunion, 
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyane.
FR84 The non-metropolitan departements of Reunion, 
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyane.
GE73 None
GE78 None
GE84 None
IS79 Rural areas and non-Jewish residents of Judea 
and Samaria
IS86 Rural areas and non-Jewish residents of Judea 
and Samaria
IT86 None
NL83 None
NW79 None
NW86 None
SW75 None
SW81 None
SW87 None
UK69
UK74
UK79
UK86
The Isles of Scilly, and three Scottish districts 
(Orkney, Shetland and W estern Isles) and the 
island parts of Cunninghame, Argyll and Bute, 
Lochabar and Skye and Lochalsh districts.
UK86 None
US74 None
US79 None
US86 None
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Data collection and acquisition
Table A. 14 Reference Person
AS81
AS85
AS89
The head of the main income unit in the main 
family in the household (husband if a couple)
CN71
CN75
CN81
Economic family head
FR79
FR84
The head is the male adult, if there is one family. 
If there is more than one family, the head is the 
oldest working person, or the oldest person when 
no household member is working.
GE73
GE78
The household head was interviewed and 
provided
information for all household members.
GE84 A single person, usually the head of the 
household, responds to general questions 
regarding the household as a whole and the 
dwelling in particular.
IS79
IS86
A single person, usually the housewife responds 
to general questions regarding the household as a 
whole
IT86 Household head. Usually the husband or father, 
but if abroad or in another region of Italy 
household head is the person who is economically 
responsible for the family.
NL83 The household head was identified by the 
respondent. That person should be over 18 years. 
If the respondent refused (or argued) the 
interviewer suggested the rent payer, home 
owner, the person with the highest income, or the 
oldest person.
NW79 The household head was identified by the Central 
Population register.
NW86 The household head was identified by the Central 
Population register.
SW75
SW81
SW87
Household head and all members of household.
UK69
UK74
UK79
UK86
Household head
US74
US79
US86
Individual basis for all reference persons age 15 
and over.
* The reference person is the person who at the time of the interview is identified as the main interview 
respondent, and to whom the relationship of all other respondents or 
household or family members are defined.
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Table A. 14 Data Collection Instruments*
AS81 1. Personal interview (i.e a schedule for each
AS85
AS89
individual)
CN71
CN75
CN81
1. Income schedule
FR79 1. Questionnaire on demographic structure
2. Questionnaire for each fiscal unitFR84
GE73
GE74
1. Questionnaire
GE84 1. Household head schedule
2. Schedule for each individual over 16
3. Schedule for foreigners
4. Address record
IS79 1. Diary Record Book
IS86 2. Questionnaire
IT86 1. Household head schedule
2. Schedule for other income recipients
NL83 1. Household schedule
2. Schedule for each household member over 6 
[short questionnaire for individuals 6-17 years; 
long questionnaire for individuals over 18 years)
NW79 1. Questionnaire
NW86 1. Questionnaire
SW75 1. Questionnaire
SW81 1. Questionnaire
SW87 1. Questionnaire
UK69 1. Household schedule
2. Income schedule
3. Diary record book
UK74 1. Household schedule
2. Income schedule
3. Diary record book
UK79 1. Household schedule
2. Income schedule
3. Diary record book
4. Credit card sheet
UK86 1. Household schedule
2. Income schedule
3. Diary record book
4. Credit card sheet
US74 1. Questionnaire on current labor force
2. Questionnaire about income and work 
experience
US79 1. Questionnaire on current labor force
2. Questionnaire about income and work 
experience
US86 1. Questionnaire on current labor force
2. Questionnaire about income and work 
experience
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Table A. 16 Respondents*
AS81 All household members aged 14 and over.
AS85 All household members aged 15 and over.
AS89 All household members ased 15 and over.
CN71 All household members ased 15 and over
CN75 All household members aged 15 and over
CN81 All household members aged 15 and over
FR79 All households with taxpayers
FR84 All households with taxpayers
GE73 All household members over 16 years of age
GE78 All household members over 16 years of age
GE84 All household members over 16 years of age
IS79 All household memebrs over 15 years of age
IS86 All household memebrs over 15 years of age
IT86 Household head and all income recipients
NL83 All household members over 6 years of age
NW79 All household members over 15 years of age
NW86 All household members over 15 years of age
SW75 All households with tax payers
SW81 All households with tax payers
SW87 All households with tax payers
UK69 All household members over 15 vears of aae
UK74 All household members over 15 years of age
UK79 All household members over 16 years of age
UK86 All household members over 16 years of age
US74 All household members over 15 years of age
US79 All household members over 15 years of age
US86 All household members over 15 vears of age
’ This refers to all individuals who were eligible or asked to complete a survey instrument.
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Table A. 17 Criteria for Data Base Inclusion
AS81 Completed schedules (or imputation of missing 
values possible) for all persons.
AS85 Completed schedules (or imputation of missing 
values possible) for all persons.
AS89 Completed schedules (or imputation of missing 
values possible) for all persons.
CN71 Completed interview with at least one household 
member
CN75 Completed interview with at least one household 
member
CN81 Completed interview with at least one household 
member
FR79 Completed schedules by consulting the tax file.
FR84 Completed schedules bv consulting the tax file.
GE73 One household member must participate
GE78 One household member must participate
GE84 Completed questionnaire of household and 
minimum
one completed questionnaire of person.
IT86 Completed schedule for household head
NL83 Completed household questionnaire
NW79 Completed household questionnaire, without 
income data
NW86 Completed household questionnaire, without 
income data
SW75 Completed schedules by consulting the tax file.
SW81 Completed schedules by consulting the tax file.
SW87 Completed schedules by consulting the tax file.
UK69 Completed schedules from all household 
members over 15 years of age
UK74 Completed schedules from all household 
members over 15 years of age
UK79 Completed schedules from all household 
members over 16 years of age
UK86 Completed schedules from all household 
members over 16 years of age
US74 Completed household questionnaire
US79 Completed household questionnaire
US86 Completed household questionnaire
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Weighting procedures
With the exception of the United Kingdom Family Expenditure Surveys for 1969, 1979 and 1986, 
survey weights have been applied to all cases in the European Community member nation surveys in 
the LIS database. Various weighting procedures have been employed in the different surveys; to adjust 
for differing selection probabilities, under-representation of sub-groups in the survey, etc.
Table A. 18 Weighting of Survev Cases*
AS81 Yes
AS85 Yes
AS89 Yes
CN71 Yes
CN85 Yes
CN81 Yes
FR79 Yes
FR84 Yes
GE73 Yes
GE74 Yes
GE78 Yes
IS79 Yes
IS86 Yes
IT86 Yes
NL83 Yes
NW79 Yes
NW86 Yes
SW75 Yes
SW81 Yes
SW87 Yes
UK69 No
UK74 No
UK79 No
UK86 No
US74 Yes
US79 Yes
US86 Yes
Determination of survey unit membership
In each of the surveys different rules are employed in order to determine whether or not any given person is to 
be considered a household member for the purposes of the survey. For example, visitors may be considered 
household members if they are staying at the surveyed household for a pre-determined period of time: or 
children away at boarding school, even though they are not resident in the household at the time of the surv ey, 
may be considered household members.
In addition, differing definitions of what constitutes a "household" or a "family" are employed in each 
of the surveys. The types and availability of information concerning the relationship of the survey unit members 
to each other, and to the survey unit head, may also vary across the different surveys. This information is 
summarized in the tables below.
Table A. 19 Household Definition
AS81 Persons in the same dwelling sharing eating
AS85 facilities
AS89
CN71 ’ Any person or group of persons living in a
CN75 dwelling
CN81
FR79 The household was formed by combining the tax
FR84 returns of all household members.
GE73 Related or unrelated persons living together in
GE78 one housing unit.
GE84
IS79 Group of people who live together most days of
IS86 the week and who have a common budget for
food
IT86 Related persons living together in one housing
unit.
NL83 Persons living and eating together form a
household.
NW79 Househjolds were defined as all people living in
NW86 the
same dwelling and having common board.
SW75 Households were defined as either one adult or
SW81 two
SW87 adults (more than 18 years old) with or without
children (equal or less than 17 years old).
UK69 A person living alone, or a group of people living
UK74 at the same address and having meals prepared
UK79 together, and with common housekeeping.
UK86
US74 Housing unit is the usual place of residence or. if
UK79 for the moment they have no usual place of
US86 residence at the time of the interview.
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Appendix B 
Sam pling e rro r
This appendix discusses the limitations of the LIS datasets and therefore the reliability o f the 
statistics quoted in this study and the inferences which are drawn from them. I have analyzed 
twenty-seven microdata sets are at three different levels: aggregate country statistics, 
disaggregated country statistics and inter-country comparisons over time and at one point in 
time. Each of these levels raises methodological and statistical issues. Because the LIS datasets 
are sample surveys, estimates from them are subject to sampling error. The typical statistics 
which are reported in this study are the percentage o f a country's sample which is in poverty or 
the summary statistics included in the inequality indices. Since the LIS samples are fairly large 
(see Appendix A. Table A. 11) the sample statistics should provide reliable estimates o f the 
population parameters. The disaggregated sample statistics are based on smaller sample size and 
therefore the standard error for those estimates will probably be greater. However, for most sub­
groups o f the population the sample size are sufficient to ensure reasonably reliable estimates.
We would expect there to be some differences between the income distribution produced 
by datasets assembled during different stages of the macro-economic business cycle. As noted 
in Chapter Two, some studies report that income inequality is countercyclical (Blank, 1989). 
Although my findings in the United Kingdom and in Australia suggest that inequality increases 
also during economic recoveries, it is reasonable to assume that recessions exacerbate income 
differences. The fact that the data was collected at different stages o f the cycle in different 
countries may imply that cross-national comparisons of poverty and inequality are biased.
A similar problem is raised by differences in the original definitions of the variables and
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in the purposes o f the surveys. If the surveys are measuring different things this may give rise 
to differences between the income distributions. Moreover, the process of redefinition o f the 
variables undertaken by the LIS staff to achieve comparison between surveys can only be 
partially successful in that it is a comparison ex-post. The surveys were not initially designed for 
purposes o f comparisons and sampling techniques vary considerably, as shown in Appendix A, 
Tables A.7- A. 13. A further complication emerges from the well-known under-reporting of 
income by survey respondents, especially the top income groups often report less income than 
expected from national income data. This is less true of data based on tax file surveys than on 
income or consumption surveys. It is difficult to make any corrections for this under-reporting, 
but the reader should be aware that it exists.
Incomplete coverage is another source of potential bias in the sample statistics. The LIS 
datasets derive from surveys of households and as such do not cover individuals who live in non­
household dwellings such as hospitals, hotels, prisons or who are homeless. These individuals 
would probably fall in the lower tail of the distribution, which means that real poverty rates are 
higher than the measures reported in this study. Sample statistics may be biased if  non-response 
rates are sizable. Single country studies of non-response indicate that the probability o f response 
declines with increasing age of the head of household and with decreasing qualifications o f the 
male head of household (Wilson, 1995). There is a higher non-response rate in households 
without children.
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Appendix C 
Description of variables
Two kinds o f variables are employed in this study, income variables and demographic 
variables. Out of 60 variables available for cross-country and intra-country comparisons I 
have used twenty-nine variables described in Tables C.l and C.3. Table C.2 reports the 
derived variables available for all the datasets analyzed.
Table C. 1. Income Variables
Variable Variable Description
VI Wages and Salary Income
V4 Farm self-employment income
V5 Non-farm self-employment income
V7 Mand. Contributions: Self Employed
V8 Income from Property
V ll Income Tax
V13 Mand. Employee Contributions
V16 Sick Pay
V17 Accident Pay
V18 Disability Pay
V19 Social Retirement Benefits
V20 Child or family Allowance
V21 Unemployment Pay
V22 Maternity Allowances
V23 Military/Veterans' Benefits
V24 Other Social Insurance
V25 Means-Tested Cash Benefits
V26 Near Cash Benefits
V32 Private Pensions
V33 Public Sector pensions
V34 Alimony/Child Support
V35 Other Regular Private Income
V36 Other Cash Income
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Table C.2. Derived variables
SELFI income from self-employment V4+V5
EARNING Earnings VI+V4+V5
PENSIOI Pension Income V32+V33
MEANSI Means-tested income V25+V26
OTHSOCI Other Social Security V16+V17+V18+V22+V23+V24
SOCI Total Social Security V19+V20+V21+OTHSOCI
SOCTRANS Social transfers Total MEANSI+SOCI
PRIVATI Private Income V34+V35
PAYROLL Payroll taxes V7+V13
FI Factor Income EARNINGS+V8
TRANSI Transfer Income SOCI+MEANSI+PRIV ATI
MI Market Income FI+PENSIOI
GI Gross Income MI+TRANSI+V36
DPI Disposable Income GI-V11-PAYROLL
Table C. 3. Demographic variables
variable variable description
D1 Age-head
D3 Sex-head
D7 Geographical indicator
D27 Number of children under 18
LFSHD Head-Labour force status
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Appendix D
The choice of inequality measures
The construction of inequality indices involve choosing certain criteria which may or may 
not be desirable according to personal preferences. There is widespread agreement among 
specialists o f income distribution that inequality measures should satisfy at least three 
principles (Cowell, 1995 ch. 2). The first is known as income scale independence. This 
means that measured inequality should not depend on the size o f total income. If there is a 
proportional increase in income, it can be argued that there has been no essential alteration 
in the income distribution and therefore it is desirable that the value o f the inequality index 
should remain the same.
The second criterium is the principle o f  population. This principle requires that 
inequality should not depend on the number of people in the population. If the number o f 
individuals in a population doubles, from n to 2n and there is the same proportion of the 
population receiving any given income, measured inequality should be the same in the 
population with 2n as in that with n. The two populations should be equally unequal. The 
third requirement is that the inequality index satisfies the principles o f  transfers. A 
hypothetical transfer of income from a rich person to a poor person should reduce measured 
inequality. All the inequality indices I employ in this study satisfy these three criteria.
The decomposition of inequality measure
Some inequality measures do not lend themselves to be broken up in inequality between and 
within groups in the population. The Gini coefficient, for instance, cannot easily be 
decomposed in a way that depends only on group means and population shares. If an index
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is not decomposable, it is possible for inequality in one group to increase and yet aggregate 
inequality to decline. There is, however, a class of measures, known as the generalized 
entropy class, which can disentangle the within-group and between-group inequality 
components. The allocation of inequality between and within groups will depend on the value 
of the inequality aversion parameter. The generalized entropy index with 0=5 adopted in this 
study also satisfies the independence property. As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are 
relatively few inequality measures that will allow a convenient breakdown by component of 
income. The coefficient of variation, however, can be handled relatively easily, although we 
should keep in mind that it is a top sensitive measure and therefore will emphasize inequality 
changes for the top-income group.
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